claim of governmental privilege in California

2000Instead, Evidence Code section 1040, the official information privilege, “ ‘represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy. ’ ” (Shepherd v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 123 , some italics added; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 539-540 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ].) Evidence Code section 1040 provides in pertinent part, “(a) As used in this section, ‘official information’ means information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the course of his or her duty and no

2000Instead, Evidence Code section 1040, the official information privilege, “ ‘represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy. ’ ” (Shepherd v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 123 , some italics added; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 539-540 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ].) Evidence Code section 1040 provides in pertinent part, “(a) As used in this section, ‘official information’ means information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the course of his or her duty and no

2020"Section 1040 of the Evidence Code 24 'represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy.' " (Shepherd, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 123 , fn. omitted.) Official information, for purposes of the privilege, means "information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the course of his or her duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to the public prior to the time the claim of privilege is made." (Evid.

2020"Section 1040 of the Evidence Code 24 'represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy.' " (Shepherd, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 123 , fn. omitted.) Official information, for purposes of the privilege, means "information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the course of his or her duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to the public prior to the time the claim of privilege is made." (Evid.

1988Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a), in turn, codifies the due process demand recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the prosecution cannot commence criminal proceedings ‘and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his [or her] defense.’ (United States v. Reynolds (1953) ... 345 U.S. 1, 12 [ 97 L.Ed. 727 , 73 S.Ct. 528 , 32 A.L.R.2d 382 ]; [citations].) In concert, the two provisions create an orderly and fair procedure designed to safeguard the legitimate interests of both the government and criminal defendants.

1988Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a), in turn, codifies the due process demand recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the prosecution cannot commence criminal proceedings ‘and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his [or her] defense.’ (United States v. Reynolds (1953) ... 345 U.S. 1, 12 [ 97 L.Ed. 727 , 73 S.Ct. 528 , 32 A.L.R.2d 382 ]; [citations].) In concert, the two provisions create an orderly and fair procedure designed to safeguard the legitimate interests of both the government and criminal defendants.

2001In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Montgomery (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1017 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 779 ].) In Shepherd v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 107 , the Supreme Court made clear that a public entity can withhold information as privileged under section 1040(b)(2) “only upon a finding that... its disclosure would be ‘against the public interest.’ ” (Id. at p. 125.) The court stated, “[T]his determination requires

2001In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Montgomery (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1017 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 779 ].) In Shepherd v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 107 , the Supreme Court made clear that a public entity can withhold information as privileged under section 1040(b)(2) “only upon a finding that... its disclosure would be ‘against the public interest.’ ” (Id. at p. 125.) The court stated, “[T]his determination requires

2000In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.” *1126 The official information privilege in Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), is expressly conditional, not absolute. 1 If the public entity satisfies the threshold burden of showing that the information was acquired in confidence, the statute requires the court next to weigh the interests and to sustain the privilege only if “ ‘there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the infor

2000In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.” *1126 The official information privilege in Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), is expressly conditional, not absolute. 1 If the public entity satisfies the threshold burden of showing that the information was acquired in confidence, the statute requires the court next to weigh the interests and to sustain the privilege only if “ ‘there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the infor

2000In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.” *1126 The official information privilege in Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), is expressly conditional, not absolute. 1 If the public entity satisfies the threshold burden of showing that the information was acquired in confidence, the statute requires the court next to weigh the interests and to sustain the privilege only if “ ‘there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the infor

2000In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.” *1126 The official information privilege in Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), is expressly conditional, not absolute. 1 If the public entity satisfies the threshold burden of showing that the information was acquired in confidence, the statute requires the court next to weigh the interests and to sustain the privilege only if “ ‘there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the infor

2000In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.” *1126 The official information privilege in Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), is expressly conditional, not absolute. 1 If the public entity satisfies the threshold burden of showing that the information was acquired in confidence, the statute requires the court next to weigh the interests and to sustain the privilege only if “ ‘there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the infor

2000In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered.” *1126 The official information privilege in Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), is expressly conditional, not absolute. 1 If the public entity satisfies the threshold burden of showing that the information was acquired in confidence, the statute requires the court next to weigh the interests and to sustain the privilege only if “ ‘there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the infor

1988Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a), in turn, codifies the due process demand recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the prosecution cannot commence criminal proceedings ‘and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his [or her] defense.’ (United States v. Reynolds (1953) ... 345 U.S. 1, 12 [ 97 L.Ed. 727 , 73 S.Ct. 528 , 32 A.L.R.2d 382 ]; [citations].) In concert, the two provisions create an orderly and fair procedure designed to safeguard the legitimate interests of both the government and criminal defendants.

1988Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a), in turn, codifies the due process demand recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the prosecution cannot commence criminal proceedings ‘and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his [or her] defense.’ (United States v. Reynolds (1953) ... 345 U.S. 1, 12 [ 97 L.Ed. 727 , 73 S.Ct. 528 , 32 A.L.R.2d 382 ]; [citations].) In concert, the two provisions create an orderly and fair procedure designed to safeguard the legitimate interests of both the government and criminal defendants.

1974Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a), in turn, codifies the due process demand recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the prosecution cannot commence criminal proceedings “and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.” 6 (United States v. Reynolds (1953) supra, 345 U.S. 1, 12 ; also see Jencks v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 657, 672 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 1103, 1114 , 77 S.Ct. 1007 ]; Roviaro v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 644-645 , 77 S.Ct. 623 ].) In concert, the two provisions cre

1974Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a), in turn, codifies the due process demand recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the prosecution cannot commence criminal proceedings “and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.” 6 (United States v. Reynolds (1953) supra, 345 U.S. 1, 12 ; also see Jencks v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 657, 672 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 1103, 1114 , 77 S.Ct. 1007 ]; Roviaro v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 644-645 , 77 S.Ct. 623 ].) In concert, the two provisions cre

1974Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a), in turn, codifies the due process demand recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the prosecution cannot commence criminal proceedings “and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.” 6 (United States v. Reynolds (1953) supra, 345 U.S. 1, 12 ; also see Jencks v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 657, 672 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 1103, 1114 , 77 S.Ct. 1007 ]; Roviaro v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 644-645 , 77 S.Ct. 623 ].) In concert, the two provisions cre

1974Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (a), in turn, codifies the due process demand recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the prosecution cannot commence criminal proceedings “and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.” 6 (United States v. Reynolds (1953) supra, 345 U.S. 1, 12 ; also see Jencks v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 657, 672 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 1103, 1114 , 77 S.Ct. 1007 ]; Roviaro v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 [ 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 644-645 , 77 S.Ct. 623 ].) In concert, the two provisions cre