dedication requirement in California

2021The City of Escondido (City) sought to acquire by condemnation from Owners a 72-foot-wide strip of land (the strip) across a mostly undeveloped 17.72-acre parcel (the Property) to join two disconnected segments of Citracado Parkway, a major road that runs through portions of the City’s industrial areas on either side of the Property.1 The City argued below that the strip should be valued under the Porterville doctrine (City of Porterville v. Young (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1260 (Porterville)), which values condemned property at its undeveloped state (here, about $50,000) when the condemning agency

2021(Stamper, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 600 .) These cases hold that a dedication requirement “must have an ‘essential nexus’ to the valid public purpose that would be served by denying the development permit outright and must be ‘ “rough[ly] proportion[al]” ’ to ‘the impact of the proposed development’ at 17 issue.” (Stamper, at p. 585; see Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 837 ; Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 390-391.) “No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the

1985(Asso ciated Home Builders, etc., Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1971) 4 Cal.3d 633, 638-640 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 484 P.2d 606 , 43 A.L.R.3d 847 ]; Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 678, 699 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 395 ].) However, there are limitations on the government’s power to require a dedication.

1977We do not find in Ayres support for the principle urged by Associated that a dedication requirement may be upheld only if the particular subdivision creates the need for dedication.” ( 4 Cal.3d at p. 638 .) So here the subdivider was in effect caught in a rezoning which, although, cast as a moratorium, was designed to permit development *754 which was consistent with the plan to be devised.

2021The City of Escondido (City) sought to acquire by condemnation from Owners a 72-foot-wide strip of land (the strip) across a mostly undeveloped 17.72-acre parcel (the Property) to join two disconnected segments of Citracado Parkway, a major road that runs through portions of the City’s industrial areas on either side of the Property.1 The City argued below that the strip should be valued under the Porterville doctrine (City of Porterville v. Young (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1260 (Porterville)), which values condemned property at its undeveloped state (here, about $50,000) when the condemning agency

2021(Stamper, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 600 .) These cases hold that a dedication requirement “must have an ‘essential nexus’ to the valid public purpose that would be served by denying the development permit outright and must be ‘ “rough[ly] proportion[al]” ’ to ‘the impact of the proposed development’ at 17 issue.” (Stamper, at p. 585; see Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 837 ; Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 390-391.) “No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the

2016Relying on the Court of Appeal decision in City of Hollister v. McCullough (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 289 (Hollister), the Owners contend that the Nollan and Dolan issues are for a jury to decide because they are ―a sub-issue within the larger issue of determining the reasonable probability of a dedication requirement.‖ (See Hollister, at p. 297 [―[P]roof that a conditional dedication is a ‗reasonable probability‘ requires a showing not only that plaintiff would probably have imposed the dedication condition if defendants had sought to develop the property, but also that the proposed dedication req

2016Second, there must be ―a reasonable probability that development of the property would have been conditioned on dedication of the property taken.‖ (Hollister, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 297 ; see State Route 4, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1551 ; Contra Costa County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dist. v. Lone Tree Investments (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 930, 936 (Contra Costa Flood Control); Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1268–1269; City of Fresno, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at pp. 120–121.) In other words, it must be reasonably probable that the condemner would actually impose the dedic

2016Second, there must be ―a reasonable probability that development of the property would have been conditioned on dedication of the property taken.‖ (Hollister, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 297 ; see State Route 4, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1551 ; Contra Costa County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dist. v. Lone Tree Investments (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 930, 936 (Contra Costa Flood Control); Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1268–1269; City of Fresno, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at pp. 120–121.) In other words, it must be reasonably probable that the condemner would actually impose the dedic

2016In State Route 4 Bypass Authority v. Superior Court (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1546 , for example, the joint powers agency formed to facilitate the construction of a new highway instructed its member agencies to condition the grant of any development applications on the dedication of a 110-foot right-of-way ― ‗lying about the centerline of the SR4 Bypass.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 1551.) A city engineer testified that this dedication requirement was designed to facilitate the project and that, in applying 6 the dedication requirement, he ―would not typically take into account any traffic study done in connect

1985Code, § 65909; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 38 [ 207 P.2d 1 , 11 A.L.R.2d 503 ].) Additionally, any government action, including a dedication requirement, which deprives the owner of all reasonable use of his property amounts to a taking of property which must be compensated.

1985Code, § 65909; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 38 [ 207 P.2d 1 , 11 A.L.R.2d 503 ].) Additionally, any government action, including a dedication requirement, which deprives the owner of all reasonable use of his property amounts to a taking of property which must be compensated.

2021Where . . . the issue is predominately one of law, we review it de novo.” (Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538 , 20 1554; see Ali v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 246, 250 .) On our de novo review, we conclude the dedication requirement is constitutional under Nollan and Dolan.

2021A. Legal Principles The measure of value in a condemnation case “is the fair market value of the property taken.” (§ 1263.310; see Stamper, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 598 .) The Porterville doctrine and project effect rule are alternative methods for determining fair market value when the condemned property is (or could become) subject to a dedication requirement. 1.

2021A. Legal Principles The measure of value in a condemnation case “is the fair market value of the property taken.” (§ 1263.310; see Stamper, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 598 .) The Porterville doctrine and project effect rule are alternative methods for determining fair market value when the condemned property is (or could become) subject to a dedication requirement. 1.

2016Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 538 (Lingle), citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 .) When a governmental entity demands that a landowner dedicate a portion of his or her property as a condition of granting a permit to develop the property, there is a ―heightened risk that the purpose [of the dedication requirement] is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.‖ (Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 841 .) ―Under the well-settled doctrine of ‗unconstitutio

2016Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 538 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 876 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 ] (Lingle). citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 868 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 ] and quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 798 , 112 S.Ct. 2886 ].) When a governmental entity demands that a landowner dedicate a portion of his or her property as a condition of granting a permit to develop the property, there is a “heightened risk that the purpose [of the dedication requirement] is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the sta

2016(Woolstenhulme, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 498, fn. 12 ; see also ante, at pp. 16–17 [preliminary legal questions in condemnation actions, even when factual inquiry is required, are for the court].) In this case, the parties do not appear to agree on when it became probable that the 1.66-acre strip would be included in the Indian Avenue northern alignment project, but the trial court did not make any finding on this issue because it believed the project effect rule did not apply at all.

2016Because the date of a property’s probable inclusion within a project is a preliminary factual determination that pertains to the admissibility of evidence regarding valuation, it is for the trial court rather than the jury to determine. ( Woolstenhulme, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 498, fn. 12; see also ante, at p. 596 [preliminary legal questions in condemnation actions, even when factual inquiry is required, are for the court].) In this case, the parties do not appear to agree on when it became probable that the 1.66-acre strip would be included in the Indian Avenue northern alignment project, but

2016Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 538 (Lingle), citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 .) When a governmental entity demands that a landowner dedicate a portion of his or her property as a condition of granting a permit to develop the property, there is a ―heightened risk that the purpose [of the dedication requirement] is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.‖ (Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 841 .) ―Under the well-settled doctrine of ‗unconstitutio

2016Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 538 [ 161 L.Ed.2d 876 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 ] (Lingle). citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 868 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 ] and quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 798 , 112 S.Ct. 2886 ].) When a governmental entity demands that a landowner dedicate a portion of his or her property as a condition of granting a permit to develop the property, there is a “heightened risk that the purpose [of the dedication requirement] is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the sta

2016Partnership (Mo.Ct.App. 1990) 795 S.W.2d 581, 587 [where the dedication requirement would have been constitutional and was reasonably likely to have been imposed, landowners suffer ―no compensable loss‖].) 4 ante, at p. 3.) The extra layer of analysis it purports to add to the Porterville inquiry is as difficult to understand as it is to apply.

2016Partnership (Mo.Ct.App. 1990) 795 S.W.2d 581, 587 [where the dedication requirement would have been constitutional and was reasonably likely to have been imposed, landowners suffer “no compensable loss”].)

2016(Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1022 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 953 P.2d 1188 ] (Landgate).) “This type of objective inquiry is consistent with the principle that courts do not delve into the individual purposes of decisionmakers in a quasi-adjudicative proceeding, but rather look to the findings made by the government agency and determine whether these are based on substantial evidence.” (Ibid.) III.

2016(Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1022 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 953 P.2d 1188 ] (Landgate).) “This type of objective inquiry is consistent with the principle that courts do not delve into the individual purposes of decisionmakers in a quasi-adjudicative proceeding, but rather look to the findings made by the government agency and determine whether these are based on substantial evidence.” (Ibid.) III.

2016Department of Water Resources v. Andresen (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1144, 1154 [testimony regarding the expectations of the parties based on contemporaneous knowledge].) Relevant evidence in this context includes not only facts bearing on when the inclusion of the property became probable, but also the nature and circumstances of the dedication requirement and other evidence bearing on the reasonable expectations of the parties.

2016Dept. of Water Resources v. Andresen (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1144, 1154 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 826 ] [testimony regarding the expectations of the parties based on contemporaneous knowledge].) Relevant evidence in this context includes not only facts bearing on when the inclusion of the property became probable, but also the nature and circumstances of the dedication requirement and other evidence bearing on the reasonable expectations of the parties.

2016Second, there must be ―a reasonable probability that development of the property would have been conditioned on dedication of the property taken.‖ (Hollister, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 297 ; see State Route 4, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1551 ; Contra Costa County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dist. v. Lone Tree Investments (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 930, 936 (Contra Costa Flood Control); Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1268–1269; City of Fresno, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at pp. 120–121.) In other words, it must be reasonably probable that the condemner would actually impose the dedic

2016(See, e.g., Contra Costa Flood Control, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th 930, 932 [public agency expected to obtain the needed land for a flood control channel by requiring property owners to dedicate land as a valid condition of development].) Thus, the Porterville doctrine applies when the evidence establishes that a dedication requirement reflects an agency original expectation that an improvement would occur as a result of development of adjacent properties in order to mitigate the impact of such development.

2016(Accord, Department of Transportation v. Lundberg (1992) 312 Or. 568 [ 825 P.2d 641, 648 ] [upholding the admission of evidence concerning the city’s dedication requirement on the issue of valuation, even though the dedication was adopted after the city and state had decided on a plan to widen the avenue that served as a state highway, and the dedication was enacted to “implement” the project].) What the majority also fails to recognize is that its asserted policy justifications for cutting back on Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1260 , have already been addressed—in Porterville itself.

2016(Accord, Department of Transportation v. Lundberg (1992) 312 Or. 568 [ 825 P.2d 641, 648 ] [upholding the admission of evidence concerning the city’s dedication requirement on the issue of valuation, even though the dedication was adopted after the city and state had decided on a plan to widen the avenue that served as a state highway, and the dedication was enacted to “implement” the project].) What the majority also fails to recognize is that its asserted policy justifications for cutting back on Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1260 , have already been addressed—in Porterville itself.

2016(Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 952, 966 ; id. at pp. 965–967.) When a court applies this intermediate scrutiny, ―[t]he proper inquiry is not into the subjective motive of the government agency, but whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between [the dedication requirement]‖ and the public purpose that would be served by denying the development permit.

2016(Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 952, 966 ; id. at pp. 965–967.) When a court applies this intermediate scrutiny, ―[t]he proper inquiry is not into the subjective motive of the government agency, but whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between [the dedication requirement]‖ and the public purpose that would be served by denying the development permit.

2007Such laws are normally upheld, since “ ‘the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.’ ” (Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558, 579-580 [ 156 L.Ed.2d 508 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.), quoting Cleburne , at p. 440.) In Dolan , the Supreme Court made a special point of distinguishing between the rational basis review and the new “rough proportionality” test that it was defining, observing that the former required only “the minimal level of scrutiny [required] under the Equal Protection Clause.” (Dolan, supr

2007Such laws are normally upheld, since “ ‘the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.’ ” (Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558, 579-580 [ 156 L.Ed.2d 508 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.), quoting Cleburne , at p. 440.) In Dolan , the Supreme Court made a special point of distinguishing between the rational basis review and the new “rough proportionality” test that it was defining, observing that the former required only “the minimal level of scrutiny [required] under the Equal Protection Clause.” (Dolan, supr

2007Under the equal protection clause, a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” (Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439 [ 87 L.Ed.2d 313 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 ].) Generally speaking, laws that distinguish among different categories of *1564 persons, unless based on suspect classifications such as race or gender, are presumed to be valid and will be sustained as long as they are “rationally r

2007Under the equal protection clause, a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” (Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439 [ 87 L.Ed.2d 313 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 ].) Generally speaking, laws that distinguish among different categories of *1564 persons, unless based on suspect classifications such as race or gender, are presumed to be valid and will be sustained as long as they are “rationally r

1989(Remmenga v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 623, 627 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 628 ].) “Conversely, if there is such a rational relationship, the requirement of dedication of property . . . is a validly imposed condition. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Any government action, including a dedication requirement, which deprives the owner of all reasonable use of his property amounts to a taking which must be compensated.

1989(Remmenga v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 623, 627 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 628 ].) “Conversely, if there is such a rational relationship, the requirement of dedication of property . . . is a validly imposed condition. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Any government action, including a dedication requirement, which deprives the owner of all reasonable use of his property amounts to a taking which must be compensated.