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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp 2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp | 2 | 6 |
People v. Maygreen2 sentences2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp 2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp | 1 | 7 |
People v. Lance W.red2 sentences2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp 2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp | 1 | 3 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences1990He concedes the Disbrow rule has been abrogated by California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d) (see People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ]), but notes the crimes in this case occurred before the effective date of that constitutional amendment (see People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 667 P.2d 149 ]), and hence Disbrow applies. 1990He concedes the Disbrow rule has been abrogated by California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d) (see People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ]), but notes the crimes in this case occurred before the effective date of that constitutional amendment (see People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 692 , 667 P.2d 149 ]), and hence Disbrow applies. | 1 | 2 |
James Thomas Cahill v. Ruth Rushen, Director, California Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp 2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp | 1 | 1 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences1990(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) The dispute about the T-shirt simply pales in significance when viewed in the context of Charlene’s entire testimony and the supporting independent evidence of defendant’s role in the crimes. 1990(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) The dispute about the T-shirt simply pales in significance when viewed in the context of Charlene’s entire testimony and the supporting independent evidence of defendant’s role in the crimes. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1985And, by its own terms, Prop. 8 does not affect Evidence Code section 940.” Also, in People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889, 894 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ], the court stated that since Disbrow “is explicitly predicated upon article I, section 15 of the California Constitution it is unaffected by the provisions of article I, section 28(d).” It appears to us that the dispositive cases on the Disbrow issue are Barrios and Clark . 1985And, by its own terms, Prop. 8 does not affect Evidence Code section 940.” Also, in People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889, 894 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ], the court stated that since Disbrow “is explicitly predicated upon article I, section 15 of the California Constitution it is unaffected by the provisions of article I, section 28(d).” It appears to us that the dispositive cases on the Disbrow issue are Barrios and Clark . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Disbrow
red
2 sentences2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp 2000I, § 28, subd. (d)) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for constitutional violations, “ ‘except to the extent the exclusion remains federally compelled.’ ” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 316 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], quoting In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886-887 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ].) May held that, in the wake of Proposition 8, statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda were now admissible for impeachment purposes—directly contrary to the rule articulated in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rp | 3 | 1978–2000 |
Ramona R. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1989That section provides: “To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” ( 44 Cal.3d at p. 317 .) We distinguished our earlier holding in Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ], since that case involved the use of legislatively compelled self-incriminatory statements or testimony, in contrast to statements merely violative of Miranda . 1989That section provides: “To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” ( 44 Cal.3d at p. 317 .) We distinguished our earlier holding in Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ], since that case involved the use of legislatively compelled self-incriminatory statements or testimony, in contrast to statements merely violative of Miranda . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Nash v. United States
green
1 sentence1978To instruct a jury that they are not to consider expressions of complicity in the charged crime as evidence that the speaker in fact committed the charged crime, but only for the purpose of demonstrating that he was probably lying when he denied committing the charged crime, would be to require, in the words of Learned Hand, ‘a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only [the jury’s] power, but anybody else’s.’ (Nash v. United States (2d Cir. 1932) 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 .)” ( Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, 112 .) (Italics in original.) Because the Spencer exclusionary rule that excludes a defendan | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.