Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.green2 sentences2024(See Reynolds, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728 [the excessiveness factors are “(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay”].) This leaves the first and third factors, defendants’ culpability and penalties imposed in similar statutes. 2024(See Reynolds, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728 [the excessiveness factors are “(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay”].) This leaves the first and third factors, defendants’ culpability and penalties imposed in similar statutes. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Braumgreen2 sentences2021(Timbs v. Indiana (2019) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 682, 686-687 , 203 L.Ed.2d 11 ].) 54 disproportionate to the Lents’ violation under the factors in Lockyer and Bajakajian. “‘We review de novo whether a fine is constitutionally excessive and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.’ [Citations.] ‘[F]actual findings made by the [trial court] in conducting the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.’” (Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (Feb. 18, 2021, A153583) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___ [2021 Cal.App.Lexis 24 2021(Timbs v. Indiana (2019) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 682, 686-687 , 203 L.Ed.2d 11 ].) 54 disproportionate to the Lents’ violation under the factors in Lockyer and Bajakajian. “‘We review de novo whether a fine is constitutionally excessive and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.’ [Citations.] ‘[F]actual findings made by the [trial court] in conducting the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.’” (Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (Feb. 18, 2021, A153583) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___ [2021 Cal.App.Lexis 24 | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2015The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.” (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 105.) 16 The residency restrictions of Jessica’s Law meet this standard. 2015The question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.‖ (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 105 .)16 The residency restrictions of Jessica‘s Law meet this standard. | 1 | 1 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2015(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1069 [“The electorate could reasonably conclude . . . .”]; id. at p. 1069, fn. 16, citing FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 314 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 211 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 ].) But the inquiry here focuses on the effects of the statute, not whether there is some “ ‘conceivable basis which might support it.’ ” (Beach Communications, at p. 315.) In stating that “[t]he question is whether the . . . means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective” (Smith, at p. 105), Smith drew no analogy between the excessiveness inquiry and rational basis revi 2015(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1069 [“The electorate could reasonably conclude . . . .”]; id. at p. 1069, fn. 16, citing FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 314 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 211 , 113 S.Ct. 2096 ].) But the inquiry here focuses on the effects of the statute, not whether there is some “ ‘conceivable basis which might support it.’ ” (Beach Communications, at p. 315.) In stating that “[t]he question is whether the . . . means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective” (Smith, at p. 105), Smith drew no analogy between the excessiveness inquiry and rational basis revi | 1 | 1 |
Disorbo v. Hoygreen1 sentence2006(Patterson v. Balsamico (2d Cir. 2006) 440 F.3d 104 , 121-122 (Patterson); Vasbinder v. Scott (2d Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 118, 121 (Vasbinder); DiSorbo v. Hoy, supra, 343 F.3d at p. 189, fn. 9 ; see also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 269-270 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 616 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 ].) Because the punitive damages award was based solely on a federal civil rights claim, we review the excessiveness claim under federal law applicable to punitive damages awards. | 1 | 1 |
Chavez v. Keatgreen2 sentences2006(Chavez v. Keat (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1413-1416 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 ].) Under federal law, a punitive damages award is not dependent on proof of a defendant’s ability to pay (Kemezy v. Peters (7th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 33, 33-34 ; Woods-Drake v. Lundy (5th Cir. 1982) 667 F.2d 1198, 1203, fn. 9 ; Chavez v. Keat, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1410-1411), but if evidence is submitted, it is an important consideration as to the reasonableness of the award. 2006(Chavez v. Keat (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1413-1416 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 ].) Under federal law, a punitive damages award is not dependent on proof of a defendant’s ability to pay (Kemezy v. Peters (7th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 33, 33-34 ; Woods-Drake v. Lundy (5th Cir. 1982) 667 F.2d 1198, 1203, fn. 9 ; Chavez v. Keat, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1410-1411), but if evidence is submitted, it is an important consideration as to the reasonableness of the award. | 1 | 1 |
Christina A. Woods-Drake v. C. L. Lundygreen1 sentence2006(Chavez v. Keat (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1413-1416 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 ].) Under federal law, a punitive damages award is not dependent on proof of a defendant’s ability to pay (Kemezy v. Peters (7th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 33, 33-34 ; Woods-Drake v. Lundy (5th Cir. 1982) 667 F.2d 1198, 1203, fn. 9 ; Chavez v. Keat, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1410-1411), but if evidence is submitted, it is an important consideration as to the reasonableness of the award. | 1 | 1 |
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.green2 sentences2006(Patterson v. Balsamico (2d Cir. 2006) 440 F.3d 104 , 121-122 (Patterson); Vasbinder v. Scott (2d Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 118, 121 (Vasbinder); DiSorbo v. Hoy, supra, 343 F.3d at p. 189, fn. 9 ; see also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 269-270 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 616 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 ].) Because the punitive damages award was based solely on a federal civil rights claim, we review the excessiveness claim under federal law applicable to punitive damages awards. 2006(Patterson v. Balsamico (2d Cir. 2006) 440 F.3d 104 , 121-122 (Patterson); Vasbinder v. Scott (2d Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 118, 121 (Vasbinder); DiSorbo v. Hoy, supra, 343 F.3d at p. 189, fn. 9 ; see also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 269-270 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 616 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 ].) Because the punitive damages award was based solely on a federal civil rights claim, we review the excessiveness claim under federal law applicable to punitive damages awards. | 1 | 1 |
Arnold R. Vasbinder v. Basil Y. Scott and Richard M. Switzergreen1 sentence2006(Patterson v. Balsamico (2d Cir. 2006) 440 F.3d 104 , 121-122 (Patterson); Vasbinder v. Scott (2d Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 118, 121 (Vasbinder); DiSorbo v. Hoy, supra, 343 F.3d at p. 189, fn. 9 ; see also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 269-270 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 616 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 ].) Because the punitive damages award was based solely on a federal civil rights claim, we review the excessiveness claim under federal law applicable to punitive damages awards. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Overstock.com, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022When we consider whether a fine is excessive, “we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and determine de novo whether the fine is excessive.” (Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091 ; Lent v. Cal. Coastal Com. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 812 , 857 [“ ‘ “[F]actual findings made by the [trial court] in conducting the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.” ’ ”].) “To decide whether the fine [is] constitutionally disproportionate, we consider: ‘(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penal 2022When we consider whether a fine is excessive, “we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and determine de novo whether the fine is excessive.” (Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091 ; Lent v. Cal. Coastal Com. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 812 , 857 [“ ‘ “[F]actual findings made by the [trial court] in conducting the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.” ’ ”].) “To decide whether the fine [is] constitutionally disproportionate, we consider: ‘(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penal | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Timbs v. Indiana
green
2 sentences2021(Timbs v. Indiana (2019) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 682, 686-687 , 203 L.Ed.2d 11 ].) 54 disproportionate to the Lents’ violation under the factors in Lockyer and Bajakajian. “‘We review de novo whether a fine is constitutionally excessive and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.’ [Citations.] ‘[F]actual findings made by the [trial court] in conducting the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.’” (Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (Feb. 18, 2021, A153583) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___ [2021 Cal.App.Lexis 24 2021(Timbs v. Indiana (2019) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [ 139 S.Ct. 682, 686-687 , 203 L.Ed.2d 11 ].) 54 disproportionate to the Lents’ violation under the factors in Lockyer and Bajakajian. “‘We review de novo whether a fine is constitutionally excessive and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.’ [Citations.] ‘[F]actual findings made by the [trial court] in conducting the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.’” (Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (Feb. 18, 2021, A153583) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___ [2021 Cal.App.Lexis 24 | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2022Analysis First, of the three analytical techniques identified by the California Supreme Court in reviewing an excessiveness claim, “[t]he main technique of analysis under California law is to consider the nature both of the offense and of the offender. [Citation.]” (People v. Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 494 .) Regarding the offense, we consider it “both in the abstract and in the totality of circumstances surrounding its actual commission” (ibid.), including “ ‘motive, the way it was committed, the extent of the defendant’s involvement, and the consequences of his acts.’ ” (People v. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2022Regarding the offender, we consider “the defendant’s individual culpability, as shown by such factors as age, 63 prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind. [Citations.]” (People v. Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 494 .) The offense of aggravated kidnapping for extortion with bodily injury is punishable by LWOP. (§ 209, subd. (a).) “The Legislature has chosen to make [some] offenses not involving homicide punishable by life imprisonment without possibility of parole. . . . 2022Analysis First, of the three analytical techniques identified by the California Supreme Court in reviewing an excessiveness claim, “[t]he main technique of analysis under California law is to consider the nature both of the offense and of the offender. [Citation.]” (People v. Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 494 .) Regarding the offense, we consider it “both in the abstract and in the totality of circumstances surrounding its actual commission” (ibid.), including “ ‘motive, the way it was committed, the extent of the defendant’s involvement, and the consequences of his acts.’ ” (People v. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Bajakajian
red
1 sentence2020Ability to Pay Is an Important Consideration in Evaluating Whether These “Fines” Are “Excessive” Under the Excessive Fines Prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution In evaluating excessiveness, the starting point for analysis—though not the end of it—is United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321 (Bajakajian), where the United States Supreme Court announced an excessiveness test that has been recognized by California courts as applicable to both the federal and state excessive fines clauses. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Jeffrey Kemezy v. James Peters
green
1 sentence2006(Chavez v. Keat (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1413-1416 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 ].) Under federal law, a punitive damages award is not dependent on proof of a defendant’s ability to pay (Kemezy v. Peters (7th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 33, 33-34 ; Woods-Drake v. Lundy (5th Cir. 1982) 667 F.2d 1198, 1203, fn. 9 ; Chavez v. Keat, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1410-1411), but if evidence is submitted, it is an important consideration as to the reasonableness of the award. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Patterson v. Balsamico
green
1 sentence2006(Patterson v. Balsamico (2d Cir. 2006) 440 F.3d 104 , 121-122 (Patterson); Vasbinder v. Scott (2d Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 118, 121 (Vasbinder); DiSorbo v. Hoy, supra, 343 F.3d at p. 189, fn. 9 ; see also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 269-270 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 616 , 101 S.Ct. 2748 ].) Because the punitive damages award was based solely on a federal civil rights claim, we review the excessiveness claim under federal law applicable to punitive damages awards. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Harris v. Harter
green
2 sentences1968While the result of [Harris v. Harter, supra, 79 Cal.App. 190 ] seems clearly justifiable, it is misleading to describe the plaintiff's cause of *350 action as one for malicious prosecution." (Italics added.) (Note, supra, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 502-503.) [fn. 7] [10] We believe that in view of the reasons stated below excessive attachments should be treated as giving rise to a cause of action for abuse of process rather than for malicious prosecution. [fn. 8] First, in the case of an excessive attachment action, two requirements of the malicious prosecution action may very well be lacking: absence of 1968While the result of [Harris v. Harter, supra, 79 Cal.App. 190 ] seems clearly justifiable, it is misleading to describe the plaintiff's cause of *350 action as one for malicious prosecution." (Italics added.) (Note, supra, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 502-503.) [fn. 7] [10] We believe that in view of the reasons stated below excessive attachments should be treated as giving rise to a cause of action for abuse of process rather than for malicious prosecution. [fn. 8] First, in the case of an excessive attachment action, two requirements of the malicious prosecution action may very well be lacking: absence of | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.