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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rojas v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2018(See Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407, 417, fn. 5 [considering construction of parallel federal rule in interpreting Evidence Code provision].) Ramy and Michel Lakah, 19 husband and wife, challenged the admissibility of documents from an Egyptian criminal investigation file under the federal hearsay exception for public records. 2018(See Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407, 417, fn. 5 [considering construction of parallel federal rule in interpreting Evidence Code provision].) Ramy and Michel Lakah, 19 husband and wife, challenged the admissibility of documents from an Egyptian criminal investigation file under the federal hearsay exception for public records. | 2 | 3 |
Williamson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Whether or not a statement is against penal interest can be determined only by considering ‘the statement in context.’” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 741 ; accord, People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610-612.) Accordingly, Evidence Code section 1230 does not authorize the admission “of non-self- inculpatory statements . . . made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” (Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 600-601 , [ 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 ]; see Grimes, at p. 715 [citing with approval Williamson’s interpretation of the “analogous exceptio 2021Whether or not a statement is against penal interest can be determined only by considering ‘the statement in context.’” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 741 ; accord, People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610-612.) Accordingly, Evidence Code section 1230 does not authorize the admission “of non-self- inculpatory statements . . . made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” (Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 600-601 , [ 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 ]; see Grimes, at p. 715 [citing with approval Williamson’s interpretation of the “analogous exceptio | 1 | 5 |
People v. Lawleygreen2 sentences2021Whether or not a statement is against penal interest can be determined only by considering ‘the statement in context.’” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 741 ; accord, People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610-612.) Accordingly, Evidence Code section 1230 does not authorize the admission “of non-self- inculpatory statements . . . made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” (Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 600-601 , [ 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 ]; see Grimes, at p. 715 [citing with approval Williamson’s interpretation of the “analogous exceptio 2013One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 (Lawley).) A court should therefore excise any portion of a statement that is not specifically disserving to the declarant (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 622 ), especially statements that inculpate or shifting blame to another (id. at p. 617), and this concern about collateral impeachment of a codefendant is implicit in the Aranda/Bruton cases (People v. Leach (1975) | 1 | 2 |
People v. Duartegreen2 sentences2021Whether or not a statement is against penal interest can be determined only by considering ‘the statement in context.’” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 741 ; accord, People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610-612.) Accordingly, Evidence Code section 1230 does not authorize the admission “of non-self- inculpatory statements . . . made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” (Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 600-601 , [ 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 ]; see Grimes, at p. 715 [citing with approval Williamson’s interpretation of the “analogous exceptio 2013One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 (Lawley).) A court should therefore excise any portion of a statement that is not specifically disserving to the declarant (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 622 ), especially statements that inculpate or shifting blame to another (id. at p. 617), and this concern about collateral impeachment of a codefendant is implicit in the Aranda/Bruton cases (People v. Leach (1975) | 1 | 2 |
In Re Jenningsgreen2 sentences2017(See In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ] [“ ‘It is a settled rule of statutory construction that where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed with reference to the different statutes.’ ”].) 15 The long-standing inclusion of an express trustworthiness requirement in the federal hearsay exception for declarations against interest further highlights the absence of a similar pro 2017(See In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ] [“ ‘It is a settled rule of statutory construction that where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed with reference to the different statutes.’ ”].) 15 The long-standing inclusion of an express trustworthiness requirement in the federal hearsay exception for declarations against interest further highlights the absence of a similar pro | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael G. Thevis, Alton Bart Hood, Global Industries, Inc., Anna Jeanette Evansred2 sentences2007A statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." (Fed. Rules Evid., rule 804(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.) The text of the rule was based on United States v. Thevis , which identified two elements: "(1) the defendant caused the witness's unavailability (2) for the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying at trial." ( United States v. Thevis, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 633, fn. 17 ; see Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exce 2007A statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." (Fed. Rules Evid., rule 804(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.) The text of the rule was based on United States v. Thevis , which identified two elements: "(1) the defendant caused the witness's unavailability (2) for the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying at trial." ( United States v. Thevis, supra, 665 F.2d at p. 633, fn. 17 ; see Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exce | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Grimes
green
2 sentences2021Whether or not a statement is against penal interest can be determined only by considering ‘the statement in context.’” (Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 741 ; accord, People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610-612.) Accordingly, Evidence Code section 1230 does not authorize the admission “of non-self- inculpatory statements . . . made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” (Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 600-601 , [ 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 ]; see Grimes, at p. 715 [citing with approval Williamson’s interpretation of the “analogous exceptio 2021Grimes also noted that cases construing and applying an analogous exception to the federal hearsay rule, and California cases construing and applying Evidence Code section 1230, had taken “a contextual approach” in applying the exceptions and “the Leach rule.” ( Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 713-715.) Grimes concluded that “the nature and purpose of the against-interest exception does not require courts to sever and excise any and all portions of an otherwise inculpatory statement that do not ‘further 65 incriminate’ the declarant. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Cortez
green
2 sentences2018It held a court could determine whether a statement was against a declarant's penal interest only in light of the surrounding circumstances, and that in the context before it, the codefendant's statements identifying the defendant by name disserved the codefendant's interest in several respects. ( Cortez, supra , 63 Cal.4th at pp. 126-128, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 .) For its premise, the high court relied on the United States Supreme Court's application of the federal hearsay exception in Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 , which state 2018It held a court could determine whether a statement was against a declarant's penal interest only in light of the surrounding circumstances, and that in the context before it, the codefendant's statements identifying the defendant by name disserved the codefendant's interest in several respects. ( Cortez, supra , 63 Cal.4th at pp. 126-128, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 , 369 P.3d 521 .) For its premise, the high court relied on the United States Supreme Court's application of the federal hearsay exception in Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 , 129 L.Ed.2d 476 , which state | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Aranda
red
2 sentences2016(Id. at p. 441, fn. 17, citing People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ], and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ].) The United States Supreme Court, interpreting an analogous exception to the federal hearsay rule, reached much the same conclusion when it later addressed the issue in Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 476 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ] (Williamson). 2016(Id. at p. 441, fn. 17, citing People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ], and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ].) The United States Supreme Court, interpreting an analogous exception to the federal hearsay rule, reached much the same conclusion when it later addressed the issue in Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 476 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ] (Williamson). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bruton v. United States
green
2 sentences2016(Id. at p. 441, fn. 17, citing People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ], and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ].) The United States Supreme Court, interpreting an analogous exception to the federal hearsay rule, reached much the same conclusion when it later addressed the issue in Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 476 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ] (Williamson). 2016(Id. at p. 441, fn. 17, citing People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ], and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ].) The United States Supreme Court, interpreting an analogous exception to the federal hearsay rule, reached much the same conclusion when it later addressed the issue in Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594 [ 129 L.Ed.2d 476 , 114 S.Ct. 2431 ] (Williamson). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Leach
green
1 sentence2013One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153 (Lawley).) A court should therefore excise any portion of a statement that is not specifically disserving to the declarant (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 622 ), especially statements that inculpate or shifting blame to another (id. at p. 617), and this concern about collateral impeachment of a codefendant is implicit in the Aranda/Bruton cases (People v. Leach (1975) | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Greenberger
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 329 .) But the exception is narrow in scope: “A court may not . . . find a declarant’s statement sufficiently reliable for admission ‘ “solely because it incorporates an admission of criminal culpability.” ’ [Citations.] As the high court reasoned in interpreting the analogous exception to the federal hearsay rule, ‘[t]he fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession’s non-self-inculpatory nature. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.