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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Caldwell v. Montoyagreen2 sentences2017That is because ―the very purpose of the Act is to afford categories of immunity where, but for its provisions, public agencies or employees would otherwise be liable under general principles of law.‖ (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 985 (Caldwell).) Thus, under the Act, specific immunities prevail over general rules of actionable duty. 2017That is because ―the very purpose of the Act is to afford categories of immunity where, but for its provisions, public agencies or employees would otherwise be liable under general principles of law.‖ (Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 985 (Caldwell).) Thus, under the Act, specific immunities prevail over general rules of actionable duty. | 2 | 2 |
Amoroso v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati 1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati | 2 | 2 |
Fritts v. County of Kerngreen2 sentences1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati 1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati | 2 | 2 |
Tielsch v. City of Anaheimgreen2 sentences1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati 1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati | 2 | 2 |
County of Los Angeles v. Surety Insurancegreen2 sentences1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati 1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati | 2 | 2 |
Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati 1994Co. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 58, 63-64 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 263 ] (County of Los Angeles); when a “decision becomes final” (Tielsch v. City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 579-580 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 740 ]); upon “issuance” of an order of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) (Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 581, 583 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 632 ] (Mario Saikhon); when a court “makes” an order relieving a party from the governmental tort claim requirement (Fritts v. County of Kern (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 303, 306 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 212 ]); or when an arbitrati | 2 | 2 |
Philpott v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2015Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1992) 4 Cal.4th 715, 731 .) “ ‘If money alone has been transferred by the rescinding party, upon the rescission the law implies a promise to return it, which becomes the basis for a common-law action of money had and received. [Citations.]’ ” (Philpott v. Superior Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512, 524-525 (Philpott); see also Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 230 [action on express contract for money had and received].) Since in the present case the common count for money had and received is based on contract, as is the cause of ac | 1 | 1 |
Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Reygreen1 sentence2015Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1992) 4 Cal.4th 715, 731 .) “ ‘If money alone has been transferred by the rescinding party, upon the rescission the law implies a promise to return it, which becomes the basis for a common-law action of money had and received. [Citations.]’ ” (Philpott v. Superior Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512, 524-525 (Philpott); see also Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 230 [action on express contract for money had and received].) Since in the present case the common count for money had and received is based on contract, as is the cause of ac | 1 | 1 |
Chevlin v. Los Angeles Community College Districtgreen1 sentence1998(See Chevlin v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 390 [applying section 818.8 in case involving community college district].) Disposition The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Sunnyside Nurseries, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences1994Relying upon language used in Sunnyside Nurseries, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 922, 929 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 152 ] ( Sunnyside ), Local 1493 contends issuance occurred when the board's order was mailed. 1994Relying upon language used in Sunnyside Nurseries, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 922, 929 [ 156 Cal. Rptr. 152 ] ( Sunnyside ), Local 1493 contends issuance occurred when the board's order was mailed. | 1 | 1 |
Cruise v. City & County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences1986The old doctrine of strict and literal compliance, with its attendant harsh and unfair results, has disappeared from our law." (Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 558, 563 [ 225 P.2d 988 ], italics added.) The foregoing general rules counsel liberal construction of the governmental tort claim statute. 1986The old doctrine of strict and literal compliance, with its attendant harsh and unfair results, has disappeared from our law." (Cruise v. City & County of San Francisco (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 558, 563 [ 225 P.2d 988 ], italics added.) The foregoing general rules counsel liberal construction of the governmental tort claim statute. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District
red
2 sentences2017The Act followed our Supreme Court's decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 , which "abolished the doctrine of governmental tort immunity." ( Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834 , 838, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453 , 548 P.2d 1125 .) The intent of the Act "is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied." ( Ibid. ) The full text of section 844.6, s 2017The Act followed our Supreme Court's decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 , which "abolished the doctrine of governmental tort immunity." ( Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834 , 838, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453 , 548 P.2d 1125 .) The intent of the Act "is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied." ( Ibid. ) The full text of section 844.6, s | 5 | 1976–2017 |
Williams v. Horvath
green
2 sentences2017The Act followed our Supreme Court's decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 , which "abolished the doctrine of governmental tort immunity." ( Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834 , 838, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453 , 548 P.2d 1125 .) The intent of the Act "is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied." ( Ibid. ) The full text of section 844.6, s 2017The Act followed our Supreme Court's decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 , 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 , which "abolished the doctrine of governmental tort immunity." ( Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834 , 838, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453 , 548 P.2d 1125 .) The intent of the Act "is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied." ( Ibid. ) The full text of section 844.6, s | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co.
green
2 sentences2017The Act followed our Supreme Court‘s decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 , which ―abolished the doctrine of governmental tort immunity.‖ (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 .) The intent of the Act ―is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied.‖ (Ibid.) 6 requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable.‖ (Cochran v. H 2017The Act followed our Supreme Court‘s decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211 , which ―abolished the doctrine of governmental tort immunity.‖ (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 .) The intent of the Act ―is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied.‖ (Ibid.) 6 requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable.‖ (Cochran v. H | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Flores v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation CA5
green
1 sentence2021(Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 208 .) But in any event, Escamilla did not consider the issue of an adequate remedy at law. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Title Insurance. Co. v. State Board of Equalization
green
1 sentence2015Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1992) 4 Cal.4th 715, 731 .) “ ‘If money alone has been transferred by the rescinding party, upon the rescission the law implies a promise to return it, which becomes the basis for a common-law action of money had and received. [Citations.]’ ” (Philpott v. Superior Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512, 524-525 (Philpott); see also Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 230 [action on express contract for money had and received].) Since in the present case the common count for money had and received is based on contract, as is the cause of ac | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kagy v. Napa State Hospital
green
2 sentences2001In Kagy v. Napa State Hospital, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1 , the court held the one-year period was tolled because the public guardian appointed for the incapacitated claimant lacked the authority to file a suit on behalf of the claimant and therefore could not adequately represent the claimant’s interests. 2001In Kagy v. Napa State Hospital, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 , the court held the one-year period was tolled because the public guardian appointed for the incapacitated claimant lacked the authority to file a suit on behalf of the claimant and therefore could not adequately represent the claimant's interests. ( Id. at pp. 6-7, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 .) Likewise, in Favorite v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 835 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , the court held the claims statute was tolled where the conservator appointed for the incapacitated claimant was incapable of acting on th | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Favorite v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2001In Kagy v. Napa State Hospital, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 , the court held the one-year period was tolled because the public guardian appointed for the incapacitated claimant lacked the authority to file a suit on behalf of the claimant and therefore could not adequately represent the claimant's interests. ( Id. at pp. 6-7, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 .) Likewise, in Favorite v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 835 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , the court held the claims statute was tolled where the conservator appointed for the incapacitated claimant was incapable of acting on th 2001In Kagy v. Napa State Hospital, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 , the court held the one-year period was tolled because the public guardian appointed for the incapacitated claimant lacked the authority to file a suit on behalf of the claimant and therefore could not adequately represent the claimant's interests. ( Id. at pp. 6-7, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 .) Likewise, in Favorite v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 835 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , the court held the claims statute was tolled where the conservator appointed for the incapacitated claimant was incapable of acting on th | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lundeen Coatings Corp. v. Department of Water and Power
green
1 sentence1998(See Lundeen Coatings Corp. v. Department of Water & Power (1991) 232 *118 Cal.App.3d 816, 832 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 551 ] [section 818.8 applies even where “allegations of the complaint are couched in terms of code violations by the government entity and not misrepresentations per se”].) As Brown put it in his argument opposing the motion for judgment on the pleadings: “The plaintiff timely filed a governmental tort claim against defendants which alleged they failed to properly counsel him as promised and negligently advised that the science class in issue would satisfy NCAA requirements.” Under se | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.