loss of a peremptory challenge in California

2012(People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 ].) As we explained in Yeoman , “[a]n erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant ‘can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .’ [Citation.] In other words, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner ' “provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced up

2012(People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 , 72 P.3d 1166 ].) As we explained in Yeoman , “[a]n erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant ‘can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .’ [Citation.] In other words, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner ' “provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced up

2025(People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 917 (Black).) “So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.” (Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 88 .) Accordingly, it is settled that “[a]n erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant ‘can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .’ [Citati

2013(Ibid.; accord, People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) Further, although defendant used five of his peremptory challenges to remove some of these 15 from the jury, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner “ ‘is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ ” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 , 40 P.3d 754 ], italics added, quoting Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 89 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 80 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 ].) Here, defendant did not challenge for cause any of the 12

2013(Ibid.; accord, People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) Further, although defendant used five of his peremptory challenges to remove some of these 15 from the jury, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner “ ‘is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ ” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 , 40 P.3d 754 ], italics added, quoting Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 89 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 80 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 ].) Here, defendant did not challenge for cause any of the 12

2013(Ibid.; accord, People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) Further, although defendant used five of his peremptory challenges to remove some of these 15 from the jury, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner “ ‘is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ ” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 , 40 P.3d 754 ], italics added, quoting Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 89 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 80 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 ].) Here, defendant did not challenge for cause any of the 12

2025(People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 917 (Black).) “So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.” (Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 88 .) Accordingly, it is settled that “[a]n erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant ‘can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .’ [Citati

2025It then passed the jury twice before exercising its final peremptory challenge to excuse a cause-challenged panelist. 39 PEOPLE v. DUNN Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. manner ‘ “provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.” ’ ” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114 (Yeoman); see Souza, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 131 ; see also Black, at p. 920 [reaffirming the Yeoman rule].) Because Juror No. 8 was the only challenged panelist who sat on defendant’s jury, defendant can establish prejudice from the de

2025It then passed the jury twice before exercising its final peremptory challenge to excuse a cause-challenged panelist. 39 PEOPLE v. DUNN Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. manner ‘ “provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.” ’ ” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114 (Yeoman); see Souza, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 131 ; see also Black, at p. 920 [reaffirming the Yeoman rule].) Because Juror No. 8 was the only challenged panelist who sat on defendant’s jury, defendant can establish prejudice from the de

2013(Ibid.; accord, People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) Further, although defendant used five of his peremptory challenges to remove some of these 15 from the jury, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner “ ‘is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ ” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 , 40 P.3d 754 ], italics added, quoting Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 89 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 80 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 ].) Here, defendant did not challenge for cause any of the 12

2013(Ibid.; accord, People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 187 .) Further, although defendant used five of his peremptory challenges to remove some of these 15 from the jury, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner ― ‗is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.‘ ‖ (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487 , italics added, quoting Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 89 .) Here, defendant did not challenge for cause any of the 12 jurors who decided his case.18 Moreover, as we explain post, none of th

2012While a statute requiring exclusion of all jurors with any feeling against the death penalty produces a jury biased in favor of death [citation], we have no proof that a similar bias arises, on either guilt or penalty issues, when both parties are allowed to exercise their equal, limited numbers of peremptory challenges . . . against jurors harboring specific attitudes they reasonably believe unfavorable.’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 983-984 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 , 183 P.3d 1146 ], quoting People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 315 ; see People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 38

2012While a statute requiring exclusion of all jurors with any feeling against the death penalty produces a jury biased in favor of death [citation], we have no proof that a similar bias arises, on either guilt or penalty issues, when both parties are allowed to exercise their equal, limited numbers of peremptory challenges . . . against jurors harboring specific attitudes they reasonably believe unfavorable.’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 983-984 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 , 183 P.3d 1146 ], quoting People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 315 ; see People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 38

2012While a statute requiring exclusion of all jurors with any feeling against the death penalty produces a jury biased in favor of death [citation], we have no proof that a similar bias arises, on either guilt or penalty issues, when both parties are allowed to exercise their equal, limited numbers of peremptory challenges . . . against jurors harboring specific attitudes they reasonably believe unfavorable.’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 983-984 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 , 183 P.3d 1146 ], quoting People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 315 ; see People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 38

2012While a statute requiring exclusion of all jurors with any feeling against the death penalty produces a jury biased in favor of death [citation], we have no proof that a similar bias arises, on either guilt or penalty issues, when both parties are allowed to exercise their equal, limited numbers of peremptory challenges . . . against jurors harboring specific attitudes they reasonably believe unfavorable.’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 983-984 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163 , 183 P.3d 1146 ], quoting People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 315 ; see People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 38

2006(See ibid.; see also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 418 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 58 P.3d 391 ].) But the loss of a peremptory challenge does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.

2006(See ibid.; see also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 418 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 58 P.3d 391 ].) But the loss of a peremptory challenge does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.

2003"It is well settled that even if the trial court erred in denying a defendant's motion to remove a juror for cause, that error will be considered harmless if `[n]one of the prospective jurors whom defendant found objectionable actually sat on his jury.' [Citations.] `[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 939 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 897 P.2d 574 , overruled on another point in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89-91 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 45

2003"It is well settled that even if the trial court erred in denying a defendant's motion to remove a juror for cause, that error will be considered harmless if `[n]one of the prospective jurors whom defendant found objectionable actually sat on his jury.' [Citations.] `[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 939 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 897 P.2d 574 , overruled on another point in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89-91 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 45

2003An erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant “can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .” (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 ], italics added.) In other words, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner “ ‘provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ ” (People

2003An erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant “can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .” (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 ], italics added.) In other words, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner “ ‘provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ ” (People

2003An erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant “can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .” (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 ], italics added.) In other words, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner “ ‘provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ ” (People

2003An erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant “can actually show that his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .” (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 630 , 774 P.2d 659 ], italics added.) In other words, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner “ ‘provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.’ ” (People

2003"It is well settled that even if the trial court erred in denying a defendant's motion to remove a juror for cause, that error will be considered harmless if `[n]one of the prospective jurors whom defendant found objectionable actually sat on his jury.' [Citations.] `[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 939 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 897 P.2d 574 , overruled on another point in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89-91 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 45

2003"It is well settled that even if the trial court erred in denying a defendant's motion to remove a juror for cause, that error will be considered harmless if `[n]one of the prospective jurors whom defendant found objectionable actually sat on his jury.' [Citations.] `[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 939 , 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 897 P.2d 574 , overruled on another point in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89-91 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 45

1995It is well settled that even if the trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to remove a juror for cause, that error will be considered harmless if “[n]one of the prospective jurors whom defendant found objectionable actually sat on his jury.” (People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1247 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 451 , 792 P.2d 251 ]; see also Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 86 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 88-89 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 ].) “[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.” (Ross, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 8

1995It is well settled that even if the trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to remove a juror for cause, that error will be considered harmless if “[n]one of the prospective jurors whom defendant found objectionable actually sat on his jury.” (People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1247 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 451 , 792 P.2d 251 ]; see also Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 86 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 88-89 , 108 S.Ct. 2273 ].) “[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury.” (Ross, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 8

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o

1988But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ [101 *770 L.Ed.2d at pp. 91-92], fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court left open the question whether the same result would follow "in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the `right' to exercise peremptory challenges...." ( 487 U.S. at p. ___ , fn. 4 [ 101 L.Ed.2d at p. 92 ].) (5) The California courts hold that the defendant must exercise his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause, and that to complain on appeal o