need for further inquiry in California

2023There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.” (Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 180 .) However, “the evidence must bear on the defendant’s competency to stand trial, rather than simply establish the existence of a mental illness that could conceivably affect his ability to understand the proceedings or assist counsel.” (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 270 ; People v. Ramos (20

2014There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.” (Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 180 [ 43 L.Ed.2d at p. 118 ].) “ ‘[M]ore is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre statements [citation] or statements of defense counsel that defendant is incapable of cooperating in his defense [citation] or psychiatric testimony that defendant is immature, dangerous,

2022(In re M.E. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 73 , 81-82 [further inquiry required where both parents claimed Indian ancestry]; In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 235 [further Register a list of all Indian tribes which are recognized and receiving services from the [BIA], and to update and publish that list annually.” (In re Wanomi P. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 156 , 166– 167.) The second tribe father named is not identified on the current list, or on the list that was current in 2019.

2020As this court has observed, “[T]he burden of coming forward with information to determine whether an Indian child may be involved and ICWA notice required in a dependency proceeding does not rest entirely—or even primarily—on the child and his or her family.” (In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 233 .) The court here fulfilled its initial obligation to ask about Tamara’s possible Indian ancestry; it failed, however, to ensure the Department complied with its duty of further inquiry based on the responses the court had received from Tamara and Loretta S. Second, relying on Austin J., sup

2013(Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 180 ; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164 .) “There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.” (Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. 162, 180 .) However, “more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre statements [citation] or statements of defense counsel that defendant is incapable of cooperating in his [or he

2004There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.” (See also People v. Laudermilk, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 283 [“the question as to what constitutes such substantial evidence . . . ‘cannot be answered by a simple formula applicable to all situations.’ ”].) The People also discuss, at great length, evidence in the record of defendant’s competence and suggest this evidence of competence undermines d

2023There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.” (Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 180 .) However, “the evidence must bear on the defendant’s competency to stand trial, rather than simply establish the existence of a mental illness that could conceivably affect his ability to understand the proceedings or assist counsel.” (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 270 ; People v. Ramos (20

2022(In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 280, 283.) The appellate court rejected as “fundamentally at odds with well-established ICWA law” the argument that a “ ‘mere possibility of Indian ancestry’ ” does not trigger the need for further inquiry, citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 65, fn. 21 (an Indian tribe is the final arbiter of its membership rights) and section 224.2, subdivision (h) (“ ‘Information that the child is not enrolled, or is not eligible for enrollment in, the tribe is not determinative of the child’s membership status unless the tribe also confirms in

2016(See In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257 , citing Williams, supra, but concluding that trial counsel was 18 ineffective for failing to investigate defendant’s blood alcohol and PCP levels when both were relevant to his mental state].) Finally, to the extent respondent suggests that Duncan’s ambiguous assertions concerning his presence in the money room and other statements that might be construed as admissions of guilt limited the need for further inquiry, that proposition was rejected in Duncan II, supra, 528 F.3d at p. 1238 [“A defendant’s admission of guilt to his lawyer does not absolv

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001We therefore begin with the pertinent principles of statutory construction and judicial review. “ ‘The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations.]’ ” (Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1064 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 959 P.2d 360 ].) Although the intent ultimately prevails over the letter of the law (id. at p. 1065), the statutory language may be sufficiently clear and unambig

2001We therefore begin with the pertinent principles of statutory construction and judicial review. “ ‘The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations.]’ ” (Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1064 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 959 P.2d 360 ].) Although the intent ultimately prevails over the letter of the law (id. at p. 1065), the statutory language may be sufficiently clear and unambig

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001We therefore begin with the pertinent principles of statutory construction and judicial review. “ ‘The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations.]’ ” (Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1064 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 959 P.2d 360 ].) Although the intent ultimately prevails over the letter of the law (id. at p. 1065), the statutory language may be sufficiently clear and unambig

2001We therefore begin with the pertinent principles of statutory construction and judicial review. “ ‘The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations.]’ ” (Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1064 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 959 P.2d 360 ].) Although the intent ultimately prevails over the letter of the law (id. at p. 1065), the statutory language may be sufficiently clear and unambig

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.

2001(Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 ] [initiatives]; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 445 ] [regulations].) “The legislative history of a statute, as well as the wider historical circumstances of its enactment, may be considered in ascertaining legislative intent.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 753 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 896 P.2d 807 ].) In the case of initiatives, it may be appropriate to consult statements to the voters (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.