offenses violation in California

2024(See Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 838 .) Despite three of the aggravating circumstances having not been proved in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and (3), and the parties agreement that none of the aggravating circumstances findings comply with Erlinger, the upper term was imposed on counts 1 and 3.4 Therefore, unless imposition of the upper term on counts 1 and 3 was harmless, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing in compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b). 3 We need not weigh in on this issue to resolve this case.

2024(See Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 835–838.)3 The parties further agree that neither section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), nor the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, permit a trial court to rely on a certified record of conviction to prove the second through fourth circumstances in aggravation—that defendant had served five prior prison terms, that defendant was on a grant of postrelease community supervision when he committed the offenses at bar, and that his prior performance on probation, parole, and postrelease community supervision was unsatisfactory.

2021(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 477–478; Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 .) Given that Jimenez sexually assaulted several minors—one of whom was under 10 years of age—over a lengthy period of time, abusing his position as a de facto family member to do so, means that this is not one of those rare cases in which a sentence is out of all proportion to the offenses in violation of the state Constitution. ( Lynch, supra, at p. 424 .) III.

2021We disagree. ( Leal, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 1004-1010.) F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Appellant argues that his sentence—which is the practical equivalent of life without the possibility of parole—constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it was disproportionate to 27 the offenses in violation of the United States and California Constitutions.

2021(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 477–478; Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 .) Given that Jimenez sexually assaulted several minors—one of whom was under 10 years of age—over a lengthy period of time, abusing his position as a de facto family member to do so, means that this is not one of those rare cases in which a sentence is out of all proportion to the offenses in violation of the state Constitution. ( Lynch, supra, at p. 424 .) III.

2021(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 477–478; Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424 .) Given that Jimenez sexually assaulted several minors—one of whom was under 10 years of age—over a lengthy period of time, abusing his position as a de facto family member to do so, means that this is not one of those rare cases in which a sentence is out of all proportion to the offenses in violation of the state Constitution. ( Lynch, supra, at p. 424 .) III.

2019A peace officer who detains or who makes or attempts to make an arrest is not required to retreat or cease from his efforts because of the resistance or threatened resistance of the person being resisted.” The court also instructed the jury on a variety of corollary issues, including when exigent circumstances may permit a police officer to enter a residence without a warrant, when Miranda8 warnings are required, when an officer is excused from the requirement to 8 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . 17. inform the person being arrested of the authority for and intent to arrest, and all o

2016“Every legitimate inference that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the information.” (Rideout v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 474 .) 10 Cuz?” After the shooting, they bragged about it: “We killed him.

2015Standard of Review “‘To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1077 .) The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence.

2015If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] This principle is especially true when an appellant makes a general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 ; see also, People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 .) Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record in light of the elements of the offenses and standard of review enunciated in the authorities set out below, and find it amply supports all of defe

2001(See People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 490, 502-503, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 [harmless error]; see also People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665 , 676-677 & fn. 6, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647 , 2 P.3d 1189 [harmless error]; People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 625, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17 , 995 P.2d 152 [same].) Even if the jury relied upon a premeditation theory of first degree murder rather than a murder-by-poison theory as to Joyce, it could not find premeditation and deliberation without determining that defendant had a state of mind constituting express malice.

2001(See People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 490, 502-503, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 [harmless error]; see also People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665 , 676-677 & fn. 6, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647 , 2 P.3d 1189 [harmless error]; People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 625, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17 , 995 P.2d 152 [same].) Even if the jury relied upon a premeditation theory of first degree murder rather than a murder-by-poison theory as to Joyce, it could not find premeditation and deliberation without determining that defendant had a state of mind constituting express malice.

1993The Court of Appeal agreed and stated: “The court imposed concurrent sentences when it should have stayed the terms imposed upon the less serious offenses of violation of sections 246 and 12021.” (People v. Kane, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 488 .) In People v. Masters, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1124 the defendant pled guilty to one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and to one count of willfully and maliciously discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle based on firing a revolver at a car occupied by three rival gang members.

1993The Court of Appeal agreed and stated: “The court imposed concurrent sentences when it should have stayed the terms imposed upon the less serious offenses of violation of sections 246 and 12021.” (People v. Kane, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 488 .) In People v. Masters, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1124 the defendant pled guilty to one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and to one count of willfully and maliciously discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle based on firing a revolver at a car occupied by three rival gang members.

1988This court held in both People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21 , and People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], that an omission to separately charge the underlying offenses was error, but was not prejudicial.

1988This court held in both People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21 , and People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], that an omission to separately charge the underlying offenses was error, but was not prejudicial.

1988This court held in both People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21 , and People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], that an omission to separately charge the underlying offenses was error, but was not prejudicial.

1988This court held in both People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21 , and People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425 [ 162 Cal. Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], that an omission to separately charge the underlying offenses was error, but was not prejudicial.

1985(See People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 377 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 357 , 461 P.2d 637 , 37 A.L.R.3d 1398 ], cert. den. 400 U.S. 927 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 187 , 91 S.Ct. 190 ].) The court imposed concurrent sentences when it should have stayed the terms imposed upon the less serious offenses of violation of sections 246 and 12021.

1985(See People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 377 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 357 , 461 P.2d 637 , 37 A.L.R.3d 1398 ], cert. den. 400 U.S. 927 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 187 , 91 S.Ct. 190 ].) The court imposed concurrent sentences when it should have stayed the terms imposed upon the less serious offenses of violation of sections 246 and 12021.

1946(Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 350 [ 74 P.2d 243 , 113 A.L.R. 1422 ].) In support of his claim of double jeopardy petitioner asserts that since both counts are based on the same occurrence or transaction, the offense defined in section 702 is necessarily included in the charge of rape or attempted rape and that an acquittal of the greater offenses is a bar to prosecution of the lesser offense.

1946(Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 350 [ 74 P.2d 243 , 113 A.L.R. 1422 ].) In support of his claim of double jeopardy petitioner asserts that since both counts are based on the same occurrence or transaction, the offense defined in section 702 is necessarily included in the charge of rape or attempted rape and that an acquittal of the greater offenses is a bar to prosecution of the lesser offense.