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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rojo v. Kligergreen2 sentences1992The primary jurisdiction doctrine evolved for the benefit of courts and administrative agencies, and unless precluded by the Legislature, it may be invoked whenever a court concludes there is a "paramount need for specialized agency fact-finding expertise." ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 88 .) [20] VII. 1992The primary jurisdiction doctrine evolved for the benefit of courts and administrative agencies, and unless precluded by the Legislature, it may be invoked whenever a court concludes there is a “paramount need for specialized agency fact-finding expertise.” (Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 88.) 20 VII. | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp.green2 sentences1985(See Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 397, 403 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 266 ].) Penal Code section 1202.4 and Government Code section 13967 are typical of other legislation in which the Legislature specifically requires the court to state on the record only the reasons supporting the waiver of a statutory mandate. 1985(See Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 397, 403 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 266 ].) Penal Code section 1202.4 and Government Code section 13967 are typical of other legislation in which the Legislature specifically requires the court to state on the record only the reasons supporting the waiver of a statutory mandate. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Sturmgreen2 sentences1978In such a case, the high court has required that the juvenile courts furnish a statement of the reasons supporting the waiver in order to assure an appellate review that has meaning. ( Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 ]; see In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 269, fn. 13 [ 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ].) *23 In contrast, the minor in the present case is retained within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 1978In such a case, the high court has required that the juvenile courts furnish a statement of the reasons supporting the waiver in order to assure an appellate review that has meaning. ( Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 ]; see In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 269, fn. 13 [ 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ].) *23 In contrast, the minor in the present case is retained within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. | 1 | 1 |
Kent v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1978In such a case, the high court has required that the juvenile courts furnish a statement of the reasons supporting the waiver in order to assure an appellate review that has meaning. ( Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 ]; see In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 269, fn. 13 [ 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ].) *23 In contrast, the minor in the present case is retained within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 1978In such a case, the high court has required that the juvenile courts furnish a statement of the reasons supporting the waiver in order to assure an appellate review that has meaning. ( Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 ]; see In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 269, fn. 13 [ 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 521 P.2d 97 ].) *23 In contrast, the minor in the present case is retained within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. | 1 | 1 |
Scher v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1958The reasons supporting this rule are stated in the following federal cases cited with approval in the Roviaro case: Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ] : In this case the officers had sufficient independent evidence to justify the arrest and search without relying on information from an informer: "In the circumstances the source of the information which caused him to be observed was unimportant to petitioner’s defense. 1958The reasons supporting this rule are stated in the following federal cases cited with approval in the Roviaro case: Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 [ 59 S.Ct. 174 , 83 L.Ed. 151 ] : In this case the officers had sufficient independent evidence to justify the arrest and search without relying on information from an informer: "In the circumstances the source of the information which caused him to be observed was unimportant to petitioner’s defense. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2007But it did say that Jones "foreshadowed" its decision in Apprendi and it cited to the Jones's discussion in of the historical roots of the jury in Anglo-American jurisprudence throughout its opinion. ( Apprendi supra, 530 U.S. at p. 476 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 .) More importantly, "the Apprendi court had this to say about why the State's reliance on Almendarez-Torres was misplaced: "The reasons supporting an exception from the general rule for the statute construed in that case do not apply to the New Jersey statute. 2007But it did say that Jones "foreshadowed" its decision in Apprendi and it cited to the Jones's discussion in of the historical roots of the jury in Anglo-American jurisprudence throughout its opinion. ( Apprendi supra, 530 U.S. at p. 476 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 .) More importantly, "the Apprendi court had this to say about why the State's reliance on Almendarez-Torres was misplaced: "The reasons supporting an exception from the general rule for the statute construed in that case do not apply to the New Jersey statute. | 3 | 2007–2009 |
People v. Julian R.
green
1 sentence2015As Logan acknowledges, our Supreme Court rejected a closely related argument in In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Flores-Montano
green
1 sentence2008Complex balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’ search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person, have no place in border searches of vehicles.” (Flores-Montano, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 152 .) We similarly find that the reasons supporting a requirement of reasonable suspicion in “highly intrusive searches of the person” do not carry over to the border search of a passenger’s stateroom. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hentschke v. Sink
green
2 sentences1979(Ed. Code, § 44896; Barton v. Governing Board, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 479 .) The reasons supporting this principle were stated in Hentschke v. Sink, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d 19 : “[A] second or third level administrator bears to his superiors a relationship of the most intimate nature, requiring complete trust by the top administrators in the judgment and cooperative nature of the subordinate. 1979(Ed. Code, § 44896; Barton v. Governing Board, supra, 60 Cal. App.3d at p. 479 .) The reasons supporting this principle were stated in Hentschke v. Sink, supra, 34 Cal. App.3d 19 : "[A] second or third level administrator bears to his superiors a relationship of the most intimate nature, requiring complete trust by the top administrators in the judgment and cooperative nature of the subordinate. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Barton v. Governing Board
green
2 sentences1979(Ed. Code, § 44896; Barton v. Governing Board, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 479 .) The reasons supporting this principle were stated in Hentschke v. Sink, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d 19 : “[A] second or third level administrator bears to his superiors a relationship of the most intimate nature, requiring complete trust by the top administrators in the judgment and cooperative nature of the subordinate. 1979(Ed. Code, § 44896; Barton v. Governing Board, supra, 60 Cal. App.3d at p. 479 .) The reasons supporting this principle were stated in Hentschke v. Sink, supra, 34 Cal. App.3d 19 : "[A] second or third level administrator bears to his superiors a relationship of the most intimate nature, requiring complete trust by the top administrators in the judgment and cooperative nature of the subordinate. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Martin v. City of Struthers
green
2 sentences1975(Martin v. Struthers (1943) 319 U.S. 141 [ 87 L.Ed. 1313 , 63 S.Ct. 862, 882 ].) However, once the outsider is aware he is unwelcome on the property, he has no right to remain. 1975(Martin v. Struthers (1943) 319 U.S. 141 [ 87 L.Ed. 1313 , 63 S.Ct. 862, 882 ].) However, once the outsider is aware he is unwelcome on the property, he has no right to remain. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Jermyn v. Hunter
neutral
2 sentences1932Hunter, 93 App. Div. 175 [ 87 N. Y. 1932Hunter, 93 App. Div. 175 [ 87 N. Y. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.