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12 California opinions name it 3 courts 1962–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Environmental Law Foundation v. Wykle Research, Inc.green2 sentences2018(Citing Environmental Law Foundation , supra , 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 69, fn. 10, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 788 ["fact that the warning language does not specifically indicate that it is referring to a risk created by ... mercury, however, is not in itself a deficiency under the regulations to Proposition 65"].) In drafting the safe harbor warnings, OEHHA considered and rejected a recommendation that the warning provide the names of specific chemicals contained in the product. 2018(Citing Environmental Law Foundation , supra , 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 69, fn. 10, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 788 ["fact that the warning language does not specifically indicate that it is referring to a risk created by ... mercury, however, is not in itself a deficiency under the regulations to Proposition 65"].) In drafting the safe harbor warnings, OEHHA considered and rejected a recommendation that the warning provide the names of specific chemicals contained in the product. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lealgreen2 sentences2014The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (CUA) (§ 11362.5) “ ‘gives a person who uses marijuana for medical purposes on a physician’s recommendation a defense to certain state criminal charges involving the drug, including possession [citations].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Leal (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 829, 838 (Leal).) The Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) (§ 11362.7 et seq.), which was “designed to clarify the CUA 9 and facilitate its enforcement, provides enhanced protection through use of identification cards. ‘At the heart of the MMP is a voluntary “identification card” scheme that, unlike the CUA—whi 2014Under the MMP, a person who suffers from a “serious medical condition” . . . may register and receive an annually renewable identification card that, in turn, can be shown to a law enforcement officer who otherwise might arrest the program participant . . . .’ [Citation.]” ( Leal, supra, at p. 838 , italics omitted.) However, “[a] card that reveals false information, fraud, or other violations of the CUA may certainly be challenged. | 1 | 1 |
Gonzales v. Raichgreen2 sentences2008Federal law, however, continues to prohibit the drug's possession, even by medical users. ( 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 , 844(a)); see Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1, 26-29 , 125 S.Ct. 2195 , 162 L.Ed.2d 1 ; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (2001) 532 U.S. 483, 491-195 , 121 S.Ct. 1711 , 149 L.Ed.2d 722 . 2008Federal law, however, continues to prohibit the drug's possession, even by medical users. ( 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 , 844(a)); see Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1, 26-29 , 125 S.Ct. 2195 , 162 L.Ed.2d 1 ; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (2001) 532 U.S. 483, 491-195 , 121 S.Ct. 1711 , 149 L.Ed.2d 722 . | 1 | 1 |
Twohy v. State Bargreen2 sentences1990(See Twohy v. State (1989) 48 Cal.3d 502, 515 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 794 , 769 P.2d 976 ] [two months' rehabilitation]; Gary v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 820, 824-825 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 482 , 749 P.2d 1336 ] [less than two years' rehabilitation and recovery dubious]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 394 , 738 P.2d 740 ] [eighteen months' rehabilitation].) On the other hand, when the period of abstention is significant, so as to demonstrate a "meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation" ( Rosenthal, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 664 ), we have concluded that 1990(See Twohy v. State (1989) 48 Cal.3d 502, 515 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 794 , 769 P.2d 976 ] [two months' rehabilitation]; Gary v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 820, 824-825 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 482 , 749 P.2d 1336 ] [less than two years' rehabilitation and recovery dubious]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 394 , 738 P.2d 740 ] [eighteen months' rehabilitation].) On the other hand, when the period of abstention is significant, so as to demonstrate a "meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation" ( Rosenthal, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 664 ), we have concluded that | 1 | 1 |
Gary v. State Bargreen2 sentences1990(See Twohy v. State (1989) 48 Cal.3d 502, 515 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 794 , 769 P.2d 976 ] [two months' rehabilitation]; Gary v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 820, 824-825 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 482 , 749 P.2d 1336 ] [less than two years' rehabilitation and recovery dubious]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 394 , 738 P.2d 740 ] [eighteen months' rehabilitation].) On the other hand, when the period of abstention is significant, so as to demonstrate a "meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation" ( Rosenthal, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 664 ), we have concluded that 1990(See Twohy v. State (1989) 48 Cal.3d 502, 515 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 794 , 769 P.2d 976 ] [two months' rehabilitation]; Gary v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 820, 824-825 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 482 , 749 P.2d 1336 ] [less than two years' rehabilitation and recovery dubious]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 394 , 738 P.2d 740 ] [eighteen months' rehabilitation].) On the other hand, when the period of abstention is significant, so as to demonstrate a "meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation" ( Rosenthal, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 664 ), we have concluded that | 1 | 1 |
Rosenthal v. State Bargreen2 sentences1990(See Twohy v. State (1989) 48 Cal.3d 502, 515 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 794 , 769 P.2d 976 ] [two months' rehabilitation]; Gary v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 820, 824-825 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 482 , 749 P.2d 1336 ] [less than two years' rehabilitation and recovery dubious]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 394 , 738 P.2d 740 ] [eighteen months' rehabilitation].) On the other hand, when the period of abstention is significant, so as to demonstrate a "meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation" ( Rosenthal, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 664 ), we have concluded that 1990(See Twohy v. State (1989) 48 Cal.3d 502, 515 [ 256 Cal. Rptr. 794 , 769 P.2d 976 ] [two months' rehabilitation]; Gary v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 820, 824-825 [ 244 Cal. Rptr. 482 , 749 P.2d 1336 ] [less than two years' rehabilitation and recovery dubious]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 664 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 394 , 738 P.2d 740 ] [eighteen months' rehabilitation].) On the other hand, when the period of abstention is significant, so as to demonstrate a "meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation" ( Rosenthal, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 664 ), we have concluded that | 1 | 1 |
Tarver v. State Bargreen2 sentences1989What is the Appropriate Degree of Discipline? (6a) Having determined that petitioner's offense involved moral turpitude and that discipline must be imposed, we are left with the task of determining the appropriate degree of that discipline. (7) It is well settled that where a disparity exists between the recommendation of the hearing panel and the review department, that of the review department is entitled to greater weight. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 693-694 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 774 , 739 P.2d 134 ].) And, even though we accord great weight to the department's recommendation, t 1989What is the Appropriate Degree of Discipline? (6a) Having determined that petitioner's offense involved moral turpitude and that discipline must be imposed, we are left with the task of determining the appropriate degree of that discipline. (7) It is well settled that where a disparity exists between the recommendation of the hearing panel and the review department, that of the review department is entitled to greater weight. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 693-694 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 774 , 739 P.2d 134 ].) And, even though we accord great weight to the department's recommendation, t | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. State Bargreen2 sentences1989What is the Appropriate Degree of Discipline? (6a) Having determined that petitioner's offense involved moral turpitude and that discipline must be imposed, we are left with the task of determining the appropriate degree of that discipline. (7) It is well settled that where a disparity exists between the recommendation of the hearing panel and the review department, that of the review department is entitled to greater weight. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 693-694 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 774 , 739 P.2d 134 ].) And, even though we accord great weight to the department's recommendation, t 1989What is the Appropriate Degree of Discipline? (6a) Having determined that petitioner's offense involved moral turpitude and that discipline must be imposed, we are left with the task of determining the appropriate degree of that discipline. (7) It is well settled that where a disparity exists between the recommendation of the hearing panel and the review department, that of the review department is entitled to greater weight. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 693-694 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 774 , 739 P.2d 134 ].) And, even though we accord great weight to the department's recommendation, t | 1 | 1 |
Robert Frumkin v. Board of Trustees, Kent State Universitygreen1 sentence1989Cir. 1985) 761 F.2d 657, 660 (supervisor who proposes termination of an employee is permitted to conduct full, impartial review of the matter and to make the final decision so long as the employee receives notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence and an opportunity to present his side of the story); Frumkin v. Board of Trustees, Kent State (6th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 19, 21-22 (no due process violation in having a university president, who had decided to dismiss a tenured professor, override the recommendation of a hearing committee not to terminate the professor’s employm | 1 | 1 |
John B. Desarno v. Department of Commercegreen1 sentence1989Cir. 1985) 761 F.2d 657, 660 (supervisor who proposes termination of an employee is permitted to conduct full, impartial review of the matter and to make the final decision so long as the employee receives notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence and an opportunity to present his side of the story); Frumkin v. Board of Trustees, Kent State (6th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 19, 21-22 (no due process violation in having a university president, who had decided to dismiss a tenured professor, override the recommendation of a hearing committee not to terminate the professor’s employm | 1 | 1 |
In Re Nevillgreen1 sentence1989And we have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction where the proposed discipline is inadequate to prevent the probable recurrence of misconduct. ( Carter v. State Bar, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1101; see also In re Nevill, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 735 ; Martin v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 717, 723 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 214 , 575 P.2d 757 ].) The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct (Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. | 1 | 1 |
Alberton v. State Bargreen2 sentences1989What is the Appropriate Degree of Discipline? (6a) Having determined that petitioner's offense involved moral turpitude and that discipline must be imposed, we are left with the task of determining the appropriate degree of that discipline. (7) It is well settled that where a disparity exists between the recommendation of the hearing panel and the review department, that of the review department is entitled to greater weight. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 693-694 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 774 , 739 P.2d 134 ].) And, even though we accord great weight to the department's recommendation, t 1989What is the Appropriate Degree of Discipline? (6a) Having determined that petitioner's offense involved moral turpitude and that discipline must be imposed, we are left with the task of determining the appropriate degree of that discipline. (7) It is well settled that where a disparity exists between the recommendation of the hearing panel and the review department, that of the review department is entitled to greater weight. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 693-694 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 774 , 739 P.2d 134 ].) And, even though we accord great weight to the department's recommendation, t | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. State Bargreen2 sentences1989And we have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction where the proposed discipline is inadequate to prevent the probable recurrence of misconduct. ( Carter v. State Bar, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1101; see also In re Nevill, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 735 ; Martin v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 717, 723 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 214 , 575 P.2d 757 ].) The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct (Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. 1989And we have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction where the proposed discipline is inadequate to prevent the probable recurrence of misconduct. ( Carter v. State Bar, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1101; see also In re Nevill, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 735 ; Martin v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 717, 723 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 214 , 575 P.2d 757 ].) The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct (Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. | 1 | 1 |
Kent v. State Bargreen2 sentences1989NOTES [*] Before Lucas, C.J., Broussard, J., Panelli, J., Eagleson, J., Kennard, J., and Low (Harry W.), J.[] [] Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. [1] Petitioner's name appeared on the ballot, but he did not win the election. [2] The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct (Standards) guide our choice of the appropriate discipline where, as here, the hearing panel decision is filed after January 1, 1986. ( Kent v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 729, 737 [ 239 Cal. Rptr. 77 , 739 P 1989NOTES [*] Before Lucas, C.J., Broussard, J., Panelli, J., Eagleson, J., Kennard, J., and Low (Harry W.), J.[] [] Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. [1] Petitioner's name appeared on the ballot, but he did not win the election. [2] The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct (Standards) guide our choice of the appropriate discipline where, as here, the hearing panel decision is filed after January 1, 1986. ( Kent v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 729, 737 [ 239 Cal. Rptr. 77 , 739 P | 1 | 1 |
Galardi v. State Bargreen2 sentences1989What is the Appropriate Degree of Discipline? (6a) Having determined that petitioner's offense involved moral turpitude and that discipline must be imposed, we are left with the task of determining the appropriate degree of that discipline. (7) It is well settled that where a disparity exists between the recommendation of the hearing panel and the review department, that of the review department is entitled to greater weight. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 693-694 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 774 , 739 P.2d 134 ].) And, even though we accord great weight to the department's recommendation, t 1989What is the Appropriate Degree of Discipline? (6a) Having determined that petitioner's offense involved moral turpitude and that discipline must be imposed, we are left with the task of determining the appropriate degree of that discipline. (7) It is well settled that where a disparity exists between the recommendation of the hearing panel and the review department, that of the review department is entitled to greater weight. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 693-694 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 774 , 739 P.2d 134 ].) And, even though we accord great weight to the department's recommendation, t | 1 | 1 |
Garlow v. State Bargreen2 sentences1987(Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 912, 916 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 640 P.2d 1106 ].) Again, however, the ultimate decision remains with this court. 1987(Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 912, 916 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 640 P.2d 1106 ].) Again, however, the ultimate decision remains with this court. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative
green
2 sentences2008Federal law, however, continues to prohibit the drug's possession, even by medical users. ( 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 , 844(a)); see Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1, 26-29 , 125 S.Ct. 2195 , 162 L.Ed.2d 1 ; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (2001) 532 U.S. 483, 491-195 , 121 S.Ct. 1711 , 149 L.Ed.2d 722 . 2008Federal law, however, continues to prohibit the drug's possession, even by medical users. ( 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 , 844(a)); see Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1, 26-29 , 125 S.Ct. 2195 , 162 L.Ed.2d 1 ; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (2001) 532 U.S. 483, 491-195 , 121 S.Ct. 1711 , 149 L.Ed.2d 722 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In Re Lewallen
green
1 sentence1980Even assuming, without conceding, that Rucker is retroactively applicable here, given the unequivocal identification of defendant by the two victims and the overwhelming evidence, a review of the entire record indicates that the admission of the statement was harmless under either the reasonable probability test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ], or the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. Cali *577 fornia (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]. 6 Finally, defendant contends that the People’s argument at the sentencing hearin | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1980Even assuming, without conceding, that Rucker is retroactively applicable here, given the unequivocal identification of defendant by the two victims and the overwhelming evidence, a review of the entire record indicates that the admission of the statement was harmless under either the reasonable probability test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ], or the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. Cali *577 fornia (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]. 6 Finally, defendant contends that the People’s argument at the sentencing hearin 1980Even assuming, without conceding, that Rucker is retroactively applicable here, given the unequivocal identification of defendant by the two victims and the overwhelming evidence, a review of the entire record indicates that the admission of the statement was harmless under either the reasonable probability test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ], or the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. Cali *577 fornia (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]. 6 Finally, defendant contends that the People’s argument at the sentencing hearin | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences1980Even assuming, without conceding, that Rucker is retroactively applicable here, given the unequivocal identification of defendant by the two victims and the overwhelming evidence, a review of the entire record indicates that the admission of the statement was harmless under either the reasonable probability test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ], or the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. Cali *577 fornia (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]. 6 Finally, defendant contends that the People’s argument at the sentencing hearin 1980Even assuming, without conceding, that Rucker is retroactively applicable here, given the unequivocal identification of defendant by the two victims and the overwhelming evidence, a review of the entire record indicates that the admission of the statement was harmless under either the reasonable probability test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ], or the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. Cali *577 fornia (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]. 6 Finally, defendant contends that the People’s argument at the sentencing hearin | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Darlington v. Hart
green
1 sentence1965Of the cases referred to above, Hart ( 11 Cal.2d 89, 92 ) and National Brass Works ( 92 Cal.App. 318, 322 ) suggest that participation in proceedings before the referee or trial court may constitute a Avaiver of objections. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
National Brass Works v. Weeks
green
1 sentence1965Of the cases referred to above, Hart ( 11 Cal.2d 89, 92 ) and National Brass Works ( 92 Cal.App. 318, 322 ) suggest that participation in proceedings before the referee or trial court may constitute a Avaiver of objections. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
green
2 sentences1962The Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board affirmed the department’s decision as to Count I but reversed as to Count II on the authority of Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 313 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 347 P.2d 909 ], which declared section 24200, subdivision (e) to be unconstitutional. 1962The Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board affirmed the department’s decision as to Count I but reversed as to Count II on the authority of Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 313 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 347 P.2d 909 ], which declared section 24200, subdivision (e) to be unconstitutional. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.