ruling is assigned error in California

1952(Estate of Magerl, 201 Cal. 162, 167 [ 256 P. 204 ]; Snidow v. Hill, 100 Cal.App.2d 31, 36 [ 222 P.2d 958 ]; Glogau v. Hagan, 107 Cal.App.2d 313 [ 237 P.2d 329 ]; Boone v. Hall, 100 Cal.App.2d 738 -741 [ 224 P.2d 881 ].) Where affirmative action, consisting of noting an exception, or of conduct equivalent thereto is required, mere silence must be taken as acquiescence when, upon *139 appeal, the ruling is assigned as error.

1952(Estate of Magerl, 201 Cal. 162, 167 [ 256 P. 204 ]; Snidow v. Hill, 100 Cal.App.2d 31, 36 [ 222 P.2d 958 ]; Glogau v. Hagan, 107 Cal.App.2d 313 [ 237 P.2d 329 ]; Boone v. Hall, 100 Cal.App.2d 738 -741 [ 224 P.2d 881 ].) Where affirmative action, consisting of noting an exception, or of conduct equivalent thereto is required, mere silence must be taken as acquiescence when, upon *139 appeal, the ruling is assigned as error.

1952(Estate of Magerl, 201 Cal. 162, 167 [ 256 P. 204 ]; Snidow v. Hill, 100 Cal.App.2d 31, 36 [ 222 P.2d 958 ]; Glogau v. Hagan, 107 Cal.App.2d 313 [ 237 P.2d 329 ]; Boone v. Hall, 100 Cal.App.2d 738 -741 [ 224 P.2d 881 ].) Where affirmative action, consisting of noting an exception, or of conduct equivalent thereto is required, mere silence must be taken as acquiescence when, upon *139 appeal, the ruling is assigned as error.

1952(Estate of Magerl, 201 Cal. 162, 167 [ 256 P. 204 ]; Snidow v. Hill, 100 Cal.App.2d 31, 36 [ 222 P.2d 958 ]; Glogau v. Hagan, 107 Cal.App.2d 313 [ 237 P.2d 329 ]; Boone v. Hall, 100 Cal.App.2d 738 -741 [ 224 P.2d 881 ].) Where affirmative action, consisting of noting an exception, or of conduct equivalent thereto is required, mere silence must be taken as acquiescence when, upon *139 appeal, the ruling is assigned as error.

1923This ruling is assigned as error under the authority of People v. Williams, 133 Cal. 168 [ 65 P. 323 ].

1923In a case recently decided (People v. Clark, ante, p. 46 [ 214 Pac. 248 ]), we passed upon the same point in language which fits the present action exactly: “The ruling was proper, as the motion did not come within the provisions of Penal Code, section 1382, fixing the grounds upon which such a motion may be made.

1919“It is well settled that negligence may be charged in general terms; that is, what was done being stated, it is sufficient to say it was negligently done, without stating the particular omission which rendered the act negligent.” (Smith v. Buttner, 90 Cal. 95 , [ 27 Pac. 29 ]; Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, 169 Cal. 683 , [ 147 Pac. 954 ].) [2] At the close of plaintiff’s evidence defendant moved for a nonsuit upon the ground that the evidence showed that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which motion was denied, and this ruling is assigned as error.

1919“It is well settled that negligence may be charged in general terms; that is, what was done being stated, it is sufficient to say it was negligently done, without stating the particular omission which rendered the act negligent.” (Smith v. Buttner, 90 Cal. 95 , [ 27 Pac. 29 ]; Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, 169 Cal. 683 , [ 147 Pac. 954 ].) [2] At the close of plaintiff’s evidence defendant moved for a nonsuit upon the ground that the evidence showed that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which motion was denied, and this ruling is assigned as error.

1919“It is well settled that negligence may be charged in general terms; that is, what was done being stated, it is sufficient to say it was negligently done, without stating the particular omission which rendered the act negligent.” (Smith v. Buttner, 90 Cal. 95 , [ 27 Pac. 29 ]; Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, 169 Cal. 683 , [ 147 Pac. 954 ].) [2] At the close of plaintiff’s evidence defendant moved for a nonsuit upon the ground that the evidence showed that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which motion was denied, and this ruling is assigned as error.

1919“It is well settled that negligence may be charged in general terms; that is, what was done being stated, it is sufficient to say it was negligently done, without stating the particular omission which rendered the act negligent.” (Smith v. Buttner, 90 Cal. 95 , [ 27 Pac. 29 ]; Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, 169 Cal. 683 , [ 147 Pac. 954 ].) [2] At the close of plaintiff’s evidence defendant moved for a nonsuit upon the ground that the evidence showed that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which motion was denied, and this ruling is assigned as error.

1913Appellant not only insists that he was entitled, without reading or referring to the deposition, as required by section 2052 of the Code of Civil Procedure (People v. Ching Hing Chang, 74 Cal. 389 , [ 16 Pac. 201 ] ; People v. Lambert, 120 Cal. 170 , [ 52 Pac. 307 ]), to question the witness as to his testimony given before the magistrate, but also insists, upon the authority of People v. Jan John, 137 Cal. 220 , [ 69 Pac. 1063 ], that the deposition could not be used to impeach the witness, and hence he was entitled to question the witness in the manner proposed.

1913Appellant not only insists that he was entitled, without reading or referring to the deposition, as required by section 2052 of the Code of Civil Procedure (People v. Ching Hing Chang, 74 Cal. 389 , [ 16 Pac. 201 ] ; People v. Lambert, 120 Cal. 170 , [ 52 Pac. 307 ]), to question the witness as to his testimony given before the magistrate, but also insists, upon the authority of People v. Jan John, 137 Cal. 220 , [ 69 Pac. 1063 ], that the deposition could not be used to impeach the witness, and hence he was entitled to question the witness in the manner proposed.

1913Appellant not only insists that he was entitled, without reading or referring to the deposition, as required by section 2052 of the Code of Civil Procedure (People v. Ching Hing Chang, 74 Cal. 389 , [ 16 Pac. 201 ] ; People v. Lambert, 120 Cal. 170 , [ 52 Pac. 307 ]), to question the witness as to his testimony given before the magistrate, but also insists, upon the authority of People v. Jan John, 137 Cal. 220 , [ 69 Pac. 1063 ], that the deposition could not be used to impeach the witness, and hence he was entitled to question the witness in the manner proposed.

1913Appellant not only insists that he was entitled, without reading or referring to the deposition, as required by section 2052 of the Code of Civil Procedure (People v. Ching Hing Chang, 74 Cal. 389 , [ 16 Pac. 201 ] ; People v. Lambert, 120 Cal. 170 , [ 52 Pac. 307 ]), to question the witness as to his testimony given before the magistrate, but also insists, upon the authority of People v. Jan John, 137 Cal. 220 , [ 69 Pac. 1063 ], that the deposition could not be used to impeach the witness, and hence he was entitled to question the witness in the manner proposed.

1913(Marshall v. Hancock, 80 Cal. 84 , [ 22 Pac. 61 ] ; Houghton v. Clarke, 80 Cal. 420 , [22 Pac. 288] ; Taylor v. Kelley, 103 Cal. 186 , [ 37 Pac. 216 ].) As was observed in Marshall v. Hancock , “the conversation, if there was one, may have been about a matter entirely aside from the matter under investigation.” *480 The witness was then asked whether or not after the father’s will was read which was a few days after his death on February 5th, and before March 7, 1906, he had a conversation with Milton wherein Milton stated that he was satisfied with his father’s will and had no intention whate

1913(Marshall v. Hancock, 80 Cal. 84 , [ 22 Pac. 61 ] ; Houghton v. Clarke, 80 Cal. 420 , [22 Pac. 288] ; Taylor v. Kelley, 103 Cal. 186 , [ 37 Pac. 216 ].) As was observed in Marshall v. Hancock , “the conversation, if there was one, may have been about a matter entirely aside from the matter under investigation.” *480 The witness was then asked whether or not after the father’s will was read which was a few days after his death on February 5th, and before March 7, 1906, he had a conversation with Milton wherein Milton stated that he was satisfied with his father’s will and had no intention whate

1913(Marshall v. Hancock, 80 Cal. 84 , [ 22 Pac. 61 ] ; Houghton v. Clarke, 80 Cal. 420 , [22 Pac. 288] ; Taylor v. Kelley, 103 Cal. 186 , [ 37 Pac. 216 ].) As was observed in Marshall v. Hancock , “the conversation, if there was one, may have been about a matter entirely aside from the matter under investigation.” *480 The witness was then asked whether or not after the father’s will was read which was a few days after his death on February 5th, and before March 7, 1906, he had a conversation with Milton wherein Milton stated that he was satisfied with his father’s will and had no intention whate

1913(Marshall v. Hancock, 80 Cal. 84 , [ 22 Pac. 61 ] ; Houghton v. Clarke, 80 Cal. 420 , [22 Pac. 288] ; Taylor v. Kelley, 103 Cal. 186 , [ 37 Pac. 216 ].) As was observed in Marshall v. Hancock , “the conversation, if there was one, may have been about a matter entirely aside from the matter under investigation.” *480 The witness was then asked whether or not after the father’s will was read which was a few days after his death on February 5th, and before March 7, 1906, he had a conversation with Milton wherein Milton stated that he was satisfied with his father’s will and had no intention whate

1913Appellant not only insists that he was entitled, without reading or referring to the deposition, as required by section 2052 of the Code of Civil Procedure (People v. Ching Hing Chang, 74 Cal. 389 , [ 16 Pac. 201 ] ; People v. Lambert, 120 Cal. 170 , [ 52 Pac. 307 ]), to question the witness as to his testimony given before the magistrate, but also insists, upon the authority of People v. Jan John, 137 Cal. 220 , [ 69 Pac. 1063 ], that the deposition could not be used to impeach the witness, and hence he was entitled to question the witness in the manner proposed.

1913Appellant not only insists that he was entitled, without reading or referring to the deposition, as required by section 2052 of the Code of Civil Procedure (People v. Ching Hing Chang, 74 Cal. 389 , [ 16 Pac. 201 ] ; People v. Lambert, 120 Cal. 170 , [ 52 Pac. 307 ]), to question the witness as to his testimony given before the magistrate, but also insists, upon the authority of People v. Jan John, 137 Cal. 220 , [ 69 Pac. 1063 ], that the deposition could not be used to impeach the witness, and hence he was entitled to question the witness in the manner proposed.

1912(People v. Corey, 8 Cal. App. 728, [ 97 Pac. 907 ], and cases there cited.) The instruction found on page 43 of the clerk’s transcript was refused and the ruling is assigned as error.

1911The information is in the language of the statute and free from the defects pointed out by this court in the case of People v. Grinnell, 9 Cal. App. 239 , [ 98 Pac. 681 ], where the information purported to charge a like offense.

1908In support of this contention he cites, among other cases, Crane v. McCormick, 92 Cal. 176 , [ 28 Pac. 222 ], where it is said: “A real estate agent’s right of recovery depends entirely upon his contract with the owner of the land. ’ ’ And McCarthy v. Loupe, 62 Cal. 302 , where it is said, in order to justify a recovery, “it is indispensable that he (the agent) should show that he was employed by the owner to make the sale.” Neither of these cases constitutes authority in support of appellant’s contention.

1908In support of this contention he cites, among other cases, Crane v. McCormick, 92 Cal. 176 , [ 28 Pac. 222 ], where it is said: “A real estate agent’s right of recovery depends entirely upon his contract with the owner of the land. ’ ’ And McCarthy v. Loupe, 62 Cal. 302 , where it is said, in order to justify a recovery, “it is indispensable that he (the agent) should show that he was employed by the owner to make the sale.” Neither of these cases constitutes authority in support of appellant’s contention.

1895Section 470 of the Penal Code provides that: “ Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any .... note, .... or utters, publishes, passes, or attempts to pass, as true and genuine, any of the above-named false, altered, forged, or counterfeited matters, as above specified and described, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person, .... is guilty of forgery.” As was said in People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507 : “ Where, in defining an offense, a statute enumerates a serie

1895Section 470 of the Penal Code provides that: “ Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any .... note, .... or utters, publishes, passes, or attempts to pass, as true and genuine, any of the above-named false, altered, forged, or counterfeited matters, as above specified and described, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person, .... is guilty of forgery.” As was said in People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507 : “ Where, in defining an offense, a statute enumerates a serie

1895Section 470 of the Penal Code provides that: “ Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any .... note, .... or utters, publishes, passes, or attempts to pass, as true and genuine, any of the above-named false, altered, forged, or counterfeited matters, as above specified and described, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person, .... is guilty of forgery.” As was said in People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507 : “ Where, in defining an offense, a statute enumerates a serie

1895Section 470 of the Penal Code provides that: “ Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any .... note, .... or utters, publishes, passes, or attempts to pass, as true and genuine, any of the above-named false, altered, forged, or counterfeited matters, as above specified and described, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person, .... is guilty of forgery.” As was said in People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507 : “ Where, in defining an offense, a statute enumerates a serie

1895Section 470 of the Penal Code provides that: “ Every person who, with intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any .... note, .... or utters, publishes, passes, or attempts to pass, as true and genuine, any of the above-named false, altered, forged, or counterfeited matters, as above specified and described, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud any person, .... is guilty of forgery.” As was said in People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507 : “ Where, in defining an offense, a statute enumerates a serie

1893In this defense it is averred that the defendants, at the time of the execution of the note, were, and for a long time prior thereto had been, respectively, the president and secretary of the San Bernardino Fruit Company, a corporation, of which facts plaintiff had full knowledge; that, prior to the making of the note, plaintiff had agreed with the corporation to loan to it $2,000; that the money was so loaned and delivered to the corporation, and the note in suit was given to secure it, and for no other purpose; that plaintiff and its officers well knew the facts, and that the note was intend

1885In Arnold v. Skaggs, 35 Cal. 684 , an assessment roll was held competent as evidence.