standards doctrine in California

2017Indeed, in the case sub judice , there is no evidence that ICO registration paperwork was ever received by the City Clerk's Office, and the *321 City sent Sheftel the order to *28 comply based on this perceived failure of registration. 6 Sheftel's filing of his ICO paperwork (assuming they were filed) at the Van Nuys Finance Office cannot be viewed as a "technical imperfection[ ] of form." As we stated in Trinity , "Nothing in the ICO suggests that the filing requirement was pointless or optional." ( Trinity , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 19 , 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 .) In the broader conte

2017Indeed, in the case sub judice , there is no evidence that ICO registration paperwork was ever received by the City Clerk's Office, and the *321 City sent Sheftel the order to *28 comply based on this perceived failure of registration. 6 Sheftel's filing of his ICO paperwork (assuming they were filed) at the Van Nuys Finance Office cannot be viewed as a "technical imperfection[ ] of form." As we stated in Trinity , "Nothing in the ICO suggests that the filing requirement was pointless or optional." ( Trinity , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 19 , 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 .) In the broader conte

2017Indeed, in the case sub judice , there is no evidence that ICO registration paperwork was ever received by the City Clerk's Office, and the *321 City sent Sheftel the order to *28 comply based on this perceived failure of registration. 6 Sheftel's filing of his ICO paperwork (assuming they were filed) at the Van Nuys Finance Office cannot be viewed as a "technical imperfection[ ] of form." As we stated in Trinity , "Nothing in the ICO suggests that the filing requirement was pointless or optional." ( Trinity , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 19 , 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 .) In the broader conte

2017Indeed, in the case sub judice , there is no evidence that ICO registration paperwork was ever received by the City Clerk's Office, and the *321 City sent Sheftel the order to *28 comply based on this perceived failure of registration. 6 Sheftel's filing of his ICO paperwork (assuming they were filed) at the Van Nuys Finance Office cannot be viewed as a "technical imperfection[ ] of form." As we stated in Trinity , "Nothing in the ICO suggests that the filing requirement was pointless or optional." ( Trinity , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 19 , 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 .) In the broader conte

2013Ch. 2009) 964 A.2d 106, 121 , fn. omitted.) As stated by the court in Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at page 812 , ―the entire question of demand futility is inextricably bound to issues of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine‘s applicability.‖ ―[O]nly where ‗a plaintiff has alleged facts with particularity which, taken as true, support a reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment . . . is demand excused.‘‖ (Balotti, supra, at § 13.14, p. 13-53, quoting Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at p. 2 815; see generally 2 McLaughlin

2013Ch. 2009) 964 A.2d 106, 121 , fn. omitted.) As stated by the court in Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at page 812 , ―the entire question of demand futility is inextricably bound to issues of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine‘s applicability.‖ ―[O]nly where ‗a plaintiff has alleged facts with particularity which, taken as true, support a reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment . . . is demand excused.‘‖ (Balotti, supra, at § 13.14, p. 13-53, quoting Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at p. 2 815; see generally 2 McLaughlin

2022(Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 .) “A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment.” (Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 .) “When a case involving such a clarifying amendment is on appeal, the appropriate resolution is to reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings in compliance with the amended legislation.” (People v. McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) Here, the changes to former section 1170, subdivision (d) apply to d

2022(Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 .) “A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment.” (Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 .) “When a case involving such a clarifying amendment is on appeal, the appropriate resolution is to reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings in compliance with the amended legislation.” (People v. McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) Here, the changes to former section 1170, subdivision (d) apply to d

2021The standards for waiver of a defendant’s right to dismissal under the five-year statute (§ 583.310) are generally applicable to section 583.320, except that “[u]nder a shorter statute of limitations the burden on the litigant to demonstrate diligence in insuring that the matter will be brought to trial in a timely manner is increased.” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 983, 995 .) The Nunns, as plaintiffs, had “ ‘a continuing duty to correctly compute the statutory [three years] and to advise the court of the impending deadline.’ ” (Wale v. Rodriguez (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d

2021The standards for waiver of a defendant’s right to dismissal under the five-year statute (§ 583.310) are generally applicable to section 583.320, except that “[u]nder a shorter statute of limitations the burden on the litigant to demonstrate diligence in insuring that the matter will be brought to trial in a timely manner is increased.” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 983, 995 .) The Nunns, as plaintiffs, had “ ‘a continuing duty to correctly compute the statutory [three years] and to advise the court of the impending deadline.’ ” (Wale v. Rodriguez (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d

2021The standards for waiver of a defendant’s right to dismissal under the five-year statute (§ 583.310) are generally applicable to section 583.320, except that “[u]nder a shorter statute of limitations the burden on the litigant to demonstrate diligence in insuring that the matter will be brought to trial in a timely manner is increased.” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 983, 995 .) The Nunns, as plaintiffs, had “ ‘a continuing duty to correctly compute the statutory [three years] and to advise the court of the impending deadline.’ ” (Wale v. Rodriguez (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d

2017(See Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc ., supra , 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333 , 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 ; Trinity , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th at p.

2017(See Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc ., supra , 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333 , 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 ; Trinity , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th at p.

2014(Ibid.; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) The juvenile court’s ruling reflects a clear understanding of the appropriate standards when hearing a petition to modify brought after reunification services have been terminated.

2013Ch. 2009) 964 A.2d 106, 121 , fn. omitted.) As stated by the court in Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at page 812 , ―the entire question of demand futility is inextricably bound to issues of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine‘s applicability.‖ ―[O]nly where ‗a plaintiff has alleged facts with particularity which, taken as true, support a reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment . . . is demand excused.‘‖ (Balotti, supra, at § 13.14, p. 13-53, quoting Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at p. 2 815; see generally 2 McLaughlin

2013(Citing United States v. Faubion (5th Cir. 1994) 19 F.3d 226, 228 .) The People’s contentions, to the effect defendant did not preserve the claim for appeal because he did not pursue relief by the proper mechanism in the trial court, present issues of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation, which also are reviewable under the de novo standard.

2013(Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 883 .) We must liberally construe the pleadings ―‗―with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.‖‘ [Citations.]‖ (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1, 32 .) Plaintiffs allege that the Board adopted the 2010 executive compensation program and that, in connection with the adoption of that program, each of the Board members ―issu[ed]‖ the 2010 Proxy Statement requesting that the shareholders vote to approve the 2010 executive compensation program.

2013(Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 883 .) We must liberally construe the pleadings ―‗―with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.‖‘ [Citations.]‖ (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1, 32 .) Plaintiffs allege that the Board adopted the 2010 executive compensation program and that, in connection with the adoption of that program, each of the Board members ―issu[ed]‖ the 2010 Proxy Statement requesting that the shareholders vote to approve the 2010 executive compensation program.

2009(Brehm v. Eisner (Del. 2000) 746 A.2d 244, 256 .) 6 The Delaware Supreme Court later clarified in Rales v. Blasband (Del. 1993) 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Rales), that the Aronson test could not be applied mechanically to all derivative suits in which no prior demand is made.

2003We conclude Genesis’s allegations regarding the unequal application of certain guidelines state a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under the standards for a claim by a “class of one” set forth in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 562 [ 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 ] (Olech).

2003We conclude Genesis’s allegations regarding the unequal application of certain guidelines state a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under the standards for a claim by a “class of one” set forth in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 562 [ 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 , 120 S.Ct. 1073 ] (Olech).

2002(Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 871 ; see fn. 4, ante.) Moreover, no waiver of any state law claims that were otherwise available occurred through Satten’s failure to pursue bankruptcy sanctions, since the matter was only in bankruptcy court as to Satten under the supplemental jurisdiction or “related to” rationales. ( 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 (b), 1367.) The prosecution of this action will not create any impermissible state court interference with the existence of federal sanctions for the filing of frivolous and malicious bankruptcy pleadings, such as was disallowed by

1995Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 ], the Supreme Court set out the standards and factors governing the instant case. *1442 “The determination of employee or independent-contractor status is one of fact if dependent upon the resolution of disputed evidence or inferences and the [trier of fact’s] decision must be upheld if substantially supported. [Citation.] If the evidence is undisputed, the question becomes one of law . . . .” ( 48 Cal.3d at p. 349 .) “Following common law tradition, California decisions . . . un

1995Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 ], the Supreme Court set out the standards and factors governing the instant case. *1442 “The determination of employee or independent-contractor status is one of fact if dependent upon the resolution of disputed evidence or inferences and the [trier of fact’s] decision must be upheld if substantially supported. [Citation.] If the evidence is undisputed, the question becomes one of law . . . .” ( 48 Cal.3d at p. 349 .) “Following common law tradition, California decisions . . . un

1965The United States Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391 [ 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 ], holds inter alia that under the federal habeas corpus statute power reposes in the federal courts to grant relief despite the petitioner’s failure to have pursued a state remedy no longer available at the time of his application.

1965The United States Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391 [ 83 S.Ct. 822 , 9 L.Ed.2d 837 ], holds inter alia that under the federal habeas corpus statute power reposes in the federal courts to grant relief despite the petitioner’s failure to have pursued a state remedy no longer available at the time of his application.