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180 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2025 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgwaygreen2 sentences2018Moreover, when a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), “[we] first review the trial court’s summary judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i).” Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600 . 2017Moreover, when a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), “[we] first review the trial court’s summary judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i).” Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600 . | 94 | 100 |
Lezlea Ross v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospitalgreen2 sentences2025“The pivotal issue in a safety standards-based claim is whether the standards on which the claim is based implicate the defendant’s duties as a health care provider, including its duties to provide for patient safety.” Id. at 505 . 2025Rather, the “pivotal” inquiry in such a case “is whether the standards on which the claim is based implicated the defendant’s duties as a health care provider, including its duties to provide for patient safety.” Id. | 8 | 46 |
Demarsenese Cage v. the Methodist Hospitalgreen2 sentences2021This nexus depends on “whether the standards on which the claim is based implicate the defendant’s duties as a health care provider, including its duties to provide for patient safety.” Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 505 ; see also Cage, 470 S.W.3d at 602 . 2020This nexus depends on “whether the standards on which the claim is based implicate the defendant’s duties as a health care provider, including its duties to provide for patient safety.” Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 505 ; see Cage, 470 S.W.3d at 602 . | 3 | 3 |
Hamilton v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2015P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008). 8 Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030 (2004). 3 nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. 9 We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 10 When a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), we will first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i). 11 If the appellant failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence 2012See id. & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008). 2 First State Bank of Texas merged with Wells Fargo in 2002. 3 When a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), we will first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i). | 2 | 2 |
Dale v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Applying the standards and analysis we set forth in Dale v. State , 170 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.), we determine that Appellant = s punishment was neither cruel and unusual nor disproportionate to the offense even if he had preserved his claimed error. 2011Applying the standards and analysis we set forth in Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.), we determine that Appellant=s punishment was neither cruel and unusual nor disproportionate to the offense even if he had preserved his claimed error. | 2 | 2 |
Butler v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See id. 2005See id. | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2006See id. at 812-13 (observing that "the standards for waiver should not be any less stringent in the context of an ineffective assistance claim than when we are speaking of a 'right to counsel' claim”). 2 . 1999The standards for a claim that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated were stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2062 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. | 1 | 2 |
Canton-Carter v. Baylor College of Medicinegreen1 sentence2022See Alanis v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Assn, 616 S.W.3d 1 , 10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied); Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“Failure to cite legal authority or to provide substantive analysis of the legal issues presented results in waiver of the complaint.”). | 1 | 1 |
First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parkergreen1 sentence2020First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont, d/b/a the Anchor of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. 2017) (when party moves for both traditional and no-evidence summary judgments, reviewing court first considers no-evidence motion); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubiogreen1 sentence2019Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex. 2005). 18 Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 505 . 19 Id. 8 To decide whether a plaintiff’s personal injury claim that arose from a fall asserted a health care liability claim subject to the Act, the Ross Court used these seven factors: 1. | 1 | 1 |
Oscar Luis Lopez v. LA MADELEINE OF TEXASgreen1 sentence2016Inc., 200 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Hamlett v. Holcombgreen1 sentence2016See Hamlett v. Holcomb, 69 S.W.3d 816 , 818–19 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (“When it is not readily apparent to the trial court that summary judgment is sought under rule 166a(i) [the no-evidence rule], the appellate court will presume that the motion is filed under the traditional summary judgment rule and analyze it accordingly.”). 2 of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion”). | 1 | 1 |
Louisa D. Reddic v. East Texas Medical Center Regional Health Care System, Individually and D/B/A East Texas Medical Center-Crockett, Inc.green1 sentence2016The key question when determining whether a claim is a health care liability claim is whether “the standards on which the claim is based implicate the defendant’s duties as a health care provider.” Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 505 ; see also Reddic, 474 S.W.3d at 676 . | 1 | 1 |
Padilla v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (“[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”); Roe v. Flores- Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 , 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1036, 1039 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 23 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Paul H. Smith v. Thomas O'donnell, of the Estate of Corwin Denneygreen1 sentence2015P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008). 8 Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030 (2004). 3 nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. 9 We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 10 When a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), we will first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i). 11 If the appellant failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence | 1 | 1 |
Roe v. Flores-Ortegagreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (“[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”); Roe v. Flores- Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 , 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1036, 1039 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 23 (2000). 2015See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (“[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”); Roe v. Flores- Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 , 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1036, 1039 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 23 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapmangreen1 sentence2015P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008). 8 Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030 (2004). 3 nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. 9 We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 10 When a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), we will first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i). 11 If the appellant failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence | 1 | 1 |
Furst v. Smithgreen1 sentence2014P. 103 (emphasis added); see also Furst v. Smith, 176 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that rule 108 incorporates the standards of rule 106 while imposing additional requirements); World Distribs., Inc. v. Knox, 968 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.) (applying the standards of rules 103 and 106 while deciding an issue under rule 108). | 1 | 1 |
| East Hill Marine, Inc. v. Rinker Boat Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Frost National Bank v. Fernandezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| 20801, INC. v. Parkergreen | 1 | 1 |
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Joachimgreen1 sentence2014Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). 4 Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). 5 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). 5 defendant who conclusively negates at least one essential element of a cause of action is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 6 When a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), we will first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i). 7 When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we examine the entire record in the light most favor | 1 | 1 |
Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fieldinggreen1 sentence2014Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). 4 Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). 5 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). 5 defendant who conclusively negates at least one essential element of a cause of action is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 6 When a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), we will first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i). 7 When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we examine the entire record in the light most favor | 1 | 1 |
| World Distributors, Inc. v. Knoxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Green v. McKaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Herndongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Grantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Porter v. Grayson Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arredondo v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeGrate v. Executive Imprints, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gutierrez v. Collinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| General Tire, Inc. v. Kepplegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Packergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Southern States Transportation, Inc. v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Myer v. Americo Life, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Myer, 371 S.W.3d at 543 (citing AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule R–12(b) (2003)). 2014Myer, 371 S.W.3d at 543 (citing AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule R-12(b) (2003)). | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2007The standards by which we test the sufficiency of the evidence are well established and are found in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. 2007The standards by which we test the sufficiency of the evidence are well established and are found in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 2007–2007 |
Watson v. State
green
2 sentences2007The standards by which we test the sufficiency of the evidence are well established and are found in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. 2007The standards by which we test the sufficiency of the evidence are well established and are found in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 2007–2007 |
Loaisiga v. Cerda
green
2 sentences2015Specifically, disposition of this appeal is also controlled by the Texas Supreme Court’s opinions, in Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie, 432 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2011), Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012), Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. 2012), Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2010), and Garland Community Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2004). 2015In Ross, the Texas Supreme Court placed its “substantive nexus” statement in the context of the existing and still valid concept that “if the facts underlying a claim could support claims against a physician or health care provider for departures from accepted standards of medical care health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, the claims are HCLCs regardless of whether plaintiff alleged defendants were liable for breach of the standards.” Id. at 503 (emphasis in original)(citing Loaisiga, 379 S.W.3d at 255 ). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Binur v. Jacobo
green
1 sentence2018Moreover, when a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), “[we] first review the trial court's summary judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i).” Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Boivin v. Town of Addison, Vermont
green
1 sentence2015P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008). 8 Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030 (2004). 3 nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. 9 We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 10 When a party moves for summary judgment under both rules 166a(c) and 166a(i), we will first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of rule 166a(i). 11 If the appellant failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Garland Community Hospital v. Rose
green
1 sentence2015Specifically, disposition of this appeal is also controlled by the Texas Supreme Court’s opinions, in Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie, 432 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2011), Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012), Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. 2012), Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2010), and Garland Community Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2004). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Williams
green
1 sentence2015Specifically, disposition of this appeal is also controlled by the Texas Supreme Court’s opinions, in Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie, 432 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2011), Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012), Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. 2012), Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2010), and Garland Community Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2004). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Yamada v. Friend
green
1 sentence2015Specifically, disposition of this appeal is also controlled by the Texas Supreme Court’s opinions, in Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie, 432 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2011), Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2012), Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. 2012), Yamada v. Friend, 335 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2010), and Garland Community Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2004). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Cole v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Republic Insurance Co. v. Davis green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Zimmerman v. Boyce neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.