state takings clause in California

2026(Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 151, 167 (Property Reserve I).) The California Supreme Court held that a “classic” condemnation action—commenced by the filing of a complaint under section 1250.110 et seq.—is not required for precondemnation entry and testing, even if such activities rise to the level of a taking or damaging of property under the state takings clause.

2026(Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 151, 167 (Property Reserve I).) The California Supreme Court held that a “classic” condemnation action—commenced by the filing of a complaint under section 1250.110 et seq.—is not required for precondemnation entry and testing, even if such activities rise to the level of a taking or damaging of property under the state takings clause.

2015(See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 376-378 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ]; HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 517-518 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 365 , 542 P.2d 237 ]; Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1278-1279 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ].) In contexts comparable to that at issue in this case, past cases of this court have interpreted the state takings clause “congruently” with the federal takings clause.

2015(See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 376-378 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ]; HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 517-518 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 365 , 542 P.2d 237 ]; Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1278-1279 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ].) In contexts comparable to that at issue in this case, past cases of this court have interpreted the state takings clause “congruently” with the federal takings clause.

2015(See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 664 .) 25 California Coastal Commission (1987) 483 U.S. 825 (Nollan) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 (Dolan).

2015(E.g., San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 664.) As the passage quoted in the text illustrates (see Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. _ [186 L.Ed.2d at p. 713]), at times the court in Koontz appears to have relied upon the special risks posed by monetary conditions, like the monetary payment at issue in that case, that are offered by a permitting authority as an alternative to or substitute for the actual dedication of property for public use.

2024(See Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 260 [“Although the California Constitution affords somewhat broader protection by also requiring compensation when property is damaged for public use, apart from this difference, the state takings clause is construed congruently with the 10 federal clause”].) She forfeited the contention by failing to raise it in the trial court.

2014The California Constitution provides a somewhat broader protection because it provides compensation for damage as well as for taking, but “the state takings clause is construed congruently with the federal clause.” (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 260 .) B.

2017Industry Assn. , at p. 462, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 351 P.3d 974 .) Governmental action that constitutes a permanent physical invasion or deprives a property of all viable economic use is usually a " 'categorical' " taking requiring compensation. ( Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th at p. 774, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ( Kavanau ).) The determination of whether a taking has occurred is "a question of law based on factual underpinnings." ( Bass Enterprises Prod.

2017Industry Assn. , at p. 462, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 351 P.3d 974 .) Governmental action that constitutes a permanent physical invasion or deprives a property of all viable economic use is usually a " 'categorical' " taking requiring compensation. ( Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th at p. 774, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ( Kavanau ).) The determination of whether a taking has occurred is "a question of law based on factual underpinnings." ( Bass Enterprises Prod.

2016In analyzing the issue, the Jacobsen court observed at the outset that ―[i]t is conceded by the respondents [i.e., the district] in their briefs . . . that if the entry upon and examination of the lands of the petitioners herein, as applied for and permitted in the above-mentioned action, would amount to the taking or damaging of petitioners‘ property within the meaning of section 14 of article I of the state constitution, the said order of the court would be violative of that provision of the constitution.‖ (Jacobsen, supra, 192 Cal. at p. 324 .) The court explained that the district‘s positi

2016(Deering, edit. 1923) § 1242, p. 674, italics added.) In considering whether the activities at issue in that case constituted the taking or damaging of property within the meaning of the state takings clause, the court in Jacobsen first reviewed the history of the state takings clause, explaining that the relevant constitutional provision was amended at the 1879 Constitutional Convention to add the words ―or damaged‖ to the provision. ( Jacobsen, supra, 192 Cal. at pp. 326-327.) The court then reviewed the activities the district proposed to undertake on the landowners‘ property and stated tha

2016(See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 378 [―Neither the ‗taken‘ nor the ‗or damaged‘ language [of California Constitution article I, section 19] ever has been extended to apply outside the realm of eminent domain or public works to impose a Constitution-based liability, unamenable to legislative regulation, for property damage incidentally caused by the actions of public employees in the pursuit of their public duties.‖]; Onick v. Long (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 381, 387 [no liability for entry by alcohol beverage control agents to enforce liquor laws].) Instead, any

2016(See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 378 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ] [“Neither the ‘taken’ nor the ‘or damaged’ language [of California Constitution article I, section 19] ever has been extended to apply outside the realm of eminent domain or public works to impose a Constitution-based liability, unamenable to legislative regulation, for property damage incidentally caused by the actions of public employees in the pursuit of their public duties.”]; Onick v. Long (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 381, 387 [ 316 P.2d 427 ] [no liability for entry by alcohol beverag

2016(See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Ricards (1973) 10 Cal.3d 385, 388-389 (Ricards) [inverse condemnation action for temporary destruction of property owner‘s easement over a bridge that afforded access to owner‘s property]; Pacific Gas & Electric v. Hufford (1957) 49 Cal.2d 545 [condemnation action to obtain an easement for the construction, operation, and maintenance of electrical transmission line]; see generally 1 Matteoni, Condemnation Practice in Cal. (3d ed. 2014) § 4.80, pp. 4- 130 to 4-132.) It is questionable, however, whether the authority afforded by the trial court‘s environmental

2016In this court’s decision in Ricards , we agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that “the destruction of the bridge constituted a taking or damaging of the owner’s property rights of access within the meaning of [the state takings clause for which] . . . [s]he . . . became entitled to just compensation” ( Ricards, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 389), but we reversed the substantial monetary award that had been granted to the property owner by the trial court.

2016San Jacinto, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 656 .) Contrary to the Court of Appeal‘s determination, we conclude that the state takings clause does not preclude the Legislature, in the precondemnation entry and testing context, from authorizing a public entity to proceed pursuant to an expedited precondemnation procedure rather than through a more elaborate classic condemnation proceeding.

2016San Jacinto, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 656.) Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s determination, we conclude that the state takings clause does not preclude the Legislature, in the precondemnation entry and testing context, from authorizing a public entity to proceed pursuant to an expedited precondemnation procedure rather than through a more elaborate classic condemnation proceeding.

2016These courts reasoned that because the Department proposed to fill the holes that it bored in the property with a type of grout that would be left in the holes after the Department completed its investigatory activities, the geological activities amounted to a permanent per se taking of property under the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419, 426 (Loretto).

2016With respect to the proposed geological testing, as with the authorized environmental testing, the Department is not seeking to obtain title to private property, to permanently maintain bored holes on the landowners‘ property, or to obtain exclusive possession of any portion of the property for a significant period of time.32 31 We note in this regard that on remand from the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Loretto, supra, 458 U.S. 419 , the New York Court of Appeals concluded that even if the challenged New York statute worked a per se taking of a landlord‘s property, the New York st

2016(See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (N.Y. 1983) 446 N.E.2d 428, 432-433, 448 .) 32 Because no permanent physical occupation of property is involved here, we have no occasion to determine what procedure would be required under the state takings clause in the event that precondemnation testing required such activity. 70 Under the precondemnation entry and testing statutes, a landowner has the opportunity to object to the proposed geological activities and to propose limitations on drilling activities that would eliminate or minimize any potential interference with the landowner‘s c

2016(See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1983) 58 N.Y.2d 143 [ 459 N.Y.S.2d 743 , 446 N.E.2d 428, 432-433 ].) Because no permanent physical occupation of property is involved here, we have no occasion to determine what procedure would be required under the state takings clause in the event that precondemnation testing required such activity.

2015(See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 376-378 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ]; HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 517-518 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 365 , 542 P.2d 237 ]; Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1278-1279 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ].) In contexts comparable to that at issue in this case, past cases of this court have interpreted the state takings clause “congruently” with the federal takings clause.

2015(See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 376-378 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ]; HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 517-518 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 365 , 542 P.2d 237 ]; Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1278-1279 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ].) In contexts comparable to that at issue in this case, past cases of this court have interpreted the state takings clause “congruently” with the federal takings clause.

2015(See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 376-378 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ]; HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 517-518 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 365 , 542 P.2d 237 ]; Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1278-1279 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ].) In contexts comparable to that at issue in this case, past cases of this court have interpreted the state takings clause “congruently” with the federal takings clause.

2015(See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 376-378 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ]; HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 517-518 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 365 , 542 P.2d 237 ]; Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1278-1279 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 ].) In contexts comparable to that at issue in this case, past cases of this court have interpreted the state takings clause “congruently” with the federal takings clause.

2015(E.g., San Remo Hotel, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 664.) As the passage quoted in the text illustrates (see Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. _ [186 L.Ed.2d at p. 713]), at times the court in Koontz appears to have relied upon the special risks posed by monetary conditions, like the monetary payment at issue in that case, that are offered by a permitting authority as an alternative to or substitute for the actual dedication of property for public use.