basis of sovereign immunity in Connecticut

2022See Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 557 , 473 A.2d 1176 (1984) (upholding trial court’s dismissal of portions of counts contained in plaintiff’s complaint on basis of sovereign immunity), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Piteau v. Board of Education, 300 Conn. 667 , 680–81, 689, 15 A.3d 1067 (2011); Ware v. State, 118 Conn. App. 65 , 80–81, 983 A.2d 853 (2009) (reversing trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to dismiss portions of counts contained in plaintiff’s com- plaint on basis of sovereign immunity).’’ (Emphasis in original.) Paragon

2022See Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 557 , 473 A.2d 1176 (1984) (upholding trial court’s dismissal of portions of counts contained in plaintiff’s complaint on basis of sovereign immunity), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Piteau v. Board of Education, 300 Conn. 667 , 680–81, 689, 15 A.3d 1067 (2011); Ware v. State, 118 Conn. App. 65 , 80–81, 983 A.2d 853 (2009) (reversing trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to dismiss portions of counts contained in plaintiff’s com- plaint on basis of sovereign immunity).’’ (Emphasis in original.) Paragon

2002If the complaint alleges facts sufficient to invoke a statutory waiver of immunity, then the trial court cannot properly grant a motion to dismiss solely on the basis of sovereign immunity." (Citation omitted.) Amore v. Frankel , 29 Conn. App. 565 , 569 , 616 A.2d 1152 , rev'd on other grounds, 228 Conn. 358 , 636 A.2d 786 (1994) (holding that because count one of the complaint alleged facts that supported a cause of action under Connecticut's defective highway statute, the count "was sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and to withstand the defendant's motion to dismiss." Id.);

2002If the complaint alleges facts sufficient to invoke a statutory waiver of immunity, then the trial court cannot properly grant a motion to dismiss solely on the basis of sovereign immunity." (Citation omitted.) Amore v. Frankel , 29 Conn. App. 565 , 569 , 616 A.2d 1152 , rev'd on other grounds, 228 Conn. 358 , 636 A.2d 786 (1994) (holding that because count one of the complaint alleged facts that supported a cause of action under Connecticut's defective highway statute, the count "was sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and to withstand the defendant's motion to dismiss." Id.);

2002If the complaint alleges facts sufficient to invoke a statutory waiver of immunity, then the trial court cannot properly grant a motion to dismiss solely on the basis of sovereign immunity." (Citation omitted.) Amore v. Frankel , 29 Conn. App. 565 , 569 , 616 A.2d 1152 , rev'd on other grounds, 228 Conn. 358 , 636 A.2d 786 (1994) (holding that because count one of the complaint alleged facts that supported a cause of action under Connecticut's defective highway statute, the count "was sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and to withstand the defendant's motion to dismiss." Id.);

2002If the complaint alleges facts sufficient to invoke a statutory waiver of immunity, then the trial court cannot properly grant a motion to dismiss solely on the basis of sovereign immunity." (Citation omitted.) Amore v. Frankel , 29 Conn. App. 565 , 569 , 616 A.2d 1152 , rev'd on other grounds, 228 Conn. 358 , 636 A.2d 786 (1994) (holding that because count one of the complaint alleged facts that supported a cause of action under Connecticut's defective highway statute, the count "was sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and to withstand the defendant's motion to dismiss." Id.);

2022Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming ( 284 Conn. 250 ) and Gold v. Rowland ( 296 Conn. 186 ), which required claims for injunctive relief against the state to satisfy one of the exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, there was no categorical exception to sovereign immunity for applications for writs of mandamus; furthermore, the trial court improperly determined that the plaintiff’s requests for mandamus relief had to rise and fall together and, therefore, improperly dismissed the portion of the first count of the complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants to act on i

2022Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming ( 284 Conn. 250 ) and Gold v. Rowland ( 296 Conn. 186 ), which required claims for injunctive relief against the state to satisfy one of the exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, there was no categorical exception to sovereign immunity for applications for writs of mandamus; furthermore, the trial court improperly determined that the plaintiff’s requests for mandamus relief had to rise and fall together and, therefore, improperly dismissed the portion of the first count of the complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants to act on i

2019In its September 7, 2017 memorandum of decision, the court noted that, in accordance with our Supreme Court’s holding in Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Com- missioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382 , 978 A.2d 49 (2009) (Envirotest), in order for a statute to waive the state’s sovereign immunity from suit by force of necessary implication, the waiver must be the ‘‘only possible interpretation of the [statutory] language.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 390 .

2019In its September 7, 2017 memorandum of decision, the court noted that, in accordance with our Supreme Court’s holding in Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Com- missioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382 , 978 A.2d 49 (2009) (Envirotest), in order for a statute to waive the state’s sovereign immunity from suit by force of necessary implication, the waiver must be the ‘‘only possible interpretation of the [statutory] language.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 390 .

2014Specifically, the defendants contend that, although the plaintiffs complaint purports to sue them in their individual capacities only, the state nevertheless is the real party in interest pursuant to the four-prong test first articulated in Somers v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476 , 123 A.2d 468 (1956), and later expounded upon in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

2014Specifically, the defendants contend that, although the plaintiffs complaint purports to sue them in their individual capacities only, the state nevertheless is the real party in interest pursuant to the four-prong test first articulated in Somers v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476 , 123 A.2d 468 (1956), and later expounded upon in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

2014Specifically, the defendants contend that, although the plaintiffs complaint purports to sue them in their individual capacities only, the state nevertheless is the real party in interest pursuant to the four-prong test first articulated in Somers v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476 , 123 A.2d 468 (1956), and later expounded upon in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

2014Specifically, the defendants contend that, although the plaintiffs complaint purports to sue them in their individual capacities only, the state nevertheless is the real party in interest pursuant to the four-prong test first articulated in Somers v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476 , 123 A.2d 468 (1956), and later expounded upon in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

2014See id., 571–72; Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn. App. 103, 122 , 891 A.2d 106 (2006).

2014See id., 571–72; Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn. App. 103, 122 , 891 A.2d 106 (2006).

2004The state and Shea, as well as the commissioner, claim that this court’s recent decision in Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 36-38 , 848 A.2d 418 (2004), is dispositive of the question of whether the trial court improperly granted Maresh’s motion for a declaratory ruling and a writ of mandamus, and improperly denied the state’s and Shea’s motions to dismiss.

2004The state and Shea, as well as the commissioner, claim that this court’s recent decision in Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven, Inc., 269 Conn. 10, 36-38 , 848 A.2d 418 (2004), is dispositive of the question of whether the trial court improperly granted Maresh’s motion for a declaratory ruling and a writ of mandamus, and improperly denied the state’s and Shea’s motions to dismiss.

2002The State moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity, citing Herzig v. Horrigan, supra, 34 Conn. App. 816 .

1994In Cairns v. Shugrue, 186 Conn. 300, 308 , 441 A.2d 185 (1982), we held that § 13a-144 does not only apply to injuries occurring upon roads within the “state highway system.” 7 Rather, under § 13a-144, whenever it is shown that the commissioner “has a legal duty to repair or maintain a particular [road], he [or she] is subject to liability for injuries occurring thereon which are caused by negligence in performing that duty.” Id., 310.

1994In Cairns v. Shugrue, 186 Conn. 300, 308 , 441 A.2d 185 (1982), we held that § 13a-144 does not only apply to injuries occurring upon roads within the “state highway system.” 7 Rather, under § 13a-144, whenever it is shown that the commissioner “has a legal duty to repair or maintain a particular [road], he [or she] is subject to liability for injuries occurring thereon which are caused by negligence in performing that duty.” Id., 310.

1991In Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 451 , 421, our Supreme Court, quoting from Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615 , 624 stated the following: "Sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state officials acting in excess of their statutory authority. . . .