Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grady v. Town of Somersgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324 , 344–46, 984 A.2d 684 (2009). 2023See, e.g., Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324 , 344–46, 984 A.2d 684 (2009). | 1 | 2 |
Doe v. Petersengreen2 sentences2018Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Appellate Court explained that "a jury reasonably could conclude from the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion that it was apparent that the joking manner in which Powers called in the emergency to dispatch, together with the defendants' failure to respond themselves, made it more likely than not that White would become a victim of the storm." Id., at 55 , 138 A.3d 1012 . *375 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Court acknowledged that this court repeatedly has stated that, under th 2018Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Appellate Court explained that "a jury reasonably could conclude from the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion that it was apparent that the joking manner in which Powers called in the emergency to dispatch, together with the defendants' failure to respond themselves, made it more likely than not that White would become a victim of the storm." Id., at 55 , 138 A.3d 1012 . *375 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Court acknowledged that this court repeatedly has stated that, under th | 1 | 2 |
Cole v. New Havengreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., State v. Raynor, 334 Conn. 264 , 266 n.1, 221 A.3d 401 (2019) (this court may ‘‘rephrase’’ certified question that ‘‘does not properly frame the issues pre- sented in the appeal because it inaccurately reflects the holding of the Appellate Court’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cole v. New Haven, 337 Conn. 326 , 336–37, 253 A.3d 476 (2020) (explaining doctrinal sources of discretionary act immunity). 3 ‘‘Kashmanian testified that his understanding of surveillance is ‘you’re following someone at a distance, trying to keep an eye on them, where they’re going; what their | 1 | 1 |
State v. Raynorgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., State v. Raynor, 334 Conn. 264 , 266 n.1, 221 A.3d 401 (2019) (this court may ‘‘rephrase’’ certified question that ‘‘does not properly frame the issues pre- sented in the appeal because it inaccurately reflects the holding of the Appellate Court’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cole v. New Haven, 337 Conn. 326 , 336–37, 253 A.3d 476 (2020) (explaining doctrinal sources of discretionary act immunity). 3 ‘‘Kashmanian testified that his understanding of surveillance is ‘you’re following someone at a distance, trying to keep an eye on them, where they’re going; what their | 1 | 1 |
Seymour National Bank v. Statered1 sentence2021In that dissenting opinion, Justice Peters cited an Indiana decision for the proposition that, ‘‘[w]here a court relied on the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts in determining the liability of a police officer, the hot pursuit of a suspect was held to be a ministerial act carrying liability for negligence and permitting a [common- law] action.’’ Shore v. Stonington, supra, 160–61 (Peters, J., dissenting); see Seymour National Bank v. State, 384 N.E.2d 1177 , 1184–85 (Ind. App. 1979) (due care language in Indiana’s emergency vehicle statute created duty of care owed by stat | 1 | 1 |
Seymour National Bank v. Stategreen1 sentence2021In that dissenting opinion, Justice Peters cited an Indiana decision for the proposition that, ‘‘[w]here a court relied on the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts in determining the liability of a police officer, the hot pursuit of a suspect was held to be a ministerial act carrying liability for negligence and permitting a [common- law] action.’’ Shore v. Stonington, supra, 160–61 (Peters, J., dissenting); see Seymour National Bank v. State, 384 N.E.2d 1177 , 1184–85 (Ind. App. 1979) (due care language in Indiana’s emergency vehicle statute created duty of care owed by stat | 1 | 1 |
Durrant v. BD. OF EDUC. OF CITY OF HARTFORDgreen2 sentences2018Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Appellate Court explained that "a jury reasonably could conclude from the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion that it was apparent that the joking manner in which Powers called in the emergency to dispatch, together with the defendants' failure to respond themselves, made it more likely than not that White would become a victim of the storm." Id., at 55 , 138 A.3d 1012 . *375 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Court acknowledged that this court repeatedly has stated that, under th 2018Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Appellate Court explained that "a jury reasonably could conclude from the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion that it was apparent that the joking manner in which Powers called in the emergency to dispatch, together with the defendants' failure to respond themselves, made it more likely than not that White would become a victim of the storm." Id., at 55 , 138 A.3d 1012 . *375 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Court acknowledged that this court repeatedly has stated that, under th | 1 | 1 |
Curran v. Krollgreen2 sentences2016Where, she’s at Route 1 near Ambleside? ‘‘Officer Powers: Yeah, someplace in a field up there. ‘‘Dispatcher Smith: Ok. ‘‘Officer Powers: She should be the person standing out in the rain. (chuckling) ‘‘Dispatcher Smith: Ok. ‘‘Officer Powers: Bye. ‘‘Dispatcher Smith: Bye.’’ 4 The plaintiff did not properly raise any other exceptions to the doctrine of discretionary act immunity. 5 See also Curran v. Kroll, 303 Conn. 845, 857 , 37 A.3d 700 (2012) (‘‘[T]he line between permissible inference and impermissible speculation is not always easy to discern. . . . 2016Where, she’s at Route 1 near Ambleside? ‘‘Officer Powers: Yeah, someplace in a field up there. ‘‘Dispatcher Smith: Ok. ‘‘Officer Powers: She should be the person standing out in the rain. (chuckling) ‘‘Dispatcher Smith: Ok. ‘‘Officer Powers: Bye. ‘‘Dispatcher Smith: Bye.’’ 4 The plaintiff did not properly raise any other exceptions to the doctrine of discretionary act immunity. 5 See also Curran v. Kroll, 303 Conn. 845, 857 , 37 A.3d 700 (2012) (‘‘[T]he line between permissible inference and impermissible speculation is not always easy to discern. . . . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Violano v. Fernandez
green
2 sentences2020Section 52-557n (a) (2) (B) extends, however, the same discretionary act immunity that applies to municipal officials to the municipalities themselves by providing that they will not be liable for damages caused by negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’ (Citations omit- ted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 , 318–20, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). ‘‘For purposes of determining whether a duty is dis- cretionary or ministeria 2020Section 52-557n (a) (2) (B) extends, however, the same discretionary act immunity that applies to municipal officials to the municipalities themselves by providing that they will not be liable for damages caused by negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’ (Citations omit- ted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 , 318–20, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). ‘‘For purposes of determining whether a duty is dis- cretionary or ministeria | 3 | 2009–2020 |
Borelli v. Renaldi
green
1 sentence2026Section 52-557n (a) (2) (B) extends, how- ever, the same discretionary act immunity that applies to municipal officials to the municipalities themselves by providing that they will not be liable for damages caused by negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1 , 10–11, 243 A.3d 1064 (2020). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Shore v. Town of Stonington
green
1 sentence2021The legislature’s act of codifying the common law would render Tetro highly instructive in the application and construction of § 52-557n, to the extent that it decided anything with respect to governmental immunity. 9 This complete omission is particularly curious, given that one year before authoring the majority opinion in Tetro, former Chief Justice Peters dissented in Shore v. Stonington, supra, 187 Conn. 147 , a discretionary act immunity case that has become paradigmatic for its application of the identifiable person, imminent harm exception. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Blake v. Mason
green
2 sentences2020Blake v. Mason, 82 Conn. 324, 327 , 73 A. 782 (1909) . . . . 2020Blake v. Mason, 82 Conn. 324, 327 , 73 A. 782 (1909) . . . . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bonington v. Town of Westport
green
2 sentences2020Section 52-557n (a) (2) (B) extends, however, the same discretionary act immunity that applies to municipal officials to the municipalities themselves by providing that they will not be liable for damages caused by negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’ (Citations omit- ted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 , 318–20, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). ‘‘For purposes of determining whether a duty is dis- cretionary or ministeria 2020Section 52-557n (a) (2) (B) extends, however, the same discretionary act immunity that applies to municipal officials to the municipalities themselves by providing that they will not be liable for damages caused by negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’ (Citations omit- ted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310 , 318–20, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). ‘‘For purposes of determining whether a duty is dis- cretionary or ministeria | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Brooks v. Powers
green
2 sentences2018Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Appellate Court explained that "a jury reasonably could conclude from the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion that it was apparent that the joking manner in which Powers called in the emergency to dispatch, together with the defendants' failure to respond themselves, made it more likely than not that White would become a victim of the storm." Id., at 55 , 138 A.3d 1012 . *375 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Court acknowledged that this court repeatedly has stated that, under th 2018Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Appellate Court explained that "a jury reasonably could conclude from the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion that it was apparent that the joking manner in which Powers called in the emergency to dispatch, together with the defendants' failure to respond themselves, made it more likely than not that White would become a victim of the storm." Id., at 55 , 138 A.3d 1012 . *375 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Court acknowledged that this court repeatedly has stated that, under th | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission
green
2 sentences2016(B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martel v. Metropolitan District Com- mission, 275 Conn. 38 , 47–48, 881 A.2d 194 (2005). ‘‘The statute thus distinguishes between discretionary acts and those that are ministerial in nature, with liability attaching to a municipality only for negligently per- formed ministerial acts, not for negligently performed discretionary acts.’’ DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn. App. 216 2016(B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martel v. Metropolitan District Com- mission, 275 Conn. 38 , 47–48, 881 A.2d 194 (2005). ‘‘The statute thus distinguishes between discretionary acts and those that are ministerial in nature, with liability attaching to a municipality only for negligently per- formed ministerial acts, not for negligently performed discretionary acts.’’ DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn. App. 216 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Evon v. Andrews
green
2 sentences2010In Grady , our Supreme Court determined that the common-law identifiable person, imminent harm exception applies to the discretionary act immunity provided to municipalities in an action brought solely against a municipality pursuant to § 52-557n (a). 9 The plaintiffs verdict form requested only an award of noneconomic damages. 10 At the time the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the plaintiffs admitted that all of the alleged negligent actions of the defendant were discretionary in nature, not ministerial. 11 “The immunity from liability for the perf 2010In Grady , our Supreme Court determined that the common-law identifiable person, imminent harm exception applies to the discretionary act immunity provided to municipalities in an action brought solely against a municipality pursuant to § 52-557n (a). 9 The plaintiffs verdict form requested only an award of noneconomic damages. 10 At the time the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the plaintiffs admitted that all of the alleged negligent actions of the defendant were discretionary in nature, not ministerial. 11 “The immunity from liability for the perf | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Spears v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2009Specifically, he argues that, under Pane v. Danbury, supra, 267 Conn. 677 -78 n.9, and Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22,29 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003), a direct cause of action for negligence may be maintained *332 pursuant to § 52-557n (a) against a municipality without the requirement that one of its employees be named as a defendant, as well. 2009Specifically, he argues that, under Pane v. Danbury, supra, 267 Conn. 677 -78 n.9, and Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22,29 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003), a direct cause of action for negligence may be maintained *332 pursuant to § 52-557n (a) against a municipality without the requirement that one of its employees be named as a defendant, as well. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Tango v. City of New Haven
green
2 sentences2009The extent to which such changes are made is unclear.” (Citation omitted.) Report of the Law Revision Commission, supra, p. 22. 25 The commission report further explains the discretionary act immunity provided by § 52-557n (a) (2) (B), with respect to the liability imposed by the statute on municipalities for their employees’ or officials’ negligence, by observing that, “at common law, municipalities were liable for the negligent execution of ministerial acts, those governmental duties which must be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment and discretion . . . .” Repor 2009The extent to which such changes are made is unclear.” (Citation omitted.) Report of the Law Revision Commission, supra, p. 22. 25 The commission report further explains the discretionary act immunity provided by § 52-557n (a) (2) (B), with respect to the liability imposed by the statute on municipalities for their employees’ or officials’ negligence, by observing that, “at common law, municipalities were liable for the negligent execution of ministerial acts, those governmental duties which must be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment and discretion . . . .” Repor | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.