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12 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Staudinger v. Barrettgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 , 375-76, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995). ‘‘The doctrine of negligence per se serves to superim- pose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general standard of care.’’ Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988). 2019See, e.g., Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 , 375-76, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995). ‘‘The doctrine of negligence per se serves to superim- pose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general standard of care.’’ Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988). | 1 | 10 |
Gore v. People's Savings Bankgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 , 375-76, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995). ‘‘The doctrine of negligence per se serves to superim- pose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general standard of care.’’ Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988). 2019See, e.g., Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360 , 375-76, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995). ‘‘The doctrine of negligence per se serves to superim- pose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general standard of care.’’ Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992"The doctrine of negligence per se serves to superimpose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general standard of care." Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94 , 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988), citing Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173 , 178 , 439 A.2d 954 (1981). 1992"The doctrine of negligence per se serves to superimpose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general standard of care." Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94 , 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988), citing Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173 , 178 , 439 A.2d 954 (1981). | 3 | 1988–1994 |
Gore v. People's Savings Bank
green
1 sentence1995First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by the statute. [Citations omitted.] Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent. [Citations omitted.] Gore v. People's Savings Bank , 35 Conn. App. 126 , 130 , 131 (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Knybel v. Cramer
green
2 sentences1994Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173, 178 , 439 A.2d 954 (1981).” Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988). “ ‘Where a statute is designed to protect persons against injury, one who has, as a result of its violation, suffered such an injury as the statute was intended to guard against has a good ground of recovery.’ Knybel v. Cramer, 129 Conn. 439, 443 , 29 A.2d 576 [1942]; Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 102 , 214 A.2d 127 [1965]. 1994Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173, 178 , 439 A.2d 954 (1981).” Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988). “ ‘Where a statute is designed to protect persons against injury, one who has, as a result of its violation, suffered such an injury as the statute was intended to guard against has a good ground of recovery.’ Knybel v. Cramer, 129 Conn. 439, 443 , 29 A.2d 576 [1942]; Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 102 , 214 A.2d 127 [1965]. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Coughlin v. Peters
green
2 sentences1994Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173, 178 , 439 A.2d 954 (1981).” Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988). “ ‘Where a statute is designed to protect persons against injury, one who has, as a result of its violation, suffered such an injury as the statute was intended to guard against has a good ground of recovery.’ Knybel v. Cramer, 129 Conn. 439, 443 , 29 A.2d 576 [1942]; Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 102 , 214 A.2d 127 [1965]. 1994Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173, 178 , 439 A.2d 954 (1981).” Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 101 , 544 A.2d 164 (1988). “ ‘Where a statute is designed to protect persons against injury, one who has, as a result of its violation, suffered such an injury as the statute was intended to guard against has a good ground of recovery.’ Knybel v. Cramer, 129 Conn. 439, 443 , 29 A.2d 576 [1942]; Coughlin v. Peters, 153 Conn. 99, 102 , 214 A.2d 127 [1965]. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Small v. South Norwalk Savings Bank
green
2 sentences1992"Statutory negligence is actionable upon satisfaction of two conditions: (1) the plaintiff must be a member of the class protected by the statute; and (2) the injury must be of the type the statute was intended to prevent." (Citation omitted.) Small v. South Norwalk Savings Bank, 205 Conn. 751 , 760 , 535 A.2d 1292 (1988). 1992"Statutory negligence is actionable upon satisfaction of two conditions: (1) the plaintiff must be a member of the class protected by the statute; and (2) the injury must be of the type the statute was intended to prevent." (Citation omitted.) Small v. South Norwalk Savings Bank, 205 Conn. 751 , 760 , 535 A.2d 1292 (1988). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.