elevated standard in Florida

2008For instance, in Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla.1987), we concluded that "[i]n a case where the proceedings implicate the loss of livelihood, an elevated standard is necessary to protect the rights and interests of the accused." Id. at 295 .

2008For instance, in Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla.1987), we concluded that "[i]n a case where the proceedings implicate the loss of livelihood, an elevated standard is necessary to protect the rights and interests of the accused." Id. at 295 .

1984Thus, we do not express an opinion on this practice. [3] Mr. Caluwe states, and the District does not dispute, that two of the individuals named have since been found guilty of the charges he levied against them by the Commission on Ethics. [4] We note, however, that the hearing officer erroneously relied on Bowling v. Department of Insurance, 394 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) as authority for applying an elevated standard of proof.

1981There we required an elevated standard of competent substantial evidence, stating: [W]hen the standards of conduct to be enforced are not explicitly fixed by statute or by rule, but depend on ... debatable expressions ...; when the conduct to be assessed is past, beyond the actor's power to conform it to agency standards announced prospectively; and when the proceeding may result in the loss of a valuable business or professional license, the critical matters in issue must be shown by evidence which is indubitably as "substantial" as the consequences. 394 So.2d at 172 .

2012Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). “[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands....” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).

2012Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). “[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands....” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).

2012Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). “[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands....” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).

2012Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). “[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands....” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).

2012Mgmt, 452 So.2d 932 (Fla.1984).

2004"A strong probability that an employer's acts will result in injury is not sufficient to overcome the immunity afforded by the statute." Clark v. Gumby's Pizza Sys., Inc., 674 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), abrogated on different grounds by Turner, 754 So.2d 683 (citation omitted) (abrogated for use of the elevated standard of "virtual certainty").

2004"A strong probability that an employer's acts will result in injury is not sufficient to overcome the immunity afforded by the statute." Clark v. Gumby's Pizza Sys., Inc., 674 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), abrogated on different grounds by Turner, 754 So.2d 683 (citation omitted) (abrogated for use of the elevated standard of "virtual certainty").

1997Reg., Bd. of Medicine, 654 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); and Pic N' Save Central Florida, Inc. v. Department of Bus.

1993Although Santosky dealt with the state's initiation of termination proceedings, the Court's analysis applies to the present case: An elevated standard of proof in a parental rights termination proceeding would alleviate "the possible risk that a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyncratic behavior." Addington v. Texas, [ 441 U.S. 418, 427 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)].

1993Although Santosky dealt with the state's initiation of termination proceedings, the Court's analysis applies to the present case: An elevated standard of proof in a parental rights termination proceeding would alleviate "the possible risk that a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyncratic behavior." Addington v. Texas, [ 441 U.S. 418, 427 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)].