elevated standard in California

2025(Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819 [explaining that prosecutors should maintain “an elevated standard of conduct”].) However, the prosecutor’s errors did not render defendant’s trial unfair nor were they meant to improperly persuade the jury.

2024The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during summation may state matters not in evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819 .) “Prosecutors, however, are held to an elevated standard of conduct.” (Ibid.) “A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique func

2014The juvenile court ordered the children removed from Father’s and Mother’s custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1), which provides that a dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of the parents unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s par

2014(Kimberly R. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1078 ; see In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581 [although trial court makes findings by the elevated standard of clear and convincing evidence, substantial evidence test remains the standard of review on appeal]; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880-881 [same].) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determination, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the determination, and we affirm the order even if there is other evidence supporting a contrary conclusion.

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [the elevated standard that governs federal rights]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] [same].) B.

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [the elevated standard that governs federal rights]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] [same].) B.

2016“Prosecutorial misconduct implies a deceptive or reprehensible method of persuading the court or jury.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 448 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1157 , 1161- 1165.) Although prosecutors are given “ ‘ “ ‘wide latitude’ ” ’ ” in arguing their cases, they nevertheless “are held to an elevated standard of conduct.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 (Hill), overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 .) The imposition of this higher standard is justifi

2016Code, § 6068, subd. (b).) A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state. [Citation.] As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the prosecutor represents “a sovereignty whose obligation 24 to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Hill (1998) 17

2009(In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ].) When the trial court makes findings by the elevated standard of clear and convincing evidence, the substantial evidence test remains the standard of review on appeal.

2009(In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ].) When the trial court makes findings by the elevated standard of clear and convincing evidence, the substantial evidence test remains the standard of review on appeal.

1990(Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 329 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ]; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 915-922 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 623 P.2d 198 ].) However, for the reasons just discussed none of the criteria for imposing this elevated standard on respondent exists here.

1990(Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 329 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ]; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 915-922 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 623 P.2d 198 ].) However, for the reasons just discussed none of the criteria for imposing this elevated standard on respondent exists here.

2003By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, no state interest requires further evidence of the consequences to the child of parental unfitness, let alone evidence that meets an elevated standard of proof." ( Cynthia D., 5 Cal.4th at p. 256 , 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 851 P.2d 1307 .) The one exception is when a colorable claim that the so-called benefit exception should be applied is raised at the termination hearing, because under the second prong of the benefit exception, the trial court at such hearing may inquire into whether the minor would benefit from a continuing relationship with the parent

2003By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, no state interest requires further evidence of the consequences to the child of parental unfitness, let alone evidence that meets an elevated standard of proof." ( Cynthia D., 5 Cal.4th at p. 256 , 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 , 851 P.2d 1307 .) The one exception is when a colorable claim that the so-called benefit exception should be applied is raised at the termination hearing, because under the second prong of the benefit exception, the trial court at such hearing may inquire into whether the minor would benefit from a continuing relationship with the parent

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [the elevated standard that governs federal rights]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] [same].) B.

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [the elevated standard that governs federal rights]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] [same].) B.

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [the elevated standard that governs federal rights]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] [same].) B.

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [the elevated standard that governs federal rights]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] [same].) B.

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [the elevated standard that governs federal rights]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] [same].) B.

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690-691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [the elevated standard that governs federal rights]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] [same].) B.

1994(Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 253 .) At the hearing in which a child is originally ordered removed from parental custody, the court is required to make findings by clear and convincing evidence that removal is necessary to avoid substantial danger to the child’s physical or emotional health. (§ 361, subd. (b).) At subsequent hearings, the court must return the child to the parents’ custody unless it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that return would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional health. (§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f); § 366.22, subd. (

1993Moreover, the court concluded, an elevated standard of proof would not unduly burden New York's fact finders. ( Ibid. )" ( In re Heather B., supra, 9 Cal. App.4th at pp. 550-552.) Our decision in In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d 908 , preceded Santosky v. Kramer .

2012In Brommel , “the district attorney released to the press copies of the confessions and admissions of defendant before they were admitted into evidence by the court. . . .” (Brommel, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 636 .) Brommel noted the “obvious impropriety of this conduct” and said: “Prosecuting officers owe a public duty of fairness to the accused as well as to the People, and they should avoid the danger of prejudicing jurors and prospective jurors by giving material to news-disseminating agencies which may be inflammatory or improperly prejudicial to defendant’s rights.” (Ibid.) Defendant is cor

2012In Brommel , “the district attorney released to the press copies of the confessions and admissions of defendant before they were admitted into evidence by the court. . . .” (Brommel, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 636 .) Brommel noted the “obvious impropriety of this conduct” and said: “Prosecuting officers owe a public duty of fairness to the accused as well as to the People, and they should avoid the danger of prejudicing jurors and prospective jurors by giving material to news-disseminating agencies which may be inflammatory or improperly prejudicial to defendant’s rights.” (Ibid.) Defendant is cor

2014The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] . . .’ ” ’ ” [¶] Prosecutors, however, are held to an elevated standard of conduct . . . ‘because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state. [Citation.]’ ” ( Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 819-820.) In evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on a prosecutor’s comments to the jury, we must determine whether “there is a reasonabl

2014The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] . . .” ’ [¶] Prosecutors, however, are held to an elevated standard of conduct . . . because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state. [Citation.]” ( Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 819-820.) In evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on a prosecutor’s comments to the jury, we must determine whether “ ‘there is a reasonable pos

1993Moreover, the court concluded, an elevated standard of proof would not unduly burden New York's fact finders. ( Ibid. )" ( In re Heather B., supra, 9 Cal. App.4th at pp. 550-552.) Our decision in In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d 908 , preceded Santosky v. Kramer .

1990(Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 329 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ]; In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 915-922 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 637 , 623 P.2d 198 ].) However, for the reasons just discussed none of the criteria for imposing this elevated standard on respondent exists here.

2025A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the 112 PEOPLE v. BARRETT Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800 , 819–820.) “ ‘ “It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to engage in behavior or tactics purposefully calculated to irritate or annoy the court or opposing counsel.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 742 (Roldan).) We will assume the prosecutor committed miscond

2025A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in representing the 112 PEOPLE v. BARRETT Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the state.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800 , 819–820.) “ ‘ “It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to engage in behavior or tactics purposefully calculated to irritate or annoy the court or opposing counsel.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 742 (Roldan).) We will assume the prosecutor committed miscond

2025This means common carriers must ‘do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under the circumstances,’ albeit ‘consistent with the character and mode of conveyance adopted and the practical operation of [their] business.’ ” (Smith v. Magic Mountain LLC (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1128 , 1136–1137; Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 785 (Lopez).) “This elevated standard of care for common carriers has its origin in English common law.

2024(People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1077 .) “A distinction clearly exists[, however] between the permissible comment that a defendant has not produced any evidence, and on the other hand an improper statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce evidence, or a duty or burden to prove 4 his or her innocence.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340 .) “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manne