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12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moore v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Moore v. State , 156 Ga. App. 92 , 93 (1), 274 S.E.2d 107 (1980) (prospective juror's statement that *306 defendant was a "firebug" where defendant was charged with arson was inherently prejudicial); Lingerfelt v. State , 147 Ga. App. 371 , 372-373 (1), 249 S.E.2d 100 (1978) (prospective juror's statement during voir dire that he heard defendant, who was on trial for burglary and rape, was a "peeping tom" was inherently prejudicial). (i) At the hearing on Barnes's motion for new trial, his trial counsel explained that after considering the issue, she elected to simply strike the pro 2019See, e.g., Moore v. State , 156 Ga. App. 92 , 93 (1), 274 S.E.2d 107 (1980) (prospective juror's statement that *306 defendant was a "firebug" where defendant was charged with arson was inherently prejudicial); Lingerfelt v. State , 147 Ga. App. 371 , 372-373 (1), 249 S.E.2d 100 (1978) (prospective juror's statement during voir dire that he heard defendant, who was on trial for burglary and rape, was a "peeping tom" was inherently prejudicial). (i) At the hearing on Barnes's motion for new trial, his trial counsel explained that after considering the issue, she elected to simply strike the pro | 2 | 2 |
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Allen v. State, 277 Ga. 711, 712 (3) ( 593 SE2d 662 ) (2004) (no ineffective assistance where trial counsel testified that he deliberately decided not to contact potential witnesses due to their lack of credibility and lack of any direct knowledge of the crimes). 2015See Allen v. State, 277 Ga. 711, 712 (3) ( 593 SE2d 662 ) (2004) (no ineffective assistance where trial counsel testified that he deliberately decided not to contact potential witnesses due to their lack of credibility and lack of any direct knowledge of the crimes). | 2 | 2 |
Lingerfelt v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Moore v. State , 156 Ga. App. 92 , 93 (1), 274 S.E.2d 107 (1980) (prospective juror's statement that *306 defendant was a "firebug" where defendant was charged with arson was inherently prejudicial); Lingerfelt v. State , 147 Ga. App. 371 , 372-373 (1), 249 S.E.2d 100 (1978) (prospective juror's statement during voir dire that he heard defendant, who was on trial for burglary and rape, was a "peeping tom" was inherently prejudicial). (i) At the hearing on Barnes's motion for new trial, his trial counsel explained that after considering the issue, she elected to simply strike the pro 2019See, e.g., Moore v. State , 156 Ga. App. 92 , 93 (1), 274 S.E.2d 107 (1980) (prospective juror's statement that *306 defendant was a "firebug" where defendant was charged with arson was inherently prejudicial); Lingerfelt v. State , 147 Ga. App. 371 , 372-373 (1), 249 S.E.2d 100 (1978) (prospective juror's statement during voir dire that he heard defendant, who was on trial for burglary and rape, was a "peeping tom" was inherently prejudicial). (i) At the hearing on Barnes's motion for new trial, his trial counsel explained that after considering the issue, she elected to simply strike the pro | 1 | 2 |
Rabenstein v. Cannizzogreen2 sentences2020Given these circumstances, the depositing of the $25,000 check by Plaintiffs’ counsel amounted to an accord and 15 Rabenstein v. Cannizo, 244 Ga. App. 107, 107 ( 534 SE2d 847 ) (2000); accord Wade v. Crannis, 209 Ga. App. 501, 503 (2) ( 433 SE2d 669 ) (1993); Hardigree v. McMichael, 181 Ga. App. 583, 583 (1) ( 353 SE2d 78 ) (1987). 10 satisfaction, discharging Plaintiffs’ claims against Barnes.16 Accordingly, for this additional reason, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 2020Given these circumstances, the depositing of the $25,000 check by Plaintiffs’ counsel amounted to an accord and 15 Rabenstein v. Cannizo, 244 Ga. App. 107, 107 ( 534 SE2d 847 ) (2000); accord Wade v. Crannis, 209 Ga. App. 501, 503 (2) ( 433 SE2d 669 ) (1993); Hardigree v. McMichael, 181 Ga. App. 583, 583 (1) ( 353 SE2d 78 ) (1987). 10 satisfaction, discharging Plaintiffs’ claims against Barnes.16 Accordingly, for this additional reason, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. | 1 | 1 |
Torres v. Elkingreen1 sentence2020In fact, when the insurer’s counsel responded to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s initial entreaty regarding interviewing Barnes by stating that he was only engaged to draft the release, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “Fair enough.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 13 See Raines v. Duskin, 247 Ga. 512, 523 (2) ( 277 SE2d 26 ) (1981) (“Precatory words are words whose ordinary significance imports entreaty, recommendation, or expectation rather than any mandatory direction.” (punctuation omitted)); Torres, 317 Ga. App. at 141 (2) (noting that “[l]anguage | 1 | 1 |
Pourreza v. Teel Appraisals & Advisory, Inc.green2 sentences2020In fact, when the insurer’s counsel responded to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s initial entreaty regarding interviewing Barnes by stating that he was only engaged to draft the release, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “Fair enough.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 13 See Raines v. Duskin, 247 Ga. 512, 523 (2) ( 277 SE2d 26 ) (1981) (“Precatory words are words whose ordinary significance imports entreaty, recommendation, or expectation rather than any mandatory direction.” (punctuation omitted)); Torres, 317 Ga. App. at 141 (2) (noting that “[l]anguage 2020In fact, when the insurer’s counsel responded to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s initial entreaty regarding interviewing Barnes by stating that he was only engaged to draft the release, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “Fair enough.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 13 See Raines v. Duskin, 247 Ga. 512, 523 (2) ( 277 SE2d 26 ) (1981) (“Precatory words are words whose ordinary significance imports entreaty, recommendation, or expectation rather than any mandatory direction.” (punctuation omitted)); Torres, 317 Ga. App. at 141 (2) (noting that “[l]anguage | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Crannisgreen2 sentences2020Given these circumstances, the depositing of the $25,000 check by Plaintiffs’ counsel amounted to an accord and 15 Rabenstein v. Cannizo, 244 Ga. App. 107, 107 ( 534 SE2d 847 ) (2000); accord Wade v. Crannis, 209 Ga. App. 501, 503 (2) ( 433 SE2d 669 ) (1993); Hardigree v. McMichael, 181 Ga. App. 583, 583 (1) ( 353 SE2d 78 ) (1987). 10 satisfaction, discharging Plaintiffs’ claims against Barnes.16 Accordingly, for this additional reason, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 2020Given these circumstances, the depositing of the $25,000 check by Plaintiffs’ counsel amounted to an accord and 15 Rabenstein v. Cannizo, 244 Ga. App. 107, 107 ( 534 SE2d 847 ) (2000); accord Wade v. Crannis, 209 Ga. App. 501, 503 (2) ( 433 SE2d 669 ) (1993); Hardigree v. McMichael, 181 Ga. App. 583, 583 (1) ( 353 SE2d 78 ) (1987). 10 satisfaction, discharging Plaintiffs’ claims against Barnes.16 Accordingly, for this additional reason, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. | 1 | 1 |
Raines v. Duskingreen2 sentences2020In fact, when the insurer’s counsel responded to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s initial entreaty regarding interviewing Barnes by stating that he was only engaged to draft the release, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “Fair enough.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 13 See Raines v. Duskin, 247 Ga. 512, 523 (2) ( 277 SE2d 26 ) (1981) (“Precatory words are words whose ordinary significance imports entreaty, recommendation, or expectation rather than any mandatory direction.” (punctuation omitted)); Torres, 317 Ga. App. at 141 (2) (noting that “[l]anguage 2020In fact, when the insurer’s counsel responded to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s initial entreaty regarding interviewing Barnes by stating that he was only engaged to draft the release, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “Fair enough.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 13 See Raines v. Duskin, 247 Ga. 512, 523 (2) ( 277 SE2d 26 ) (1981) (“Precatory words are words whose ordinary significance imports entreaty, recommendation, or expectation rather than any mandatory direction.” (punctuation omitted)); Torres, 317 Ga. App. at 141 (2) (noting that “[l]anguage | 1 | 1 |
Herring v. Dunninggreen1 sentence2020In fact, when the insurer’s counsel responded to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s initial entreaty regarding interviewing Barnes by stating that he was only engaged to draft the release, Plaintiffs’ counsel responded: “Fair enough.” Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 13 See Raines v. Duskin, 247 Ga. 512, 523 (2) ( 277 SE2d 26 ) (1981) (“Precatory words are words whose ordinary significance imports entreaty, recommendation, or expectation rather than any mandatory direction.” (punctuation omitted)); Torres, 317 Ga. App. at 141 (2) (noting that “[l]anguage | 1 | 1 |
Hardigree v. McMichaelgreen2 sentences2020Given these circumstances, the depositing of the $25,000 check by Plaintiffs’ counsel amounted to an accord and 15 Rabenstein v. Cannizo, 244 Ga. App. 107, 107 ( 534 SE2d 847 ) (2000); accord Wade v. Crannis, 209 Ga. App. 501, 503 (2) ( 433 SE2d 669 ) (1993); Hardigree v. McMichael, 181 Ga. App. 583, 583 (1) ( 353 SE2d 78 ) (1987). 10 satisfaction, discharging Plaintiffs’ claims against Barnes.16 Accordingly, for this additional reason, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. 2020Given these circumstances, the depositing of the $25,000 check by Plaintiffs’ counsel amounted to an accord and 15 Rabenstein v. Cannizo, 244 Ga. App. 107, 107 ( 534 SE2d 847 ) (2000); accord Wade v. Crannis, 209 Ga. App. 501, 503 (2) ( 433 SE2d 669 ) (1993); Hardigree v. McMichael, 181 Ga. App. 583, 583 (1) ( 353 SE2d 78 ) (1987). 10 satisfaction, discharging Plaintiffs’ claims against Barnes.16 Accordingly, for this additional reason, the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to enforce settlement. | 1 | 1 |
PATEL Et Al. v. PATELgreen2 sentences2018Patel , 342 Ga. App. at 92 (2), 802 S.E.2d 871 . 3 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Barnes' motion on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. 2. 2018Patel , 342 Ga. App. at 92 (2), 802 S.E.2d 871 . 3 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Barnes' motion on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. 2. | 1 | 1 |
Tante v. Herringgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Tante, 264 Ga. at 694 , 453 S.E.2d 686 . [1] The correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals that the statute of limitation barred Barnes's claim based on Turner's failure to inform Barnes of the need to renew the filing is not within the scope of the question posed, which clearly dealt only with the duty to renew which the majority wrongly assumes, and should not be considered in this appeal. 2004See, e.g., Tante, 264 Ga. at 694 , 453 S.E.2d 686 . [1] The correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals that the statute of limitation barred Barnes's claim based on Turner's failure to inform Barnes of the need to renew the filing is not within the scope of the question posed, which clearly dealt only with the duty to renew which the majority wrongly assumes, and should not be considered in this appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Handson v. HCA Health Services of Georgia, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Handson v. HCA Health Svcs. of Ga., 264 Ga. 293, n. 1 ( 443 SE2d 831 ) (1994). 2004See Handson v. HCA Health Svcs. of Ga., 264 Ga. 293, n. 1 ( 443 SE2d 831 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Lunsford v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Lunsford v. State, 237 Ga. App. 696 ( 515 SE2d 198 ) (1999) (order denying a motion for an out-of-time appeal is directly appealable). | 1 | 1 |
Lunsford v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Lunsford v. State, 237 Ga. App. 696 ( 515 SE2d 198 ) (1999) (order denying a motion for an out-of-time appeal is directly appealable). | 1 | 1 |
Eisele v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Eisele v. State, 238 Ga. App. 289, 290 ( 519 SE2d 9 ) (1999). 2000Eisele v. State, 238 Ga. App. 289, 290 ( 519 SE2d 9 ) (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Waldrep v. Goodwingreen2 sentences1990See Wallace v. ARA Svcs., supra; Saunders v. Vikers, supra. Accordingly, Barnes’ motion pierced Johnson’s pleadings (Waldrep v. Goodwin, 230 Ga. 1, 2 ( 195 SE2d 432 )), and Johnson was required to set forth specific facts showing there was a genuine issue for trial or summary judgment would be entered against her. 1990See Wallace v. ARA Svcs., supra; Saunders v. Vikers, supra. Accordingly, Barnes’ motion pierced Johnson’s pleadings (Waldrep v. Goodwin, 230 Ga. 1, 2 ( 195 SE2d 432 )), and Johnson was required to set forth specific facts showing there was a genuine issue for trial or summary judgment would be entered against her. | 1 | 1 |
Summer-Minter & Associates, Inc. v. Giordanogreen2 sentences1990OCGA § 9-11-56 (e); Summer-Minter & Assoc. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 604 ( 203 SE2d 173 ). 1990OCGA § 9-11-56 (e); Summer-Minter & Assoc. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 604 ( 203 SE2d 173 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stephens v. ALAN v. MOCK CONST. CO., INC.
green
2 sentences2014Under these circumstances, Barnes and White had full and fair notice and opportunity to respond to the issues, and the trial court did not err in sua sponte granting summary judgment in favor of Weinberg on the issue of liability on his breach of contract claim. 3 Stephens, 302 Ga. App. at 288-289 . 3. 2014Under these circumstances, Barnes and White had full and fair notice and opportunity to respond to the issues, and the trial court did not err in sua sponte granting summary judgment in favor of Weinberg on the issue of liability on his breach of contract claim.3 Id. at 288-289 . 3. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Barnes v. State
green
1 sentence1999This court held that the trial court erred in denying Barnes’s motion to suppress, noting that he “was free to walk away and refuse to answer or ignore the officers’ request to speak unless the police had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that he was involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 46 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.