statutory affirmative defense in Georgia

2014See Maxey v. State, 272 Ga. App. 800, 802 (1) ( 613 SE2d 236 ) (2005) (“In order to assert a statutory affirmative defense,... the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent.”).

2014See Maxey v. State, 272 Ga. App. 800, 802 (1) ( 613 SE2d 236 ) (2005) (“In order to assert a statutory affirmative defense,... the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent.”).

2013Haynes v. State, 281 Ga. App. 81, 82 (2) (b) ( 635 SE2d 370 ) (2006); Maxey v. State, 272 Ga. App. 800, 802 (1) ( 613 SE2d 236 ) (2005) (“In order to assert a statutory affirmative defense,. . . the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent.. ..”).

2013Haynes v. State, 281 Ga. App. 81, 82 (2) (b) ( 635 SE2d 370 ) (2006); Maxey v. State, 272 Ga. App. 800, 802 (1) ( 613 SE2d 236 ) (2005) (“In order to assert a statutory affirmative defense,. . . the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent.. ..”).

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2020“The trial court’s refusal to give [the] instruction deprived [Pennington] of one of [his] defense theories . . . and thus deprived [him] of the chance for the jury to [acquit him based on the affirmative defense].” Shah v. State, 300 Ga. 14, 22 (2) (b) ( 793 SE2d 81 ) (2016).

2020“The trial court’s refusal to give [the] instruction deprived [Pennington] of one of [his] defense theories . . . and thus deprived [him] of the chance for the jury to [acquit him based on the affirmative defense].” Shah v. State, 300 Ga. 14, 22 (2) (b) ( 793 SE2d 81 ) (2016).

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ward v. State, 288 Ga. 641, 645 (4) ( 706 SE2d 430 ) (2011).

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ward v. State, 288 Ga. 641, 645 (4) ( 706 SE2d 430 ) (2011).

2013Opio v. State, 283 Ga. App. 894, 899 (1) (d) (iii) ( 642 SE2d 906 ) (2007) (duly certified medical records did not need to be authenticated at trial).

2013Opio v. State, 283 Ga. App. 894, 899 (1) (d) (iii) ( 642 SE2d 906 ) (2007) (duly certified medical records did not need to be authenticated at trial).

2006(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Holder v. State, 194 Ga.App. 790, 794 (4), 391 S.E.2d 808 (1990). "[T]he danger of death or dismemberment at some future time, in the absence of all danger at the time of [the crime], will not excuse." Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 528 , 15 S.E. 748 (1892). [T]o assert a statutory affirmative defense, such as coercion, the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent; evidence of coercion is then presented to justify, excuse, or mitigate the crime by showing no criminal intent.

2006(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Holder v. State, 194 Ga.App. 790, 794 (4), 391 S.E.2d 808 (1990). "[T]he danger of death or dismemberment at some future time, in the absence of all danger at the time of [the crime], will not excuse." Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 528 , 15 S.E. 748 (1892). [T]o assert a statutory affirmative defense, such as coercion, the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent; evidence of coercion is then presented to justify, excuse, or mitigate the crime by showing no criminal intent.

2006(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Holder v. State, 194 Ga.App. 790, 794 (4), 391 S.E.2d 808 (1990). "[T]he danger of death or dismemberment at some future time, in the absence of all danger at the time of [the crime], will not excuse." Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 528 , 15 S.E. 748 (1892). [T]o assert a statutory affirmative defense, such as coercion, the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent; evidence of coercion is then presented to justify, excuse, or mitigate the crime by showing no criminal intent.

2006(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Holder v. State, 194 Ga.App. 790, 794 (4), 391 S.E.2d 808 (1990). "[T]he danger of death or dismemberment at some future time, in the absence of all danger at the time of [the crime], will not excuse." Burns v. State, 89 Ga. 527, 528 , 15 S.E. 748 (1892). [T]o assert a statutory affirmative defense, such as coercion, the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent; evidence of coercion is then presented to justify, excuse, or mitigate the crime by showing no criminal intent.

1999However, in order to assert a statutory affirmative defense, such as coercion, the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent; evidence of coercion is then presented to “justify, excuse, or mitigate [the crime] by showing no criminal intent.” Hightower v. State, 224 Ga. App. 703, 705 ( 481 SE2d 867 ) (1997).

1999However, in order to assert a statutory affirmative defense, such as coercion, the defendant must admit all of the elements of the crime except intent; evidence of coercion is then presented to “justify, excuse, or mitigate [the crime] by showing no criminal intent.” Hightower v. State, 224 Ga. App. 703, 705 ( 481 SE2d 867 ) (1997).

1999“After evidence of [coercion] is presented, the State bears the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cits.]” Manning v. State, 231 Ga. App. 584, 585 (3) ( 499 SE2d 650 ) (1998). *431 In order for duress or fear produced by threats or menaces [ ] to be a valid legal excuse for doing anything which would otherwise be criminal, the act must have been done under such threats or menaces as show that life or member was in danger. . . .

1999“After evidence of [coercion] is presented, the State bears the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cits.]” Manning v. State, 231 Ga. App. 584, 585 (3) ( 499 SE2d 650 ) (1998). *431 In order for duress or fear produced by threats or menaces [ ] to be a valid legal excuse for doing anything which would otherwise be criminal, the act must have been done under such threats or menaces as show that life or member was in danger. . . .