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12 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Walters v. Stategreen2 sentences2018We therefore conclude that because no evidence presented at trial raised this statutory affirmative defense, Nelson and Savoie were not entitled to an instruction on this defense, and the trial court did not err by failing to include such an instruction in the jury charge.9 See id. § 2.04(c); Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 208–09. 9 Appellants also argue that the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury that it had the right to nullify an unconstitutional law. 2018See Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 208–09. | 3 | 3 |
Arredondo v. Duggergreen2 sentences2013Arredondo appealed, arguing that section 93.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code replaced the common law unlawful acts doctrine, and that the statutory affirmative defense did not apply in this case.2 The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 93.001 supersedes the common law unlawful acts doctrine.3 347 S.W.3d at 769 . 2013Arredondo appealed, arguing that section 93.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code replaced the common law unlawful acts doctrine, and that the statutory affirmative defense did not apply in this case. 2 The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 93.001 supersedes the common law unlawful acts doctrine. 3 347 S.W.3d at 769 . | 2 | 4 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See Miller v. State, 660 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). [2] So named after the following cases of this Court: Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Cr. 1985See Miller v. State, 660 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). . | 2 | 2 |
In Re JFCgreen1 sentence2019See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (sufficiency standards of review). | 1 | 1 |
Stefanoff v. Stategreen1 sentence2018“Although jury nullification is a recognized part of our judicial system, there is no constitutional requirement that a trial judge instruct the jury on nullification.” Stefanoff v. State, 78 S.W.3d 496, 502 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alexander v. State
green
2 sentences1998For the inauspicious genesis of the rule, see Mullins v. State, 35 Tex.Crim. 149 , 32 S.W. 691 (1895) and Alexander v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. 359 , 20 S.W. 756 (1892). [1] All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated. [1] Alibi is not, however, a statutory affirmative defense. 1998For the inauspicious genesis of the rule, see Mullins v. State, 35 Tex.Crim. 149 , 32 S.W. 691 (1895) and Alexander v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. 359 , 20 S.W. 756 (1892). [1] All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated. [1] Alibi is not, however, a statutory affirmative defense. | 2 | 1985–1998 |
Mullens v. State
green
2 sentences1998For the inauspicious genesis of the rule, see Mullins v. State, 35 Tex.Crim. 149 , 32 S.W. 691 (1895) and Alexander v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. 359 , 20 S.W. 756 (1892). [1] All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated. [1] Alibi is not, however, a statutory affirmative defense. 1998For the inauspicious genesis of the rule, see Mullins v. State, 35 Tex.Crim. 149 , 32 S.W. 691 (1895) and Alexander v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. 359 , 20 S.W. 756 (1892). [1] All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated. [1] Alibi is not, however, a statutory affirmative defense. | 2 | 1985–1998 |
Royster v. State
green
2 sentences1998See Miller v. State, 660 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). [2] So named after the following cases of this Court: Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Cr. 1985See Miller v. State, 660 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). [2] So named after the following cases of this Court: Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Cr. | 2 | 1985–1998 |
Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. v. Zuleima Olivares, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Pedro Olivares, Jr., & Pedro Olivares
green
1 sentence2025By contrast, section 89.045 applies to both the Commission waived its arguments that the proper standard Commission and private entities that qualify as operators or was good faith rather than negligence and that the evidence nonoperators and provides a statutory affirmative defense to conclusively established the Commission's good faith.10 Id. liability for those entities' “good-faith effort[s] to carry out at *9. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Holley v. Adams
green
1 sentence2018Compounding the issue, DFPS argued that a statutory affirmative defense to termination under Subsection (O) (for parents’ good-faith efforts to comply and no-fault lapses) was unavailable to Monica because she had never pleaded the defense, presumably having failed to anticipate breaking her lease more than a year after trial “commenced.” See id. § 161.001(d) (“A court may not order termination under Subsection (b)(1)(O) based on the failure by the parent to comply with a specific provision of a court order if a parent proves by a preponderance of evidence that: (1) the parent was unable to co | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.