branch rule in Indiana

1976This doctrine is described as follows in Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp. (1944), 222 Ind. 253 , 53 N.E.2d 161 : “The other branch of the subject applies where the causes of action are not the same, but where some fact or question has been determined and adjudicated in the former suit, and the same fact or question is again put in issue in a subsequent suit between the same parties.

1971This branch of the subject may appropriately be described as “estoppel by verdict or finding.” ( 222 Ind. at 257 ) Perhaps the better and more modern designation for this so-called branch of the doctrine of res judicata is “collateral estoppel.” 4 Without meaning to suggest that the decision of the arbitrator is, or is not, an administive decision, we quote from 2 Am.

1897In Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30, 37 , it was said of this rule: “As we understand the latter branch of this rule, it relates simply to every matter which might have been litigated under the pleadings in the cause.” In Bradley v. Bank of the State of Indiana, 20 Ind. 528 , it was said: “The issues on the attachment in the case were properly made up for trial, at the time of the trial on the merits of the cause of action; and hence, we must hold that they were then tried.” Citing Fischli v. Fischli, supra. In Duncan v. Holcomb, 26 Ind. 378 , it was said: “It is only those matters involved in the

1862We are referred to Fischli v. Fischli, 1 Blackf. 360 , where it is laid down as a general rule, that “ Whenever a matter is finally determined by a competent tribunal, it is considered at rest forever; and that this principle embraces not only what was actually determined, but every other matter which the parties might have litigated in the cause.” As we understand the latter branch of the rule, it relates simply to every matter which might have been litigated under the pleadings in the cause.

2007Roche, 291 F.3d at 483 (quoting Fountain, 211 F.3d at 435 ).

2007Roche, 291 F.3d at 483 (quoting Fountain, 211 F.3d at 435 ).

2007Roche, 291 F.3d at 483 (quoting Fountain, 211 F.3d at 435 ).

2007Roche, 291 F.3d at 483 (quoting Fountain, 211 F.3d at 435 ).

1989To be admissible under this branch of the exception, this Court requires that "[the crimes must ... be so related in character, time and place of commission as to establish some plan which embraced both the prior and subsequent criminal activity and the charged crime." Malone v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1339, 1347 .

1986Rees v. Heyser (1980) lst Dist.Ind.App., 404 N.E.2d 1183 . .

1986Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Assoc., Inc. (1982) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 222 .

1981In Indiana the principles of res judicata were held to apply to criminal cases before the United States Supreme Court recognized collateral estoppel as an aspect of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against Double Jeopardy in Ashe v. Swenson, (1969) 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 .

1981In Indiana the principles of res judicata were held to apply to criminal cases before the United States Supreme Court recognized collateral estoppel as an aspect of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against Double Jeopardy in Ashe v. Swenson, (1969) 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 .

1974Since the contentions in Booher’s brief rest solely on the argument that appellee’s action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata, we must deem any other questions suggested by the record to be waived. *50 In his reply brief Booher cites a recent Supreme Court decision Skendzel v. Marshall (1973), 261 Ind. 226 , 301 N.E.2d 641 .

1974Since the contentions in Booher’s brief rest solely on the argument that appellee’s action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata, we must deem any other questions suggested by the record to be waived. *50 In his reply brief Booher cites a recent Supreme Court decision Skendzel v. Marshall (1973), 261 Ind. 226 , 301 N.E.2d 641 .

1908The classification of Indiana by Wigmore that excellent textwriter — -2 Wigmore, Evidence, §1536 — as one of the few jurisdictions in which this branch of the exception (the admissibility of the account books of a party) has not been recognized, is erroneous, as the following cases show: Place v. Baugher (1902), 159 Ind. 232 ; Wilbur v. Scherer (1895), 13 Ind. App. 428 ; Fleming v. Yost (1894), 137 Ind. 95 ; Culver v. Marks (1890), 122.

1908The classification of Indiana by Wigmore that excellent textwriter — -2 Wigmore, Evidence, §1536 — as one of the few jurisdictions in which this branch of the exception (the admissibility of the account books of a party) has not been recognized, is erroneous, as the following cases show: Place v. Baugher (1902), 159 Ind. 232 ; Wilbur v. Scherer (1895), 13 Ind. App. 428 ; Fleming v. Yost (1894), 137 Ind. 95 ; Culver v. Marks (1890), 122.

1908The classification of Indiana by Wigmore that excellent textwriter — -2 Wigmore, Evidence, §1536 — as one of the few jurisdictions in which this branch of the exception (the admissibility of the account books of a party) has not been recognized, is erroneous, as the following cases show: Place v. Baugher (1902), 159 Ind. 232 ; Wilbur v. Scherer (1895), 13 Ind. App. 428 ; Fleming v. Yost (1894), 137 Ind. 95 ; Culver v. Marks (1890), 122.

1897In Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30, 37 , it was said of this rule: “As we understand the latter branch of this rule, it relates simply to every matter which might have been litigated under the pleadings in the cause.” In Bradley v. Bank of the State of Indiana, 20 Ind. 528 , it was said: “The issues on the attachment in the case were properly made up for trial, at the time of the trial on the merits of the cause of action; and hence, we must hold that they were then tried.” Citing Fischli v. Fischli, supra. In Duncan v. Holcomb, 26 Ind. 378 , it was said: “It is only those matters involved in the

1897In Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30, 37 , it was said of this rule: “As we understand the latter branch of this rule, it relates simply to every matter which might have been litigated under the pleadings in the cause.” In Bradley v. Bank of the State of Indiana, 20 Ind. 528 , it was said: “The issues on the attachment in the case were properly made up for trial, at the time of the trial on the merits of the cause of action; and hence, we must hold that they were then tried.” Citing Fischli v. Fischli, supra. In Duncan v. Holcomb, 26 Ind. 378 , it was said: “It is only those matters involved in the

1897In Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30, 37 , it was said of this rule: “As we understand the latter branch of this rule, it relates simply to every matter which might have been litigated under the pleadings in the cause.” In Bradley v. Bank of the State of Indiana, 20 Ind. 528 , it was said: “The issues on the attachment in the case were properly made up for trial, at the time of the trial on the merits of the cause of action; and hence, we must hold that they were then tried.” Citing Fischli v. Fischli, supra. In Duncan v. Holcomb, 26 Ind. 378 , it was said: “It is only those matters involved in the

1897In Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30, 37 , it was said of this rule: “As we understand the latter branch of this rule, it relates simply to every matter which might have been litigated under the pleadings in the cause.” In Bradley v. Bank of the State of Indiana, 20 Ind. 528 , it was said: “The issues on the attachment in the case were properly made up for trial, at the time of the trial on the merits of the cause of action; and hence, we must hold that they were then tried.” Citing Fischli v. Fischli, supra. In Duncan v. Holcomb, 26 Ind. 378 , it was said: “It is only those matters involved in the

1897In Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30, 37 , it was said of this rule: “As we understand the latter branch of this rule, it relates simply to every matter which might have been litigated under the pleadings in the cause.” In Bradley v. Bank of the State of Indiana, 20 Ind. 528 , it was said: “The issues on the attachment in the case were properly made up for trial, at the time of the trial on the merits of the cause of action; and hence, we must hold that they were then tried.” Citing Fischli v. Fischli, supra. In Duncan v. Holcomb, 26 Ind. 378 , it was said: “It is only those matters involved in the

1897Co., 81 Ind. 239 , it is said, that, “in general, no allegation or evidence, tending to impeach a judgment, will be admitted in any subsequent distinct controversy between the parties.

1893This branch of the inquiry involved a question of law and fact, and, to the extent that capacity was involved in the issue, the very question to be'determined by the jury.” In De Witt v. Barly, 17 N. Y. 340 , the question at issue was the mental capacity of a grantor.