12 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boyd v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Citing Randolph v. State, 755 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind. 2001), and Boyd v. State, 430 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 1982), the State argues that refusing a trial court’s offer of an admonishment to the jury results in waiver of a mistrial claim. | 1 | 1 |
Randolph v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Citing Randolph v. State, 755 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind. 2001), and Boyd v. State, 430 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 1982), the State argues that refusing a trial court’s offer of an admonishment to the jury results in waiver of a mistrial claim. | 1 | 1 |
Kevin Charles Isom v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2020Our supreme court has more recently clarified, however, that waiver of a mistrial claim “occurs where there was neither a request for admonishment nor a motion for mistrial.” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 482 (Ind. 2015). 2020See id. (finding no Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1515 | January 30, 2020 Page 19 of 22 waiver where Isom moved for a mistrial and proceeding to the merits of Isom’s mistrial claim). [38] Immediately after J.R. referred to the protective order, Smith moved for a mistrial. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2016In Jones v. State, 100 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. App. 2002), pet. for Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A04-1510-CT-1664 | May 25, 2016 Page 6 of 7 discretionary review denied, the court held an instruction to disregard is presumed to cure error except in extreme circumstances where the evidence is “clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and is of such a character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on their minds.” Id. 2016In Jones v. State, 100 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. App. 2002), pet. for Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A04-1510-CT-1664 | May 25, 2016 Page 6 of 7 discretionary review denied, the court held an instruction to disregard is presumed to cure error except in extreme circumstances where the evidence is “clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and is of such a character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on their minds.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Roehl v. Stategreen1 sentence2016The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied similar reasoning in Roehl v. State, 253 N.W.2d 210, 217 (Wis. 1977): “We have frequently said that possible prejudice to a defendant is presumptively erased from the jury’s collective mind when admonitory instructions have been properly given by the court.” As Meyer has not demonstrated either presumption is overcome, we cannot say denial of a mistrial was error. [10] We noted in Piatek that there is little Indiana authority addressing in depth when such a presumption is overcome, but we found guidance in decisions from other states. | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. Stategreen2 sentences2014For example, some cases recited a presumption of prejudice, yet held without explanation that defendants have to meet the “probable harm” standard reserved for juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons — that is, that the misconduct is “gross” and “probably harmed the defendant.” E.g., Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899, 901, 903 (Ind.2001); Stokes v. State, 908 N.E.2d 295, 300 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied; Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied, disapproved of on other grounds. 2014For example, some cases recited a presumption of prejudice, yet held without explanation that defendants have to meet the “probable harm” standard reserved for juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons—that is, that the misconduct is “gross” and “probably harmed the defendant.” E.g., Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899, 901, 903 (Ind. 2001); Stokes v. State, 908 N.E.2d 295, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, disapproved of on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Pagan v. Stategreen2 sentences2014For example, some cases recited a presumption of prejudice, yet held without explanation that defendants have to meet the “probable harm” standard reserved for juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons — that is, that the misconduct is “gross” and “probably harmed the defendant.” E.g., Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899, 901, 903 (Ind.2001); Stokes v. State, 908 N.E.2d 295, 300 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied; Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied, disapproved of on other grounds. 2014For example, some cases recited a presumption of prejudice, yet held without explanation that defendants have to meet the “probable harm” standard reserved for juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons—that is, that the misconduct is “gross” and “probably harmed the defendant.” E.g., Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899, 901, 903 (Ind. 2001); Stokes v. State, 908 N.E.2d 295, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, disapproved of on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. Stategreen2 sentences2014For example, some cases recited a presumption of prejudice, yet held without explanation that defendants have to meet the “probable harm” standard reserved for juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons — that is, that the misconduct is “gross” and “probably harmed the defendant.” E.g., Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899, 901, 903 (Ind.2001); Stokes v. State, 908 N.E.2d 295, 300 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied; Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied, disapproved of on other grounds. 2014For example, some cases recited a presumption of prejudice, yet held without explanation that defendants have to meet the “probable harm” standard reserved for juror misconduct cases not involving out-of-court communications with unauthorized persons—that is, that the misconduct is “gross” and “probably harmed the defendant.” E.g., Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899, 901, 903 (Ind. 2001); Stokes v. State, 908 N.E.2d 295, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, disapproved of on other grounds. | 1 | 1 |
Bret Lee Sisson v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2014See id. at 11 . | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Washington, 434 U.S. at 499, 514-16 , 98 S.Ct. 824 . 2011See, e.g., Washington, 434 U.S. at 499, 514-16 , 98 S.Ct. 824 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tinnin v. State
green
2 sentences1986Tinnin v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 203, 206 , 416 N.E.2d 116, 118 . 1986Tinnin v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 203, 206 , 416 N.E.2d 116, 118 . | 2 | 1982–1986 |
Chandler v. State
green
2 sentences1983Darnell v. State, (1982) Ind., 435 N.E.2d 250 ; Chandler v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 142 ; Stacker v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 692 , 348 N.E.2d 648 . 1982Chandler v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 142 ; Tinnin v. State, (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 116 . | 2 | 1982–1983 |
Blood v. State
green
2 sentences1989Blood v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 417 , 398 N.E.2d 671 . 1989Blood v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 417 , 398 N.E.2d 671 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Maldonado v. State
green
2 sentences1989Perigo further asserts that the above questioning requires a mistrial under the test of Maldonado v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 492 , 355 N.E.2d 843 . 1989Perigo further asserts that the above questioning requires a mistrial under the test of Maldonado v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 492 , 355 N.E.2d 843 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Stacker v. State
green
2 sentences1983Darnell v. State, (1982) Ind., 435 N.E.2d 250 ; Chandler v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 142 ; Stacker v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 692 , 348 N.E.2d 648 . 1983Darnell v. State, (1982) Ind., 435 N.E.2d 250 ; Chandler v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 142 ; Stacker v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 692 , 348 N.E.2d 648 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Darnell v. State
green
1 sentence1983Darnell v. State, (1982) Ind., 435 N.E.2d 250 ; Chandler v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 142 ; Stacker v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 692 , 348 N.E.2d 648 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences1981Appellant argues, citing Roviaro v. United States, (1957) 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 and Glover v. State, (1969) Ind., 251 N.E.2d 814 , that the State should have been compelled to disclose the name of the “informant.” These cases have no application to this situation. 1981Appellant argues, citing Roviaro v. United States, (1957) 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 and Glover v. State, (1969) Ind., 251 N.E.2d 814 , that the State should have been compelled to disclose the name of the “informant.” These cases have no application to this situation. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Glover v. State
green
1 sentence1981Appellant argues, citing Roviaro v. United States, (1957) 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 and Glover v. State, (1969) Ind., 251 N.E.2d 814 , that the State should have been compelled to disclose the name of the “informant.” These cases have no application to this situation. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Paquette
green
2 sentences1979The New York Court of Appeals found that as the absence of the witnesses was directly attributable to the defendant, the declaration of a mistrial did not bar reprosecution, saying: If the act of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy. 31 N.Y.2d at 380 , 339 N.Y.S.2d at 960 , 292 N.E.2d at 18 . 1979The New York Court of Appeals found that as the absence of the witnesses was directly attributable to the defendant, the declaration of a mistrial did not bar reprosecution, saying: If the act of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy. 31 N.Y.2d at 380 , 339 N.Y.S.2d at 960 , 292 N.E.2d at 18 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.