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14 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Banks v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Heady’s motion for written opinion argues that “[t]he decision of this Court to affirm the denial of the motion is contrary to the mistrial standard set by the Florida Supreme Court in Ibar v. State, 938 So.2d 451, 470-471 (Fla. 2006) and Banks v. State, 46 So.3d 989, 997 (Fla. 2010).” In Ibar, the defendant moved for mistrial because a detective testified that the first lead in solving the case came from a police homicide unit, from which the jury could have inferred that Ibar was being held on another homicide. | 1 | 1 |
Ibar v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Heady’s motion for written opinion argues that “[t]he decision of this Court to affirm the denial of the motion is contrary to the mistrial standard set by the Florida Supreme Court in Ibar v. State, 938 So.2d 451, 470-471 (Fla. 2006) and Banks v. State, 46 So.3d 989, 997 (Fla. 2010).” In Ibar, the defendant moved for mistrial because a detective testified that the first lead in solving the case came from a police homicide unit, from which the jury could have inferred that Ibar was being held on another homicide. 2017Ibar, 938 So.2d at 470 . | 1 | 1 |
Joseph v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Joseph v. State, 704 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“[T]he strong curative instruction promptly given by the trial court alleviated any possible prejudice, thus the court correctly denied the mistrial motion.”). *80 III. | 1 | 1 |
Breedlove v. Stategreen1 sentence2016While it is undoubtedly true that testimony regarding the detective’s disciplinary history in another case was irrelevant in the instant case, see Breedlove v. State, 580 So.2d 605, 609 (Fla.1991), we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial because the defense counsel’s objection to the State’s question was sustained before Detective Stein answered the question, and the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction. | 1 | 1 |
Wicklow v. Stategreen1 sentence2013It is true that “[rjesorting to personal attacks on defense counsel is an improper trial tactic which can poison the mind of the jury.” Wicklow v. State, 43 So.3d 85, 87-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Cartwright v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Cartwright v. State, 885 So.2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Jackson v. State, 25 So.3d 518, 528-29 (Fla.2009) (finding a witness’s comment regarding fact that defendant always carried a gun, the mention of which was previously excluded by defense motion in limine, was improper but did not warrant a mistrial because defense counsel declined a curative instruction and witness’s gun reference was brief), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3420 , 177 L.Ed.2d 332 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Thalergreen1 sentence2011See Jackson v. State, 25 So.3d 518, 528-29 (Fla.2009) (finding a witness’s comment regarding fact that defendant always carried a gun, the mention of which was previously excluded by defense motion in limine, was improper but did not warrant a mistrial because defense counsel declined a curative instruction and witness’s gun reference was brief), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3420 , 177 L.Ed.2d 332 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Gray v. Kernangreen1 sentence2011See Jackson v. State, 25 So.3d 518, 528-29 (Fla.2009) (finding a witness’s comment regarding fact that defendant always carried a gun, the mention of which was previously excluded by defense motion in limine, was improper but did not warrant a mistrial because defense counsel declined a curative instruction and witness’s gun reference was brief), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 3420 , 177 L.Ed.2d 332 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Salazar v. State
green
2 sentences2023Id. at 372 . 2008For the reasons more extensively set forth in my special concurrence in Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364 (Fla.2008), I do not agree with the majority's use of the mistrial standard in this case because counsel both objected and moved for a mistrial. | 2 | 2008–2023 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2014“Likewise, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and the court should grant a mistrial only where the error is so prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial.” Id. 2013“Likewise, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and the court should grant a mistrial only where the error is so prejudicial that it vitiates the entire trial.” Id. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Thomason v. State
green
1 sentence2024Thus, she argued, the court failed to consider and reject all possible alternatives before declaring the mistrial in violation of Thomason v. State, 620 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1993). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Cole v. State
green
1 sentence2004Cole v. State, 701 So.2d 845 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Castro v. State
green
1 sentence2002Israel also claims, citing Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111 (Fla.1989), that the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial was error with respect to the penalty phase. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Victor Harvey Smith
green
1 sentence2002NOTES [1] See, e.g., United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that where the trial judge expressed a clear intent to declare a mistrial and the defense counsel had an opportunity to object but did not, consent would be implied). [2] See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.1973); Jones v. Hogg, 732 F.2d 53 (6th Cir.1984). [3] In fact, it appears that the trial court did view it as a "red flag" but proceeded anyway. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Elhannon Jones, Jr. v. F. Byrd Hogg, Special Judge, Perry Circuit Court, Hazard, Kentucky
green
1 sentence2002NOTES [1] See, e.g., United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that where the trial judge expressed a clear intent to declare a mistrial and the defense counsel had an opportunity to object but did not, consent would be implied). [2] See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.1973); Jones v. Hogg, 732 F.2d 53 (6th Cir.1984). [3] In fact, it appears that the trial court did view it as a "red flag" but proceeded anyway. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Cheryl Lynne Puleo
green
1 sentence2002NOTES [1] See, e.g., United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that where the trial judge expressed a clear intent to declare a mistrial and the defense counsel had an opportunity to object but did not, consent would be implied). [2] See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.1973); Jones v. Hogg, 732 F.2d 53 (6th Cir.1984). [3] In fact, it appears that the trial court did view it as a "red flag" but proceeded anyway. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Albert Goldstein
green
1 sentence2002NOTES [1] See, e.g., United States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that where the trial judge expressed a clear intent to declare a mistrial and the defense counsel had an opportunity to object but did not, consent would be implied). [2] See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.1973); Jones v. Hogg, 732 F.2d 53 (6th Cir.1984). [3] In fact, it appears that the trial court did view it as a "red flag" but proceeded anyway. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ed Ricke & Sons v. Green by and Through Swan
green
1 sentence2002Additionally, based on Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 468 So.2d 908 (Fla.1985), plaintiffs' counsel requested that the court defer ruling on his mistrial motion until the jury returned its verdict. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Riedel v. Driscoll
green
1 sentence1972Cf. Eggers v. Phillips Hardware Co., Fla. 1956, 88 So.2d 507 ; Riedel v. Driscoll, Fla.App. 1960, 124 So.2d 42 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Eggers v. Phillips Hardware Company
green
1 sentence1972Cf. Eggers v. Phillips Hardware Co., Fla. 1956, 88 So.2d 507 ; Riedel v. Driscoll, Fla.App. 1960, 124 So.2d 42 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.