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12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Murraygreen2 sentences2024State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 35 (1995). ¶20 Nash asserts that the denial of a mistrial was error because of “the pervasiveness of the jury misconduct, the timing of the violation, the jurors’ lack of candor, and the number of constitutional rights affected.” For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. ¶21 First, two jurors reported discussions about the witnesses and their roles within MBS. 2014State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 35 , 906 P.2d 542, 568 (1995). | 2 | 2 |
Pool v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1995Thus, the question here is whether either section 44-1841, 44-1842 or 44-1991 is a lesser-included offense of section 13-2312. [1] In Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98 , 677 P.2d 261 (1984) our supreme court held, in the context of deciding what standard to apply for deciding when prosecutorial conduct which results in a mistrial will bar retrial, that the double jeopardy clause of the Arizona Constitution need not be read as narrowly as its federal counterpart. 1995Thus, the question here is whether either section 44-1841, 44-1842 or 44-1991 is a lesser-included offense of section 13-2312. [1] In Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98 , 677 P.2d 261 (1984) our supreme court held, in the context of deciding what standard to apply for deciding when prosecutorial conduct which results in a mistrial will bar retrial, that the double jeopardy clause of the Arizona Constitution need not be read as narrowly as its federal counterpart. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Fentongreen1 sentence2025A. Consent ¶23 Arizona courts have held that a defendant does not consent to a mistrial for double jeopardy purposes by merely failing to object to its declaration, State v. Fenton, 19 Ariz. App. 274, 276 (App. 1973), unless “that silence . . . in the context of other circumstances indicate[s] consent.” State v. Henderson, 116 Ariz. 310, 314 (App. 1977) (inferring consent to a mistrial when defense counsel “actively participated” and had “every opportunity” to object but did not do so). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2025A. Consent ¶23 Arizona courts have held that a defendant does not consent to a mistrial for double jeopardy purposes by merely failing to object to its declaration, State v. Fenton, 19 Ariz. App. 274, 276 (App. 1973), unless “that silence . . . in the context of other circumstances indicate[s] consent.” State v. Henderson, 116 Ariz. 310, 314 (App. 1977) (inferring consent to a mistrial when defense counsel “actively participated” and had “every opportunity” to object but did not do so). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jorgensongreen2 sentences2002Most of this delay is attributable to the State's disclosure failures. [9] See State v. Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. 390, 391, ¶ 4 , 10 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2000) ("The grant of a mistrial does not bar retrial except when the mistrial is granted because of intentional prosecutorial misconduct aimed at preventing an acquittal."). [10] Our colleague, in dissenting from this portion of our opinion, writes that in addressing a sanction not discussed by the parties, we are "acting as a roving commission of justice." See infra ¶ 46. 2002Most of this delay is attributable to the State's disclosure failures. [9] See State v. Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. 390, 391, ¶ 4 , 10 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2000) ("The grant of a mistrial does not bar retrial except when the mistrial is granted because of intentional prosecutorial misconduct aimed at preventing an acquittal."). [10] Our colleague, in dissenting from this portion of our opinion, writes that in addressing a sanction not discussed by the parties, we are "acting as a roving commission of justice." See infra ¶ 46. | 1 | 1 |
Doyle v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1981See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). 1981See also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Washington
green
2 sentences2019In that case, the trial judge declared a mistrial because of defense counsel's improper remarks during opening statements. 434 U.S. at 498 , 98 S.Ct. 824 . 2019In that case, the trial judge declared a mistrial because of defense counsel's improper remarks during opening statements. 434 U.S. at 498 , 98 S.Ct. 824 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Tsosie
green
2 sentences2010For example, in Tsosie , we concluded that the unusual circumstances of that case gave rise to a presumption of pros-ecutorial vindictiveness even though the ease was in a pretrial setting. 171 Ariz. at 687-88 , 832 P.2d at 704-05 . ¶ 16 Cases in which the charge is altered following a mistrial require an analysis that does not fit neatly within the pretrial/post-trial dichotomy. 2010For example, in Tsosie , we concluded that the unusual circumstances of that case gave rise to a presumption of pros-ecutorial vindictiveness even though the ease was in a pretrial setting. 171 Ariz. at 687-88 , 832 P.2d at 704-05 . ¶ 16 Cases in which the charge is altered following a mistrial require an analysis that does not fit neatly within the pretrial/post-trial dichotomy. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gori v. United States
green
2 sentences1999Id. at 367 , 81 S.Ct. 1523 . ¶ 14 There are several reasons why we do not believe that Gori governs the case before us. 1999Id. at 367 , 81 S.Ct. 1523 . ¶ 14 There are several reasons why we do not believe that Gori governs the case before us. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Reynolds
green
2 sentences1999On appeal, the court said that a mistrial does not bar retrial when events occur that cast “an irrevocable cloud over the jury’s fairness and impartiality.” Id. at 535 , 466 P.2d at 408 . 1999On appeal, the court said that a mistrial does not bar retrial when events occur that cast “an irrevocable cloud over the jury’s fairness and impartiality.” Id. at 535 , 466 P.2d at 408 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Madrid
green
2 sentences1977United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); State v. Madrid, 113 Ariz. 290 , 552 P.2d 451 (1976). 1977United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); State v. Madrid, 113 Ariz. 290 , 552 P.2d 451 (1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
United States v. Jorn
green
2 sentences1977United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); State v. Madrid, 113 Ariz. 290 , 552 P.2d 451 (1976). 1977United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); State v. Madrid, 113 Ariz. 290 , 552 P.2d 451 (1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Westover v. State
green
2 sentences1968Westover v. State, 66 Ariz. 145 , 185 P.2d 315 . 1968Westover v. State, 66 Ariz. 145 , 185 P.2d 315 . | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.