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8 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bennett v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Bennett v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 261, 280 , 511 S.E.2d 439, 448 (1999); see also Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123 , 127 n. 2, 340 S.E.2d 828 , 830 n. 2 (1986) (recognizing the well-settled principle that, where a defendant successfully objects to the admission of evidence and requests that it be stricken or obtains a ruling that evidence is admissible for only a limited purpose, a court has no duty to give a cautionary or limiting instruction unless the defendant specifically requests one). 2009See, e.g., Bennett v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 261, 280 , 511 S.E.2d 439, 448 (1999); see also Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123 , 127 n. 2, 340 S.E.2d 828 , 830 n. 2 (1986) (recognizing the well-settled principle that, where a defendant successfully objects to the admission of evidence and requests that it be stricken or obtains a ruling that evidence is admissible for only a limited purpose, a court has no duty to give a cautionary or limiting instruction unless the defendant specifically requests one). | 3 | 3 |
Manetta v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Bennett v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 261, 280 , 511 S.E.2d 439, 448 (1999); see also Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123 , 127 n. 2, 340 S.E.2d 828 , 830 n. 2 (1986) (recognizing the well-settled principle that, where a defendant successfully objects to the admission of evidence and requests that it be stricken or obtains a ruling that evidence is admissible for only a limited purpose, a court has no duty to give a cautionary or limiting instruction unless the defendant specifically requests one). 2009See, e.g., Bennett v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 261, 280 , 511 S.E.2d 439, 448 (1999); see also Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123 , 127 n. 2, 340 S.E.2d 828 , 830 n. 2 (1986) (recognizing the well-settled principle that, where a defendant successfully objects to the admission of evidence and requests that it be stricken or obtains a ruling that evidence is admissible for only a limited purpose, a court has no duty to give a cautionary or limiting instruction unless the defendant specifically requests one). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Cheryl Lynne Puleogreen2 sentences2008Not only “may [a criminal defendant] waive his” double jeopardy rights in the mistrial context, “[t]his waiver may be express or implied.” Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 929 , 15 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1941); see also Puleo, 817 F.2d at 705 (“[W]here the trial judge expressed a clear intent to declare a mistrial and the defense counsel had an opportunity to object but did not” the appellant “consented to the mistrial” and noting, “[i]t has certainly never been the rule that consent need be express; indeed, consent may always be ‘implied from the totality of circumstances attendant on the declarati 2008Commonwealth v. Washington, 3 This standard has also been codified in Virginia: “the court may, in its discretion . . . discharge the jury when it appears that . . . there is manifest necessity for such discharge.” Code § 8.01-361. -6- 263 Va. 298, 304-05 , 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) 4 ; see also Puleo, 817 F.2d at 705 ; Goldstein, 479 F.2d at 1067 . | 1 | 1 |
Mack v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2008Not only “may [a criminal defendant] waive his” double jeopardy rights in the mistrial context, “[t]his waiver may be express or implied.” Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 929 , 15 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1941); see also Puleo, 817 F.2d at 705 (“[W]here the trial judge expressed a clear intent to declare a mistrial and the defense counsel had an opportunity to object but did not” the appellant “consented to the mistrial” and noting, “[i]t has certainly never been the rule that consent need be express; indeed, consent may always be ‘implied from the totality of circumstances attendant on the declarati 2008Not only “may [a criminal defendant] waive his” double jeopardy rights in the mistrial context, “[t]his waiver may be express or implied.” Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 929 , 15 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1941); see also Puleo, 817 F.2d at 705 (“[W]here the trial judge expressed a clear intent to declare a mistrial and the defense counsel had an opportunity to object but did not” the appellant “consented to the mistrial” and noting, “[i]t has certainly never been the rule that consent need be express; indeed, consent may always be ‘implied from the totality of circumstances attendant on the declarati | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2008Commonwealth v. Washington, 3 This standard has also been codified in Virginia: “the court may, in its discretion . . . discharge the jury when it appears that . . . there is manifest necessity for such discharge.” Code § 8.01-361. -6- 263 Va. 298, 304-05 , 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) 4 ; see also Puleo, 817 F.2d at 705 ; Goldstein, 479 F.2d at 1067 . 2008Commonwealth v. Washington, 3 This standard has also been codified in Virginia: “the court may, in its discretion . . . discharge the jury when it appears that . . . there is manifest necessity for such discharge.” Code § 8.01-361. -6- 263 Va. 298, 304-05 , 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) 4 ; see also Puleo, 817 F.2d at 705 ; Goldstein, 479 F.2d at 1067 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Perezgreen2 sentences2002United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824); see also Allen, 252 Va. at 109 , 472 S.E.2d at 279 . 2002United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); see also Allen, 252 Va. at 109 , 472 S.E.2d at 279 . | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2002United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824); see also Allen, 252 Va. at 109 , 472 S.E.2d at 279 . 2002United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824); see also Allen, 252 Va. at 109 , 472 S.E.2d at 279 . | 1 | 1 |
MacKenzie v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997Id. at 553, 439 S.E.2d at 623 (citing MacKenzie v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 236, 240 , 380 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1989)). 1997Id. at 553, 439 S.E.2d at 623 (citing MacKenzie v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 236, 240 , 380 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997A. In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 551, 553 , 439 S.E.2d 622, 623 , aff'd en banc, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994), we held that prosecutorial misconduct causing a mistrial does not bar retrial unless the prosecutor intended to subvert the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 1997A. In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 551, 553 , 439 S.E.2d 622, 623 , aff'd en banc, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994), we held that prosecutorial misconduct causing a mistrial does not bar retrial unless the prosecutor intended to subvert the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Remmer v. United States
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 228-29 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lewis v. Com.
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 212 , 608 S.E.2d at 909 . 2011Id. at 212 , 608 S.E.2d at 909 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Albert Goldstein
green
2 sentences2008Not only “may [a criminal defendant] waive his” double jeopardy rights in the mistrial context, “[t]his waiver may be express or implied.” Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 929 , 15 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1941); see also Puleo, 817 F.2d at 705 (“[W]here the trial judge expressed a clear intent to declare a mistrial and the defense counsel had an opportunity to object but did not” the appellant “consented to the mistrial” and noting, “[i]t has certainly never been the rule that consent need be express; indeed, consent may always be ‘implied from the totality of circumstances attendant on the declarati 2008Commonwealth v. Washington, 3 This standard has also been codified in Virginia: “the court may, in its discretion . . . discharge the jury when it appears that . . . there is manifest necessity for such discharge.” Code § 8.01-361. -6- 263 Va. 298, 304-05 , 559 S.E.2d 636, 639 (2002) 4 ; see also Puleo, 817 F.2d at 705 ; Goldstein, 479 F.2d at 1067 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Robinson v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1997A. In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 551, 553 , 439 S.E.2d 622, 623 , aff'd en banc, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994), we held that prosecutorial misconduct causing a mistrial does not bar retrial unless the prosecutor intended to subvert the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Robinson v. Com.
green
2 sentences1997A. In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 551, 553 , 439 S.E.2d 622, 623 , aff'd en banc, 18 Va.App. 814 , 447 S.E.2d 542 (1994), we held that prosecutorial misconduct causing a mistrial does not bar retrial unless the prosecutor intended to subvert the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 1997Id. at 553, 439 S.E.2d at 623 (citing MacKenzie v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 236, 240 , 380 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1989)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.