Fidler hearing in Massachusetts

2023Two and one-half years later, in December 2012, the defendants filed a joint motion pursuant to Fidler, 377 Mass. at 200-201 (first Fidler motion), seeking to subpoena the juror.

2016See Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 386 (2005), quoting Fidler, supra. Here, the judge, in her memorandum of decision denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, assumed that extraneous material had reached the jury deliberation room, and moved on to the second prong of the Fidler inquiry.

2025See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 13 , cert. denied, 580 U.S. 899 (2016) (Mitchell I).

2023Nor does the juror's residence approximately a mile from the location of the incident suggest any bias." The judge's denial of the first Fidler motion was affirmed in an appeal that was consolidated with the direct appeals of Mitchell's, Pabon's, and Ortiz's convictions.5 See Mitchell I, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 30-31 .

2012Where the misconduct deprives a defendant of his [Sjixth [Ajmendment rights, courts must consider the misconduct 11 Our refusal to adopt a strict exclusionary rule, however, does not mean that Constantine’s conduct was proper or, more particularly, that the motion judge should have declined to investigate the Commonwealth’s claim that Constantine may have initiated contact with one or more jurors. 12 As suggested in Commonwealth v. Solis, 407 Mass. at 401-402 , where there is a credible claim 13 that the jury may have been exposed to an extraneous matter or influence, but there is also a claim

2012Where the misconduct deprives a defendant of his [Sjixth [Ajmendment rights, courts must consider the misconduct 11 Our refusal to adopt a strict exclusionary rule, however, does not mean that Constantine’s conduct was proper or, more particularly, that the motion judge should have declined to investigate the Commonwealth’s claim that Constantine may have initiated contact with one or more jurors. 12 As suggested in Commonwealth v. Solis, 407 Mass. at 401-402 , where there is a credible claim 13 that the jury may have been exposed to an extraneous matter or influence, but there is also a claim

2025We also agree with the judge that the two-day Fidler hearing, along with the evidence admitted, was sufficient to assess juror bias, and "[a]ny further testimony by [the juror] would not add anything further." See Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 348 (2004).

2016See Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 386 (2005), quoting Fidler, supra. Here, the judge, in her memorandum of decision denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, assumed that extraneous material had reached the jury deliberation room, and moved on to the second prong of the Fidler inquiry.

2016See Commonwealth v. Kincaid, 444 Mass. 381, 386 (2005), quoting Fidler, supra. Here, the judge, in her memorandum of decision denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial, assumed that extraneous material had reached the jury deliberation room, and moved on to the second prong of the Fidler inquiry.

2002See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 32 Mass. App. Ct. at 579 .

2002See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 32 Mass. App. Ct. at 579 .

1991Commonwealth v. Grant, 391 Mass. 645, 653 (1984).

1991Commonwealth v. Grant, 391 Mass. 645, 653 (1984).

1984See Commonwealth v. Fidler, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 28,40 (1978), aff’d, 377 Mass. 192 (1979).

1984Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). 18 We note that, as a general matter, the pre-empanelment voir dire of prospective jurors, rather than a postverdict Fidler hearing, is the appropriate forum for investigating extraneous knowledge brought to the case by a juror.