reasonable use doctrine in Massachusetts

2023"Under the reasonable use doctrine, 'each possessor is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others, but incurs liability when his harmful interference with the flow of surface waters is unreasonable.'" DeSanctis v. Lynn Water & Sewer Comm'n, 423 Mass. 112, 116 (1996), quoting Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 327 (1956). 6 As we have observed, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence in the summary judgment record showed that the plaintiffs' property experience

2001“Under the reasonable use doctrine, ‘each possessor is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others, but incurs liability when his harmful interference with the flow of surface waters is unreasonable.’ ” Id. quoting Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 327 , 120 A.2d 4 (1956).

2010In Tucker v. Badoian, the Supreme Judicial Court redefined the law applicable to riparian property owners’ water rights by rejecting the property owner-friendly common enemy rule and accepting a more flexible approach, the reasonable use doctrine. 376 Mass. 907, 916-19 (1978) (Kaplan, J., concurring).

2008Landowners no longer have “absolute control over subsurface water.” See Prince v. Stockdell, 397 Mass. 843, 845 (1986); Tucker v. Badojan, 376 Mass. 907, 916-19 (1978) (discussion of the reasonable use doctrine).

2023"Under the reasonable use doctrine, 'each possessor is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others, but incurs liability when his harmful interference with the flow of surface waters is unreasonable.'" DeSanctis v. Lynn Water & Sewer Comm'n, 423 Mass. 112, 116 (1996), quoting Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 327 (1956). 6 As we have observed, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence in the summary judgment record showed that the plaintiffs' property experience

2023Moreover, under the reasonable use doctrine, "[i]f a landowner fails to control the flow of surface waters but on a consideration of all relevant factors his actions are reasonable, an action for nuisance will not lie." DeSanctis, 423 Mass. at 117 .

2010Id. at 46 ; see also Von Hennenberg v. Generazio, 403 Mass. 519, 523 (1988) (reasoning that focus of the reasonable use rule is not just the landowner’s action, but also its affect on the other landowner’s property, such that landowner can be held liable for discharge or blockage of water from another’s land); Trenz v. Town of Norwell, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 271, 275-80 (2007) (refining reasonable use standard in riparian rights context to include consideration of whether harm to neighbor is substantial and whether landowner can avoid harm in part or on the whole without undue hardship).

2010Id. at 46 ; see also Von Hennenberg v. Generazio, 403 Mass. 519, 523 (1988) (reasoning that focus of the reasonable use rule is not just the landowner’s action, but also its affect on the other landowner’s property, such that landowner can be held liable for discharge or blockage of water from another’s land); Trenz v. Town of Norwell, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 271, 275-80 (2007) (refining reasonable use standard in riparian rights context to include consideration of whether harm to neighbor is substantial and whether landowner can avoid harm in part or on the whole without undue hardship).

2008Landowners no longer have “absolute control over subsurface water.” See Prince v. Stockdell, 397 Mass. 843, 845 (1986); Tucker v. Badojan, 376 Mass. 907, 916-19 (1978) (discussion of the reasonable use doctrine).

2004See, e.g., Davis v. Sikes, 254 Mass. at 547 .

1996This is the essential inquiry in any nuisance action.” Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217 (1977).

1988See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156 (1970); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544 (1971).

1988See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156 (1970); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544 (1971).

1982Citing Leeds v. Wheeler, 157 Mass. 67, 68 (1892), and First African Methodist Episcopal Soc’y v. Brown, 147 Mass. 296, 299-300 (1888), the amici curiae, Massachusetts Conveyancers’ Association and Abstract Club, suggest that only recordable interests constitute encumbrances, and that therefore registration did not affect the Commonwealth’s right to drain.