Father motion in Arizona

2025See Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 , 102-03 ¶ 18 (2003). 2 CARDONA v. IVORY Decision of the Court ¶5 That first parenting exchange on May 19, 2023 was unsuccessful, with Mother calling the police and reporting the children refused to go with Father.

2025See State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75 , 79 ¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived arguments); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85 (1966) (declining to find arguments waived where interests of minor children were involved); accord Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 , 102 ¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed that the child’s best interest is paramount in custody determinations.”) (collecting cases).

2025Crystal E., 241 Ariz. at 578, ¶ 5 . ¶29 We begin with the chronic substance abuse ground.

2025See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577-78, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (citation omitted).

2025Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz. 259, 272, ¶ 49 (App. 2017). ¶23 The court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s motion to amend the parenting plan.

2021This is contrary to the holding in Fox, 242 Ariz. at 267-68, ¶ 34 , which was issued more than a year before Father’s motion.

2016The law-of-the-case doctrine is a prudential policy of “refusing to reopen questions previously decided in the same case by the same court or a higher appellate court.” Powell- Cerkoney v. TCR-Montana Ranch Joint Venture, II, 176 Ariz. 275, 278 , 860 P.2d 1328, 1331 (App. 1993) (citations omitted). ¶7 In a 2007 ruling denying Father’s motion to set aside the decree, the court did not, as Mother asserts, address the issue of property equalization on its merits.

2016The law-of-the-case doctrine is a prudential policy of “refusing to reopen questions previously decided in the same case by the same court or a higher appellate court.” Powell- Cerkoney v. TCR-Montana Ranch Joint Venture, II, 176 Ariz. 275, 278 , 860 P.2d 1328, 1331 (App. 1993) (citations omitted). ¶7 In a 2007 ruling denying Father’s motion to set aside the decree, the court did not, as Mother asserts, address the issue of property equalization on its merits.

2025See State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75 , 79 ¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived arguments); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85 (1966) (stating waiver is discretionary where minor children are involved); accord Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 , 102 ¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed that the child's best interest is paramount in custody determinations.”) (citing cases).

2025See State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75 , 79 ¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived arguments); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85 (1966) (declining to find arguments waived where interests of minor children were involved); accord Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 , 102 ¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed that the child’s best interest is paramount in custody determinations.”) (collecting cases).

2025See State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75 , 79 ¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived arguments); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85 (1966) (stating waiver is discretionary where minor children are involved); accord Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 , 102 ¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed that the child's best interest is paramount in custody determinations.”) (citing cases).

2025See State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75 , 79 ¶ 12 (2002) (exercising discretion to address waived arguments); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85 (1966) (declining to find arguments waived where interests of minor children were involved); accord Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 , 102 ¶ 18 (2003) (“We have repeatedly stressed that the child’s best interest is paramount in custody determinations.”) (collecting cases).

2025See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343 , 347-48 ¶ 13 (App. 1998); Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

2015See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343 , 347 ¶ 13, 972 P.2d 676, 680 (App. 1998).

2024Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to address the substance of the appeal, see Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966), insofar that true legal issues can be gleaned from Father’s brief. ¶7 Father’s primary contention appears to be that the court gave undue weight to some evidence while improperly ignoring other evidence.

2023See 6 GARZA v. COLLINSWORTH Decision of the Court Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966) (an appellate court may, in its discretion, entertain a deficient brief on its merits). ¶21 We review the superior court’s legal decision-making and parenting-time orders for an abuse of discretion.

2024“If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the [superior] court ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other grounds.” Id. at 280, ¶ 3 (citations omitted).

2022See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 12 .

2023See Schaefer v. Murphey, 131 Ariz. 295, 299 (1982) (“As an appellate court, we are confined to reviewing only those matters contained in the record.”). 3 OLESEN v. DANIEL/BURGE Decision of the Court one parent has committed an act of domestic violence against the other, there is a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint legal decision-making authority by the offending parent is contrary to the child’s best interests.

2022See Schaefer v. Murphey, 131 Ariz. 295, 299 (1982) (“As an appellate court, we are confined to reviewing only those matters contained in the record”). 2 WEBSTER v. SMITH Decision of the Court month.

2019“The time for achieving [§ 25- 411]’s intended [procedural] protections . . . has passed if noncompliance is first brought to our attention on appeal from the final judgment.” In re the Marriage of Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, 302, ¶ 11 (App. 2000).

2015See Dorman, 198 Ariz. at 303, ¶ 11 (once superior court has "conducted an evidentiary hearing, reviewed the merits of the case, and determined there was sufficient cause to modify physical custody[,] [i]t is too late to obtain effective appellate review of alleged noncompliance with the prehearing procedural statements of § 25-411."). ¶11 Father's brief also argues insufficient evidence supported the court's decision to grant Mother's petition.

2016Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251-52, ¶ 29 (2000). ¶9 A sufficient factual basis supports Father’s plea and the juvenile court’s termination order.

2014See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 27 , 995 P.2d at 687 . 5 GAVINO C. v. DCS et al.

2015Arvizu, 183 Ariz. at 833 , 902 P.2d at 227 . ¶7 Even if we assume for argument the 2011 minute entry was a final judgment,3 the denial of Father’s motion to correct the record in 2014 is not appealable.

2015Arvizu, 183 Ariz. at 833 , 902 P.2d at 227 . ¶7 Even if we assume for argument the 2011 minute entry was a final judgment,3 the denial of Father’s motion to correct the record in 2014 is not appealable.

2025See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343 , 347-48 ¶ 13 (App. 1998); Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52 ¶ 16.

2021Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (“Our duty on review does not include re-weighing conflicting evidence or redetermining the preponderance of the evidence.”). ¶8 Father’s brief included documents that he did not present to the superior court.

2026Though the court denied Father’s objection and allowed Mother’s evidence, it stated it would give her evidence the weight it deserved. ¶15 Despite Mother’s untimely disclosure of evidence, the law requires the court to “consider all factors that are relevant to the child’s physical and emotional well-being,” and reach a decision “in accordance with the best interests of the child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A); see also Kelly, 252 Ariz. at 375–76, ¶ 20 (if the court fails to explore potentially significant evidence offered by a parent, the court violates the Legislature’s directive to consider how such

2026Child Support A. Calculation of Income ¶37 Father argues that the superior court erred in its determination of each party’s income for the purposes of calculating child support. ¶38 “We review child support awards for abuse of discretion.” Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 112, ¶ 9 (App. 2016).

2026Marital and Property Issues ¶23 Father asserts the superior court abused its discretion by declining “to exercise or retain jurisdiction over the parties’ marital status and related property and debt issues.” The court dismissed Father’s claim for divorce and property settlement, referring to the principles of judicial economy and inconvenient forum. ¶24 “When a married couple with children divorces, a court may be asked to resolve three sets of issues: (1) dissolution of the marriage; (2) child custody and visitation; and (3) financial questions including spousal maintenance, child support, a

2026“The 4 HAWKINS v. HAWKINS Decision of the Court burden of proving changed circumstances is on the party seeking modification.” Scott v. Scott, 121 Ariz. 492, 494 (1979). ¶13 Here, the superior court awarded temporary spousal maintenance but denied additional spousal maintenance in the final dissolution decree and affirmed both decisions following Father’s motion to amend.

2026Judicial Bias ¶62 Father raises vague assertions of judicial bias, noting that the judge made negative comments about the paternal grandparents’ decision to evict Mother. ¶63 “A party challenging a trial judge’s impartiality must overcome a strong presumption that trial judges are free of bias and prejudice.” State v. Cropper, 205 Ariz. 181, 185, ¶ 22 (2002) (citation modified).

2026But the reasonableness of legal positions are “evaluated by an objective standard of reasonableness.” In re Marriage of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 548, ¶ 10 (App. 2008).

2025Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 238, ¶ 12 (App. 2012)).

2025ARCAP 11(c)(1)(B) (stating the appellant has the duty to include the relevant transcript to challenge a judgment on contrary evidence grounds); Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73 (same). ¶17 Regarding the alleged concealment of the FNE report, the record contradicts Father's claim that the report was withheld.

2025The superior court did not err in denying Father’s motion to set aside the termination order. ¶29 Father argues that his due process rights were violated because the late-disclosed documents supported his argument that “DCS had failed to make the ICWA-mandated active efforts to provide him with remedial services and rehabilitative programs.” He contends that the untimely documents “presented questions that needed to be resolved through the litigation process,” specifically whether the contact information DCS gave to the service providers was accurate. ¶30 “The Due Process Clause of the Fourtee

2024Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (noting that a failure to comply with ARCAP 13(a)(7) “can constitute abandonment and waiver of the party’s claims”). ¶12 Father disputes the court’s findings that he abused alcohol and that he failed to rebut the presumption of unfitness.

2024Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 18 (App. 2014). ¶12 Waiver aside, Father’s claim nevertheless fails.

2024See State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 571, 573, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (“[W]e ordinarily do not consider issues on review that have not been considered and decided by the trial court.”).

2023Due process requires that the court “afford the parties ‘an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.’” Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 468, ¶ 20 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). ¶34 The superior court spent significant time at a July 2019 status conference determining which motions were pending and concluded the following remained: (1) Father’s request for attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to an earlier contempt petition that Mother withdrew; (2) paternal grandparents’ petition for third-party rights; (3) motions related to Father’s request for a protected address

2023See JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353 . ¶27 Father’s claim that he was not provided a recommended neurological evaluation is likewise unpersuasive.