Father motion in Texas

2026See In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700 , 702 (Tex. 2022); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019); In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); see also Tex. Fam.

2026See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269 , 279 (Tex. 2024); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019). -4- TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER SUBSECTION (E) To terminate parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), the Department must show—by clear and convincing evidence—that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX.

2026See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (“Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.”).

2024Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). “[T]he rights of natural parents are not absolute,” however, “protection of the child is paramount,” and “[t]he rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 4 Because we conclude below that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N), we do not address Father’s challenge to the termination of his parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(O).

2023In determining children’s best interests, courts consider the following Holley factors: (1) the desires of the child[ren], (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child[ren] now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child[ren] now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals, (6) the plans for the child[ren] by these individuals, (7) the stability of the home, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper on

2022Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(1)(D),(E); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (on appeal, the reviewing court reviews the parent’s complaints about conduct endangerment and condition endangerment findings based on the parent’s right to due process). 13 In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. 2012). 14 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). 15 See In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005). 11 In a factual-sufficiency review, we “give due deference” to the trial court’s findings based on the direct and circumstantial evidence before the factfinder in the trial.16 Under the factual-suffic

2022See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611 , 616–17 (Tex. 2007) (concluding that a challenge to the trial court’s appointment of a managing conservator is not subsumed in a parent’s challenge to the trial court’s termination order).

2016See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex.2007) (explaining procedure to be followed by a parent, the Department, and the trial court when a judgment terminating parental rights is reversed by the court of appeals but the Department’s conservator- ship pursuant to section 153.131 is affirmed); s ee also In re R.S.D., 446 S.W.3d 816 , 822-23 & n. 5 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131 (West 2014). .

2018Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). 4 Section 161.211(c) limits a direct or collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights, based on an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights, to issues relating to fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit.

2018Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). 4 Section 161.211(c) limits a direct or collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights, based on an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights, to issues relating to fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit.

2024We therefore remand this case to the court of appeals for a best-interest determination.61 * * * 60 See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (listing father’s use of marijuana “shortly before the final hearing” as evidence in favor of termination). 61 Because we affirm termination on the (D), (E), and (P) grounds, we need not reach the Department’s other challenges, including: (1) the court of appeals’ refusal to consider the Department’s cross-point; (2) the reversal of the Department’s appointment as managing conservator; and (3) the court of appeals’ decision to render judgment rather than remand. 22

2018“In considering whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of 8 endangerment, we must determine whether there was ‘some evidence of endangerment on which a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction of endangerment.’” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012) (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009)).

2018See Z.C., 280 S.W.3d at 478 .

2011See In re C.P.V.Y. , 315 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (presuming that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for continuance that was not supported by affidavit); In re Z.C. , 280 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. struck) (holding that because a motion for continuance was unsworn and unsupported by affidavit, “under the plain language of the rule, the trial court was without discretion to grant it”).

2010See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15-16 .

2010See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15-16 .

2022Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(1)(D),(E); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (on appeal, the reviewing court reviews the parent’s complaints about conduct endangerment and condition endangerment findings based on the parent’s right to due process). 13 In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. 2012). 14 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). 15 See In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005). 11 In a factual-sufficiency review, we “give due deference” to the trial court’s findings based on the direct and circumstantial evidence before the factfinder in the trial.16 Under the factual-suffic

2022Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(1)(D),(E); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (on appeal, the reviewing court reviews the parent’s complaints about conduct endangerment and condition endangerment findings based on the parent’s right to due process). 13 In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. 2012). 14 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). 15 See In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005). 11 In a factual-sufficiency review, we “give due deference” to the trial court’s findings based on the direct and circumstantial evidence before the factfinder in the trial.16 Under the factual-suffic

2024Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). “[T]he rights of natural parents are not absolute,” however, “protection of the child is paramount,” and “[t]he rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 4 Because we conclude below that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N), we do not address Father’s challenge to the termination of his parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(O).

2023Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). 4 Because we conclude below that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N), we do not address Father’s challenge to the termination of his parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(O).

2022See Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 626 .

2022See Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986) (noting that appellate courts review ruling on motion for continuance for abuse of discretion); R.J.R. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-21-00245-CV, 2021 WL 4775570 , at *2 (Tex. App.— Austin Oct. 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).

2016The Department counters that Father’s brief “fails to acknowledge the entirety of the evidence relevant to [his] argument, nor accounts for the procedures 1 Father also claims that Child Advocates affirmatively misled Father’s counsel by telling him a week before trial that Child Advocates would not recommend terminating father’s rights. 9 in place which afforded [Father] ample notice that his rights were at stake.” The Department urges us to rely on the general rules regarding discovery sanctions, i.e., “whether (1) there is a direct relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction

2016The Department counters that Father’s brief “fails to acknowledge the entirety of the evidence relevant to [his] argument, nor accounts for the procedures in place which afforded [Father] ample notice that his rights were at stake.” The Department urges us to rely on the general rules regarding discovery sanctions, i.e., “whether (1) there is a direct relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed and (2) the sanction is no more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purpose.” (citing In re Hood, 113 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Tex. App.— 1 Father also claims that Child Advo

2015“The termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights, and our constitution and statutes provide for one level of appeal as a matter of right in termination cases.” In re T.V., 8 S.W.3d 448, 449 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, order) (per curiam).

2015“The termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights, and our constitution and statutes provide for one level of appeal as a matter of right in termination cases.” In re T.V., 8 S.W.3d 448, 449 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, order) (per curiam).

2011See In re C.M.R. , No. 02-07-00394-CV, 2008 WL 4963510 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Ringer v. Kimball , 274 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying prisoner’s request for a bench warrant because prisoner’s bench warrant motion contained no information by which trial court could assess the necessity of his appearance at pretrial hearing).

2011See In re C.M.R., No. 02-07-00394-CV, 2008 WL 4963510 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Ringer v. Kimball, 274 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying prisoner’s request for a bench warrant because prisoner’s bench warrant motion contained no information by which trial court could assess the necessity of his appearance at pretrial hearing).

2011See In re C.P.V.Y., 315 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (presuming that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for continuance that was not supported by affidavit); In re Z.C., 280 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. struck) (holding that because a motion for continuance was unsworn and unsupported by affidavit, ―under the plain language of the rule, the trial court was without discretion to grant it‖).

2011See In re C.P.V.Y. , 315 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (presuming that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for continuance that was not supported by affidavit); In re Z.C. , 280 S.W.3d 470, 478 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. struck) (holding that because a motion for continuance was unsworn and unsupported by affidavit, “under the plain language of the rule, the trial court was without discretion to grant it”).

2023In determining children’s best interests, courts consider the following Holley factors: (1) the desires of the child[ren], (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child[ren] now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child[ren] now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals, (6) the plans for the child[ren] by these individuals, (7) the stability of the home, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper on

2023As a result, “[t]ermination ‘“can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.”’” In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.— 9 Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)).

2022Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(1)(D),(E); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (on appeal, the reviewing court reviews the parent’s complaints about conduct endangerment and condition endangerment findings based on the parent’s right to due process). 13 In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. 2012). 14 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). 15 See In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005). 11 In a factual-sufficiency review, we “give due deference” to the trial court’s findings based on the direct and circumstantial evidence before the factfinder in the trial.16 Under the factual-suffic

2019In a legal sufficiency review, the appellate court must consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.”20 In doing so, we assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in a manner favoring the trial court’s finding, if a reasonable factfinder could have made that finding that is being challenged in the appeal.21 Thus, under a legal sufficiency review, we disregard all evidence a reasonable factfinder could have, by inference, disbelieved or found incr

2026See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.

2026See In re Roisman, 651 S.W.3d 419 , 433-34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, orig. proceeding); see also In re Daugherty, No. 05-18- 00290-CV, 2018 WL 3031658 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 19, 2018, orig. proceeding) (collecting cases). 4 determination of the mandamus petition.

2026See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 119-20; Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d at 777-78.

2026See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 119-20; Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d at 777-78.

2026See In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700 , 702 (Tex. 2022); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019); In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); see also Tex. Fam.

2026See In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700 , 702 (Tex. 2022); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019); In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); see also Tex. Fam.

2025See In re S.F., 32 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (finding that criminal behavior and incarceration may demonstrate parent has engaged in course of conduct detrimental to a child); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet denied) (“Father also pleaded guilty to two drug charges and to being 7 Having determined the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsection (E), we need not consider Father’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to suppo

2025See In re D.J.H., 381 S.W.3d 606, 611-12 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (along with a best-interest finding, only one predicate violation under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a termination decree). -9- a felon in possession of a weapon.

2025See 11 There is no order ruling on Father’s motion for new trial, and thus the motion was overruled by operation of law. 12 Mother and Father do not dispute that the notices included the required information. 61 In re Levi U., 78 Cal. App. 4th at 199 (holding determination of applicability of ICWA can be either express or implied).

2025Texas courts agree that an outside influence “must emanate from outside the jury and 3 The grounds articulated in Father’s motion for new trial and the trial court’s order do not allege that any juror was not qualified to serve. 19 its deliberations.” Blackmon v. Mixson, 755 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.).