Father motion in Indiana

2025Father’s challenge to the sufficiency of the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JT-2943 | May 1, 2025 Page 12 of 17 evidence to support this conclusion effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.3 See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879 .

2012Again, Father’s claim to the contrary merely amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do.4 See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879 . 4 To the extent that Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support certain factual findings made by the juvenile court, including that he had failed to adequately parent his son, that he failed to show adequate concern for exposing A.B. to and infecting A.B. with hepatitis C, and that he failed to establish paternity of A.B., we note that each of these findings is adequately supported by the evidence mos

2020Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by the respondent parent’s custody.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted). “[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a [termination] petition … are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8 (a) (emphasis added).2 2 The argument section of Father’s brief consists largely of complaints about his difficult life and includes statements that impugn the trial court’s discernment and intellect

2014See, e.g., T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 661 n. 2 (denying motion to dismiss appeal based on the untimely filing of a Notice of Appeal noting, “[b]e-cause of the importance surrounding an individual’s right to parent his children, we deny the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and proceed to the merits of Father’s claim”); In re K.T.K. 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind.2013) (proceeding to a merits determination even though the appeal of the trial court’s amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights was not timely filed); In re D.L., 952 N.E.2d 209, 212-14 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (discussing the merits of the claim al

2019See Rowlett , 841 N.E.2d at 619 (providing that no abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the denial of his request for a continuance).

2016Cf. Rowlett, 841 N.E.2d at 619-20, 622 (concluding that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying father’s motion to continue the termination hearing where father was incarcerated and set to be released six weeks after the scheduled termination hearing, completed over 1100 hours of services while incarcerated, and maintained a two-way relationship with his children—through phone calls and letters—while incarcerated).

2015Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152 .

2009We express our appreciation to Mr. Pappas for his obvious concern for the welfare of J.M. and the quality of his advocacy. [3] Father petitioned the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court "for further evidentiary proceedings regarding Father's current ability to provide a safe and stable environment for J.M. and the extent to which Father has remedied the conditions that led to J.M.'s removal from his care." (Pet. for Reh'g on Behalf of [A.M.] at 3.) He supported his petition with a "Motion to Supplement the Record." Although the CCS shows no ruling on the Father's motion, we f

2019A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

2018A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

2018See In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d at 1191 .

2017This is a qu'estion of first impression that requires us to interpret Indiana Code Section 31—19—9—IS, “Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is reviewed de novo, or without deference to the trial court’s interpretation.” In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

2017See Wright, 989 N.E.2d at 330 .

2017See Wright, 989 N.E.2d at 330 .

2017See, e.g., Diehl v. Clemons, 12 N.E.3d 285, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trams, denied.

2017See, e.g., Diehl v. Clemons, 12 N.E.3d 285, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

2016When a party requests special findings and conclusions thereon, “we may affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings.” Werner v. Werner, 946 N.E.2d 1233, 1244 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). [16] In conjunction with the Trial Rule 52 standard, there is a longstanding policy in our State that appellate courts should defer to the determinations of trial courts in family law matters.

2016When a party requests special findings and conclusions thereon, “we may affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings.” Werner v. Werner, 946 N.E.2d 1233, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [16] In conjunction with the Trial Rule 52 standard, there is a longstanding policy in our State that appellate courts should defer to the determinations of trial courts in family law matters.

2016We will find clear error only if “the record does not offer facts or inferences to support the trial court’s findings or conclusions of law.” Rogers v. Rogers, 876 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. [15] In the instant case, at the request of Father, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusion of law with respect to Mother’s verified notice of intent to move, Father’s objection on Mother’s relocation and his motion for order to prevent relocation, Father’s verified petition to modify physical and legal custody or in the alternative expand Father’s parenting tim

2016We will find clear error only if “the record does not offer facts or inferences to support the trial court's findings or conclusions of law.” Rogers v. Rogers, 876 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [15] In the instant case, at the request of Father, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusion of law with respect to Mother’s verified notice of intent to move, Father’s objection on Mother’s relocation and his motion for order to prevent relocation, Father’s verified petition to modify physical and legal custody or in the alternative expand Father’s parenting

2014See, e.g., T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 661 n.2 (denying motion to dismiss appeal based on the untimely filing of 8 a Notice of Appeal noting, “[b]ecause of the importance surrounding an individual’s right to parent his children, we deny the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and proceed to the merits of Father’s claim”); In re K.T.K, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (proceeding to a merits determination even though the appeal of the trial court’s amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights was not timely filed); In re D.L., 952 N.E.2d 209, 212-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the merits of the clai

2014See, e.g., T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 661 n. 2 (denying motion to dismiss appeal based on the untimely filing of a Notice of Appeal noting, “[b]e-cause of the importance surrounding an individual’s right to parent his children, we deny the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and proceed to the merits of Father’s claim”); In re K.T.K. 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind.2013) (proceeding to a merits determination even though the appeal of the trial court’s amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights was not timely filed); In re D.L., 952 N.E.2d 209, 212-14 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (discussing the merits of the claim al

2014See, e.g., T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 661 n.2 (denying motion to dismiss appeal based on the untimely filing of 8 a Notice of Appeal noting, “[b]ecause of the importance surrounding an individual’s right to parent his children, we deny the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and proceed to the merits of Father’s claim”); In re K.T.K, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (proceeding to a merits determination even though the appeal of the trial court’s amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights was not timely filed); In re D.L., 952 N.E.2d 209, 212-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the merits of the clai

2014See, e.g., T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 661 n. 2 (denying motion to dismiss appeal based on the untimely filing of a Notice of Appeal noting, “[b]e-cause of the importance surrounding an individual’s right to parent his children, we deny the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and proceed to the merits of Father’s claim”); In re K.T.K. 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind.2013) (proceeding to a merits determination even though the appeal of the trial court’s amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights was not timely filed); In re D.L., 952 N.E.2d 209, 212-14 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (discussing the merits of the claim al

2014See, e.g., T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 661 n.2 (denying motion to dismiss appeal based on the untimely filing of 8 a Notice of Appeal noting, “[b]ecause of the importance surrounding an individual’s right to parent his children, we deny the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and proceed to the merits of Father’s claim”); In re K.T.K, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (proceeding to a merits determination even though the appeal of the trial court’s amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights was not timely filed); In re D.L., 952 N.E.2d 209, 212-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the merits of the clai

2014See, e.g., T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 661 n. 2 (denying motion to dismiss appeal based on the untimely filing of a Notice of Appeal noting, “[b]e-cause of the importance surrounding an individual’s right to parent his children, we deny the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss and proceed to the merits of Father’s claim”); In re K.T.K. 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind.2013) (proceeding to a merits determination even though the appeal of the trial court’s amended order terminating Mother’s parental rights was not timely filed); In re D.L., 952 N.E.2d 209, 212-14 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (discussing the merits of the claim al

2008The trial court denied Father's motion after concluding that the "correct support order for [Father] is based upon the minimum wage for [Father]." Id. at 1022 (record citation omitted).

2008The trial court denied Father’s motion after concluding that the “correct support order for [Father] is based upon the minimum wage for [Father].” Id. at 1022 (record citation omitted).

2003The UCCJA is the "exclusive method of determining the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in a custody dispute with an interstate dimension." Caban v. Healey, 634 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), trans. denied.

2003The UCCJA is the "exclusive method of determining the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in a custody dispute with an interstate dimension." Caban v. Healey, 634 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied.

2009Consequently, we observed, "it does not appear from the record of the hearing or the order that the parties or the trial court addressed each of the factors listed in Indiana Code Section 31-17-2.2-1(b), at the hearing on Father's motion to modify custody." Id.

2009Consequently, we observed, "it does not appear from the record of the hearing or the order that the parties or the trial court addressed each of the factors listed in Indiana Code Section 31-17-2.2-1(b), at the hearing on Father's motion to modify custody." Id.

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1898 | March 2, 2020 Page 11 of 13 N.E.2d at 761–62 (reversing the denial of Father’s motion for unsupervised parenting time with child because the trial court made no finding of endangerment); In re Paternity of W.C., 952 N.E.2d 810 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing the trial court’s order suspending Mother’s parenting time with her special needs child despite need for Mother to improve her parenting skills because the evidence did not establish circumstances egregious enough to support a finding that parenting time should be terminated);

2014See Walker, 911 N.E.2d at 130 ; see also D.B. v. M.B.V., 913 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (stating “on remand, should the trial court restrict Father’s parenting time upon entry of the requisite statutory finding of endangerment, we encourage the trial court to order that the parenting time be supervised.”).1 Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s motion to continue the final hearing and conclude that Father waived his claim of error under Evidence Rule 612.

2018See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 220-21 .

2017Mother then asserts, without any support in the record, that she “too believes that she could provide the Minor Child a home if she had assistance.” Id.

2026Id.

2026See Plank, 981 N.E.2d at 53 .

2025See Dennerline v. Atterholt, 886 N.E.2d 582, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding waiver under similar circumstances based partly on the long-standing rule that a party cannot argue on appeal an issue not properly presented to the trial court). [29] Second, Father’s motion to correct error was not timely filed.

2025Father is advised in any future appellate filings to refer to the judge as judge, court, trial court, or “Judge [last name].” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-457 | October 3, 2025 Page 12 of 23 to an interlocutory order “is ineffective for any purpose.” Murray v. Murray, 309 N.E.2d 831, 832 (1974) (decided under prior version of appellate rules that required the filing of a motion to correct error after a final judgment as a prerequisite to appeal). [30] Third, Father has not recited the legal standard by which due process violations are determined.

2025See Asher v. Coomler, 994 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that order issued by magistrate was “without legal effect[,]” where appellant was improperly “denied a special judge to preside over the proceedings”). 6 For its part, DCS asserts that Father was “on notice that Magistrate Hahn was not exclusively assigned to Hamilton Circuit Court” and that Father’s motion for change of judge “made no request for an additional change of magistrate.” Appellee’s Br. at 9.