Father challenge in California

2024(See, e.g., In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [affirming finding of jurisdiction over minor because the father did not challenge all bases for jurisdiction, but “not[ing]” the court’s view on the challenged finding “[f]or [the] Father’s benefit”]; see also In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 .) 12 Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to assume dependency jurisdiction over a child when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) [t]he failure or inabili

2013We deny Father’s motion to take judicial notice of In re David R. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 576 , review granted March 13, 2013, S208475, matter transferred June 12, 2013, with directions to us to vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766 , because In re David R. cannot be cited as authority.

2026(In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 ; see also In re Christopher M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316 .) We conclude that Father’s challenge to the findings against him are justiciable because the jurisdictional findings may affect whether he is an “‘offending parent’” under the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2022(See In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308 [“‘[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both.’”]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [“an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence”].) CFS also asserts that because we cannot grant Father effective relief, Father’s challenge is an attempt to obtain an opinion on an abstract proposition.

2024(See, e.g., In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [affirming finding of jurisdiction over minor because the father did not challenge all bases for jurisdiction, but “not[ing]” the court’s view on the challenged finding “[f]or [the] Father’s benefit”]; see also In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 .) 12 Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to assume dependency jurisdiction over a child when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] (A) [t]he failure or inabili

2022(See, e.g., In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [affirming finding of jurisdiction over minor because the father did not challenge all bases for jurisdiction, but “not[ing]” the court’s view on the challenged finding “[f]or [the] Father’s benefit”].) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to assume dependency jurisdiction over a child when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or prot

2025(See In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048 , 1061 [“Because a parent is aggrieved by an erroneous reasonable services finding, the parent may obtain appellate review of the finding by appealing the order in which it was made, even if the parent is not challenging any other part of that order”]; In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1005 [“An erroneous reasonable services finding may have consequences for the parent if the child is removed again from the other parent’s custody during the dependency proceedings [citation] or if the parent is involved in a future dependency proceeding”].) We the

2021(See Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1395 ; see also In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994 (A.G.).) 7 reunification period are statutorily required, though there is “no constitutional ‘entitlement’ to these services.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 475 .) “At each review hearing, if the child is not returned to the custody of his or her parent, the juvenile court is required to determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been

2023An appeal from a jurisdiction finding under section 300 is not justiciable where “no effective relief could be granted . . . , as jurisdiction would be established regardless of the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to any such [challenged] jurisdictional grounds.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 329 (Madison S.); accord, In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490 [“An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.”].)

2022(See In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308 [“‘[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both.’”]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [“an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence”].) CFS also asserts that because we cannot grant Father effective relief, Father’s challenge is an attempt to obtain an opinion on an abstract proposition.

2026(In re Christopher M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1316-1317; In re A.R. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1150 .) 10 IV.

2021(In re A.R. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1152 [appellate court finds mother waived argument concerning the jurisdictional finding that she had not provided adequate medical care to children by her failure to present evidence that supported the finding]; see also James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014 , 1021 “[[e]vidence not favorable to the petitioner cannot be simply ignored as if it does not exist”].) Second, and more fundamentally, Father’s challenge to the juvenile court’s reliance upon the June 13 domestic violence incident to support its detriment finding is, implicitly, a

2026Our Supreme Court has explained that a court’s duty is “‘“to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions . . . .”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 3 We requested and received supplemental briefing from Father and SSA on this issue. 6 14 Cal.5th 266 , 276 (D.P.).) And “[a] case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.”’” (Ibid.) Since “‘the critical factor’” in determining whether the appeal is moot is “‘whether the a

2025Our Supreme Court has explained that a court’s duty is “ ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 7 carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions . . . .” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 , 276.) And “[a] case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Since “ ‘the critical factor’ ” in determining whether the appeal is moot is “ ‘wheth

2025(See Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 840 [the phrase “within 6 months” in section 366.21, subdivision (e) means “such time as remains until a potential 12-month review hearing, even if less than six months”].) The juvenile court’s order is consistent with the statutory scheme; despite Father’s eventual efforts, his extreme delay in engaging in services presented a great obstacle to reunification in the present case.

2014Extending services beyond the 12-month review hearing is “disfavored.” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 845 .) Such services “are available only if the juvenile court finds specifically that the parent has ‘consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child,’ made ‘significant progress’ on the problems that led to removal, and ‘demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.’ ” (Ibid.) Father’s brief does not

2025(See Adoption of Emilio G. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1147, 1152-1153 [declining to disturb trial 7 court’s discretionary findings where there was “considerable evidence” of father’s physical and emotional abuse of mother].) Father’s challenge to the denial of visitation with S.O. is equally without merit.

2020(Adoption of Emilio G. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1151 .) For reasons stated in its order denying Father’s motion to vacate the adoption, the court would likely find it in K.B.’s best interests to allow the adoption to proceed, and the case would be in its current posture – i.e., K.B. would be adopted by J.B. and Father’s parental rights would be terminated.

2024(Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 763 ; In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 638-639 [exercising discretion to decide merits of appeal challenging jurisdictional findings involving one of two parents].) 8 B.

2023(Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 8 Cal.3d 857 , 864 [court cannot address belated claims that were not appealed].) Second, Father’s challenge to one basis for jurisdiction is moot because unchallenged bases underlie jurisdiction. “[W]here there are multiple findings against one parent[,] the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 [one valid finding supports affirmance and moots a challenge to other jurisdictional bases]; In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Ca

2024(In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046 ; In re Marriage of Tara and Robert D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 871 , 881.) Here, Commissioner Cumba’s denial of the continuance resulted in the dismissal of Father’s motion to modify child support before it was ever considered on the merits.

2015Code, § 3653 without substantive change]; see In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1051-1052 .) The appealed order is dated April 15, 2014, and concerned Father's motion to modify his child support obligations filed in late July 2013.

2024We note that consideration of a parent’s disability is not per se improper in dependency proceedings, though the disability is viewed only “in light of the disabled parent’s response to services and demonstrated ability to safely care for the child.” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425 .) Regardless, Father’s claim is not supported by the record.

2021Father appealed. 5 DISCUSSION I “The purpose of the California dependency system is to protect children from harm and to preserve families when safe for the child. (§ 300.2; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 .) The focus during the reunification period is to preserve the family whenever possible. [Citation.] Until services are terminated, family reunification is the goal and the parent is entitled to every presumption in favor of returning the child to parental custody. (§§ 366.21, 366.22; [citation].)” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424 (Tracy J.).) Re

2024In addition, Father is correct in that if there is insufficient evidence to support the section 300, subdivision (g) allegation against him, “the outcome of this appeal is the difference between [F]ather’s being an ‘offending’ parent versus a ‘non-offending’ parent.” (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 763 .) “Such a distinction may have far-reaching implications with respect to future dependency proceedings in this case and [F]ather’s parental rights.” (Ibid.; see In re D.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 911, 917 [“[T]he finding on the section 300, subdivision (c) allegation could potentially af

2016Proc., § 902 [appellant must be aggrieved].) 7 [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction” [citation].’ [Citation.]” (In re D.P. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 911, 917 .) Here, the father does not challenge the dispositional orders, nor could he.

2023An appeal from a jurisdiction finding under section 300 is not justiciable where “no effective relief could be granted . . . , as jurisdiction would be established regardless of the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to any such [challenged] jurisdictional grounds.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 329 (Madison S.); accord, In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490 [“An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.”].)

2023(Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 8 Cal.3d 857 , 864 [court cannot address belated claims that were not appealed].) Second, Father’s challenge to one basis for jurisdiction is moot because unchallenged bases underlie jurisdiction. “[W]here there are multiple findings against one parent[,] the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 [one valid finding supports affirmance and moots a challenge to other jurisdictional bases]; In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Ca

2023(In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 210 [“the social services agency has the burden of presenting evidence to support its allegations and requested orders”].) And in challenging the merits of an order, “a parent is not required to object to the agency’s failure to carry its burden of proof.” (Javier G., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 464 .) Accordingly, Father’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the Agency provided him with reasonable services is not forfeited by his failure to argue the issue below.

2016In support of its position, DCFS relies on In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196 .

2021(Maj. opn. ante, at p. 6; see D.H., at pp. 732-733.) While I agree that prompt resolution of this case is in the best interest of all involved—especially D.L.—remanding for further proceedings “is the only way to safeguard [Father’s] rights as [D.L.’s] presumed father and ensure that he is afforded due process.” (In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 .) I would reach the same conclusion regarding Father’s challenge to the order setting the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing.

2014In In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845 , a noncustodial father submitted to dependency jurisdiction, then disappeared for three years.

2020While “application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 961-962), “the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.]” (In re S.B., at p. 1293.) We are not faced with such a case here.

2016(See In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1210 (P.A.) [“an appellate court may review an error despite a party’s failure to raise it below if due process rights are involved”].) “[T]he appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.]” (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) “[T]he discretion must be exercised with special care in [dependency] matters,” in which “considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount importance. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The instant case does not present an imp