driving privilege in North Carolina

1996Defendants cite one of the leading cases on this point, Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1981).

1995Defendants cite one of the leading cases on this point, Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.1981).

2019The trial court found “the Division seeks to revoke the Petitioner’s driving privilege for willfully refusing a chemical analysis (specifically a breath analysis) that the Petitioner was not requested to submit to” because the Affidavits indicate “Petitioner was requested to submit to a blood analysis and only a blood analysis[.]” Relying on Lee v. Gore, 365 N.C. 227 , 717 S.E.2d 356 (2011), the trial court determined the DMV did not have the authority to revoke defendant’s privilege because “the affidavits signed on July 7, 2017 and on November 9, 2017 are not ‘properly executed affidavits’ t

2019The trial court found “the Division seeks to revoke the Petitioner’s driving privilege for willfully refusing a chemical analysis (specifically a breath analysis) that the Petitioner was not requested to submit to” because the Affidavits indicate “Petitioner was requested to submit to a blood analysis and only a blood analysis[.]” Relying on Lee v. Gore, 365 N.C. 227 , 717 S.E.2d 356 (2011), the trial court determined the DMV did not have the authority to revoke defendant’s privilege because “the affidavits signed on July 7, 2017 and on November 9, 2017 are not ‘properly executed affidavits’ t

2008Id. at 702 , 573 S.E.2d at 236 .

2008Id. at 702 , 573 S.E.2d at 236 .

2004The Commission denied the plaintiff's claim, noting that although "[t]he position of firefighter may be considered inherently dangerous and exposes firefighters to many traumatic events not usually witnessed by the general public," the plaintiff "fail[ed] to show that such events were factors significantly contributing to [his] psychological problems, including [post-traumatic stress disorder], depression and anger." Id. at ____, 589 S.E.2d at 386 .

2004The Commission denied the plaintiff's claim, noting that although "[t]he position of firefighter may be considered inherently dangerous and exposes firefighters to many traumatic events not usually witnessed by the general public," the plaintiff "fail[ed] to show that such events were factors significantly contributing to [his] psychological problems, including [post-traumatic stress disorder], depression and anger." Id. at ____, 589 S.E.2d at 386 .

1997When determining whether revocation of petitioner’s license was proper, “we are not concerned with the admissibility or suppression of evidence,” but only with “whether the petitioner’s driving privilege was properly revoked . . . because of his willful refusal to take a [chemical analysis.]” Gardner, 39 N.C.

1997App. at 574 , 251 S.E.2d at 727 .

1996Henry, 315 N.C. at 495-96 , 340 S.E.2d at 734 .

1996Henry, 315 N.C. at 495-96 , 340 S.E.2d at 734 .

1990Underwood v. Howland, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473 , 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968); Fox v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259 (1954).

1990Underwood v. Howland, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473 , 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968); Fox v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259 (1954).

1990Underwood v. Howland, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473 , 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968); Fox v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259 (1954).

1990Underwood v. Howland, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473 , 164 S.E.2d 2 (1968); Fox v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 241 N.C. 31 , 84 S.E.2d 259 (1954).

1986Harrell v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E. 2d 182 (1956).

1986Harrell v. Scheidt, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 243 N.C. 735 , 92 S.E. 2d 182 (1956).

1980However, upon the receipt of a sworn report of the arresting officer and the person authorized to administer a chemical test that the person arrested, after being advised of his rights as set forth in subsection (a), willfully refused to submit to the test upon the request of the officer, the Division shall revoke the driving privilege of the person arrested for a period of six months. [Emphasis added.] In Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E. 2d 544 (1979), a similar case involving facts virtually identical to those in the case at bar, our Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of this

1980However, upon the receipt of a sworn report of the arresting officer and the person authorized to administer a chemical test that the person arrested, after being advised of his rights as set forth in subsection (a), willfully refused to submit to the test upon the request of the officer, the Division shall revoke the driving privilege of the person arrested for a period of six months. [Emphasis added.] In Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E. 2d 544 (1979), a similar case involving facts virtually identical to those in the case at bar, our Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of this

1980However, upon the receipt of a sworn report of the arresting officer and the person authorized to administer a chemical test that the person arrested, after being advised of his rights as set forth in subsection (a), willfully refused to submit to the test upon the request of the officer, the Division shall revoke the driving privilege of the person arrested for a period of six months. [Emphasis added.] In Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453 , 259 S.E. 2d 544 (1979), a similar case involving facts virtually identical to those in the case at bar, our Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of this

1980App. 491 , 250 S.E. 2d 690 (1979), enunciated the following principles with respect to G.S. § 20-16.2: The thirty-minute time limit referred to in G.S. § 20-16.2(a) (4) is absolute, and a person accused under the statute has no right to delay the test in excess of thirty minutes while waiting for his attorney to arrive or to return his call. [See also State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C.

1980App. 491 , 250 S.E. 2d 690 (1979), enunciated the following principles with respect to G.S. § 20-16.2: The thirty-minute time limit referred to in G.S. § 20-16.2(a) (4) is absolute, and a person accused under the statute has no right to delay the test in excess of thirty minutes while waiting for his attorney to arrive or to return his call. [See also State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C.

1975See generally, G.S. 20-16 (Driver’s license suspension) ; Honeycutt v. Scheldt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E. 2d 777 (1961) (Driving privilege held conditional on obeying the law) ; G.S. 148-42 (Conditional release of inmates by Parole Commission) ; State v. Caudle, 7 N.C.

1975App. 276 , 172 S.E. 2d 231 (1970), rev’d other grounds, 276 N.C. 550 , 173 S.E. 2d 778 (1970) (Sentence suspended on certain conditions).

1975See generally, G.S. 20-16 (Driver’s license suspension) ; Honeycutt v. Scheldt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E. 2d 777 (1961) (Driving privilege held conditional on obeying the law) ; G.S. 148-42 (Conditional release of inmates by Parole Commission) ; State v. Caudle, 7 N.C.

1975See generally, G.S. 20-16 (Driver’s license suspension) ; Honeycutt v. Scheldt, 254 N.C. 607 , 119 S.E. 2d 777 (1961) (Driving privilege held conditional on obeying the law) ; G.S. 148-42 (Conditional release of inmates by Parole Commission) ; State v. Caudle, 7 N.C.

1975App. 276 , 172 S.E. 2d 231 (1970), rev’d other grounds, 276 N.C. 550 , 173 S.E. 2d 778 (1970) (Sentence suspended on certain conditions).

1975App. 276 , 172 S.E. 2d 231 (1970), rev’d other grounds, 276 N.C. 550 , 173 S.E. 2d 778 (1970) (Sentence suspended on certain conditions).