7 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gearldsgreen2 sentences2013Thus, to convict Heimansohn of driving while suspended as a class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that Heimansohn operated a motor vehicle upon a highway when he knew that his driving license was 1 Ind. Code § 9-24-19-1 provides: “Except as provided in sections 2, 3, and 4 of this chapter, a person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway while the person’s driving privilege, license, or permit is suspended or revoked commits a Class A infraction.” 2 In State v. Gearlds, 956 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), the court addressed this statute and stated that “what the legis 2013Thus, to convict Heimansohn of driving while suspended as a class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that Heimansohn operated a motor vehicle upon a highway when he knew that his driving license was 1 Ind. Code § 9-24-19-1 provides: “Except as provided in sections 2, 3, and 4 of this chapter, a person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway while the person’s driving privilege, license, or permit is suspended or revoked commits a Class A infraction.” 2 In State v. Gearlds, 956 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), the court addressed this statute and stated that “what the legis | 1 | 1 |
Giovanoni v. INDIANA DEPT. OF WRKFRC. DEVT.green1 sentence2011Unlike the claimant in Giovanoni, who suffered from seizures and debilitating migraines, id. at 908, Recker makes no appellate claim that her inability to meet the job requirements was affected by a demonstrable impediment. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kenneth G. Montgomerygreen1 sentence1997See, e.g., Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d at 1079 (holding that defendant’s mental slowness and the fact that he had been interrogated for four hours, did not render his confession involuntary; reasoning that in most cases where the confession was held involuntary, the interrogation lasted for a matter of days, not hours, and that defendant had sufficient intelligence to pass a driving test and hold a job); United States v. Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1195-96 (7th Cir.l994)(holding that seven hours of interrogation of a defendant assumed to be of limited capacity due to a cocaine addiction, would no | 1 | 1 |
Brewer v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See also Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind.l997)(holding that die fact that police pressed defendant to continue with his statement although defendant wanted to stop and that defendant had a low level of intelligence, did not render his confession involuntary); Brewer v. State, 646 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ind.1995)(holding that the fact that defendant was under the influence of drugs and severely mentally ill was insufficient under the totality of the circumstances to require the exclusion of his statement); Pettiford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind.l993)(holding ’ that, although a per | 1 | 1 |
Pettiford v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See also Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind.l997)(holding that die fact that police pressed defendant to continue with his statement although defendant wanted to stop and that defendant had a low level of intelligence, did not render his confession involuntary); Brewer v. State, 646 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ind.1995)(holding that the fact that defendant was under the influence of drugs and severely mentally ill was insufficient under the totality of the circumstances to require the exclusion of his statement); Pettiford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind.l993)(holding ’ that, although a per | 1 | 1 |
Light v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See, e.g., Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d at 1079 (holding that defendant’s mental slowness and the fact that he had been interrogated for four hours, did not render his confession involuntary; reasoning that in most cases where the confession was held involuntary, the interrogation lasted for a matter of days, not hours, and that defendant had sufficient intelligence to pass a driving test and hold a job); United States v. Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1195-96 (7th Cir.l994)(holding that seven hours of interrogation of a defendant assumed to be of limited capacity due to a cocaine addiction, would no | 1 | 1 |
Haviland v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See also Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind.l997)(holding that die fact that police pressed defendant to continue with his statement although defendant wanted to stop and that defendant had a low level of intelligence, did not render his confession involuntary); Brewer v. State, 646 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ind.1995)(holding that the fact that defendant was under the influence of drugs and severely mentally ill was insufficient under the totality of the circumstances to require the exclusion of his statement); Pettiford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind.l993)(holding ’ that, although a per | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
POROD v. State
green
2 sentences2023Brook argued that the instruction should be stricken and that the proceedings should be bifurcated with a second phase to prove the prior driving violation, asserting that “having the prior conviction in front of the jury would just, it leads them to believe that she committed the crime more so.” Id. [11] The State opposed Brook’s request for bifurcation, arguing that “the driving while suspended statute elevates what’s normally an infraction, a civil judgment, to an A misdemeanor” and the “prior that we’re relying on is a civil judgment, so it is not a conviction.” Id. 2023Brook argued that the instruction should be stricken and that the proceedings should be bifurcated with a second phase to prove the prior driving violation, asserting that “having the prior conviction in front of the jury would just, it leads them to believe that she committed the crime more so.” Id. [11] The State opposed Brook’s request for bifurcation, arguing that “the driving while suspended statute elevates what’s normally an infraction, a civil judgment, to an A misdemeanor” and the “prior that we’re relying on is a civil judgment, so it is not a conviction.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Circle Health Partners, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development
green
2 sentences2018Appeals of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 47 N.E.3d 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). [8] Here, the LALJ found that Company “provides a two day orientation class to its independent contractors which includes ‘the appropriate training for the position,’” “a DOT [Department of Transportation] physical, drug screen, information on Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act (FMCS) regulations, employer policies, and a driving test” and that Company “provides the FMCSR Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 93A02-1703-EX-556 | March 5, 2018 Page 4 of 20 pocketbook to its independent contractors.” Appellant’s App. Vol 2018Appeals of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev. , 47 N.E.3d 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). [8] Here, the LALJ found that Company "provides a two day orientation class to its independent contractors which includes 'the appropriate training for the position,' " "a DOT [Department of Transportation] physical, drug screen, information on Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act (FMCS) regulations, employer policies, and a driving test" and that Company "provides the FMCSR pocketbook to its independent contractors." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 9. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Recker v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Development
green
1 sentence2012On that point, the court concluded that the employee’s failure on three occasions to pass a driving test essential to her employment as a delivery truck driver were matters over which the employee had “some control.” Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Blydenburg v. David
green
1 sentence1977(See Blydenburg v. David, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 284 ; Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566 , 358 P.2d 765 ; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 , 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 .)” (Our emphasis) In summary we hold that the police officer had probable cause to stop Davis and to request Davis to take a chemical sobriety" test. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Sudduth
green
1 sentence1977The court rejected the contention *439 and held (p. 546, 55 Cal. Reptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401 ) that suspects have no constitutional right to refuse a test designed to produce physical evidence in the form of a breath sample. . . . * * * In other states which have implied consent laws similar to section 13353 of the California Vehicle Code, it has been held, in civil proceedings for suspension of a person’s driving privilege, that admission of evidence of the person’s refusal to take the required tests, does not violate his privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Lee v. State
green
2 sentences1977(See Blydenburg v. David, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 284 ; Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566 , 358 P.2d 765 ; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 , 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 .)” (Our emphasis) In summary we hold that the police officer had probable cause to stop Davis and to request Davis to take a chemical sobriety" test. 1977(See Blydenburg v. David, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 284 ; Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566 , 358 P.2d 765 ; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 , 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 .)” (Our emphasis) In summary we hold that the police officer had probable cause to stop Davis and to request Davis to take a chemical sobriety" test. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences1977(See Blydenburg v. David, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 284 ; Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566 , 358 P.2d 765 ; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 , 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 .)” (Our emphasis) In summary we hold that the police officer had probable cause to stop Davis and to request Davis to take a chemical sobriety" test. 1977(See Blydenburg v. David, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 284 ; Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566 , 358 P.2d 765 ; Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415 , 110 N.W.2d 75 , 88 A.L.R.2d 1055 .)” (Our emphasis) In summary we hold that the police officer had probable cause to stop Davis and to request Davis to take a chemical sobriety" test. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.