driving privilege in California

2024(E.g., Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 462 [“One aspect of this accelerated procedure is a slight relaxation of the rules of evidence applicable to an administrative per se review hearing.”].) Nonetheless, the Legislature intentionally crafted the APS suspension statutes to minimize the possibility of error: One of the express legislative purposes was “[t]o guard against the potential for any erroneous deprivation of the driving privilege by providing an opportunity for 17 Among the issues a person can raise at an APS suspension hearing is the reliability of any chemical test results, which Plai

2015Discussion A. Background The DMV suspended plaintiff’s license to drive pursuant to the “administrative per se” law, “under which a person arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and who is determined to have a prohibited amount of alcohol in his or her blood, must have driving privileges suspended prior to an actual conviction for a criminal offense.” ( Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 454.) As we explained in that case, “ ‘[t]he express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the

2025Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated “Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of [Vehicle Code provisions prohibiting driving while under the influence of alcohol], and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.” (§ 191.5,

2024Specifically, section 191.5 requires proof that the homicide was committed ‘in the driving of a vehicle’ and that the driving was in violation of specified Vehicle Code provisions prohibiting driving while intoxicated.” (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 989 .) Gross vehicular manslaughter is not a lesser included offense under the statutory elements test because “[a]lthough as a factual matter, a murder may be carried out by means of a vehicle and by an intoxicated driver, in the abstract it obviously is possible to commit a murder without committing gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxica

2024(E.g., Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 462 [“One aspect of this accelerated procedure is a slight relaxation of the rules of evidence applicable to an administrative per se review hearing.”].) Nonetheless, the Legislature intentionally crafted the APS suspension statutes to minimize the possibility of error: One of the express legislative purposes was “[t]o guard against the potential for any erroneous deprivation of the driving privilege by providing an opportunity for 17 Among the issues a person can raise at an APS suspension hearing is the reliability of any chemical test results, which Plai

2024(E.g., Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 462 [“One aspect of this accelerated procedure is a slight relaxation of the rules of evidence applicable to an administrative per se review hearing.”].) Nonetheless, the Legislature intentionally crafted the APS suspension statutes to minimize the possibility of error: One of the express legislative purposes was “[t]o guard against the potential for any erroneous deprivation of the driving privilege by providing an opportunity for 17 Among the issues a person can raise at an APS suspension hearing is the reliability of any chemical test results, which Plai

1969He stated his reason for refusal: “And, quite franldy, I didn’t know what to say—I mean I wasn’t aware of all the ramifications of this particular law.” 2 (Italics ours.) “It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a person’s driving privilege under the California Implied Consent Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to consult with counsel, or to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate one’s right against self-incrimination (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [ 16 L.E

1969He stated his reason for refusal: “And, quite franldy, I didn’t know what to say—I mean I wasn’t aware of all the ramifications of this particular law.” 2 (Italics ours.) “It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a person’s driving privilege under the California Implied Consent Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to consult with counsel, or to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate one’s right against self-incrimination (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [ 16 L.E

1968It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a person’s driving privilege under the California Implied Consent Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to consult with counsel, or to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate one’s right against self-incrimination (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 913-916 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 ]; People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal.2d 543, 546-547 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 421 P.2d 401 ] ; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1

1968It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a person’s driving privilege under the California Implied Consent Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to consult with counsel, or to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate one’s right against self-incrimination (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 913-916 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 ]; People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal.2d 543, 546-547 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 421 P.2d 401 ] ; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1

1969He stated his reason for refusal: “And, quite franldy, I didn’t know what to say—I mean I wasn’t aware of all the ramifications of this particular law.” 2 (Italics ours.) “It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a person’s driving privilege under the California Implied Consent Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to consult with counsel, or to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate one’s right against self-incrimination (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [ 16 L.E

1969He stated his reason for refusal: “And, quite franldy, I didn’t know what to say—I mean I wasn’t aware of all the ramifications of this particular law.” 2 (Italics ours.) “It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a person’s driving privilege under the California Implied Consent Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to consult with counsel, or to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate one’s right against self-incrimination (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [ 16 L.E

1969He stated his reason for refusal: “And, quite franldy, I didn’t know what to say—I mean I wasn’t aware of all the ramifications of this particular law.” 2 (Italics ours.) “It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a person’s driving privilege under the California Implied Consent Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to consult with counsel, or to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate one’s right against self-incrimination (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [ 16 L.E

1969He stated his reason for refusal: “And, quite franldy, I didn’t know what to say—I mean I wasn’t aware of all the ramifications of this particular law.” 2 (Italics ours.) “It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a person’s driving privilege under the California Implied Consent Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to consult with counsel, or to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate one’s right against self-incrimination (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [ 16 L.E

2025“Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.” (§ 191.5, subd. (a); see also CALCRIM No. 590.) “Gross negligence is the exercise of so

2013(People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 562, 577 .) "Where the circumstances support the trier of fact's finding of guilt, an appellate court cannot reverse merely because it believes the evidence is reasonably reconciled with the defendant's innocence." (People v. Meza (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1747 .) Penal Code section 191.5 subdivision (a) provides: "Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and t

1999It would be inconsistent with the purpose of this factfinding procedure, and with the intent to suspend the driving privilege of those who are thus found to have been driving under the influence, to rescind the suspension for reasons that have nothing to do with whether the person was in fact driving while intoxicated.” (Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 599, 606 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 ].) In enacting the administrative per se law, the Legislature did not intend to create a more onerous process, as opposed to the criminal process, of deterring drunk drivers.

1999It would be inconsistent with the purpose of this factfinding procedure, and with the intent to suspend the driving privilege of those who are thus found to have been driving under the influence, to rescind the suspension for reasons that have nothing to do with whether the person was in fact driving while intoxicated.” (Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 599, 606 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 ].) In enacting the administrative per se law, the Legislature did not intend to create a more onerous process, as opposed to the criminal process, of deterring drunk drivers.

1999(See Timberline, Inc. v. Jaisinghani, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368, fn. 5 .) In contrast to a criminal prosecution for drunk driving, the administrative remedy involving the suspension of driver’s licenses was designed to be a “swift and certain” method of deterring such conduct. 5 (Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th 841, 847 , citing Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 312 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 ].) “Before it may suspend a person’s driving privilege, the Department must make a specific factual determination the person was driving or in physical control of a vehicl

1999(See Timberline, Inc. v. Jaisinghani, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368, fn. 5 .) In contrast to a criminal prosecution for drunk driving, the administrative remedy involving the suspension of driver’s licenses was designed to be a “swift and certain” method of deterring such conduct. 5 (Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th 841, 847 , citing Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 312 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 ].) “Before it may suspend a person’s driving privilege, the Department must make a specific factual determination the person was driving or in physical control of a vehicl

2024Finally, the court imposed a 180-day jail term on the misdemeanor conviction in count 10 and a 364- day jail term on the misdemeanor conviction in count 11. 7 manner, and with gross negligence.” (§ 192, subd. (c)(1); see also CALCRIM No. 592.) The offense is a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, which requires, in addition to the elements above, proof “the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code,” which define unlawful use of alcohol and other drugs while operating a vehicle. (§ 191.5, subd. (a); see also CALCRIM No.

2016In other words, if a crime cannot be committed without also committing a lesser offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense." (Id. at p. 985.) Section 191.5 provides in relevant part: "(a) Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result o

2023As a general matter under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars parties or parties in privity from ‘ “successive litigation of the very same claim . . . as the earlier [action].” ’ [Citation.] The driving principle behind the claim preclusion doctrine is that the parties have had a ‘ “full and fair opportunity to litigate” ’ claims alleged in the first action.” (Guerrero v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1098 (Guerrero); see Taylor v. Sturgell (2008) 553 U.S. 880, 892 (Taylor).) “Unlike issue preclusion, which applies only

2018As a general matter under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars parties or parties in privity from "successive litigation of the very same claim ... as the earlier [action]." ( Taylor v. Sturgell (2008) 553 U.S. 880 , 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161 , 171 L.Ed.2d 155 ( Taylor ).) The driving principle behind the claim preclusion doctrine is that the parties have had a " 'full and fair opportunity to litigate' " claims alleged in the first action. ( Ibid. , citing Montana v. United States (1979) 440 U.S. 147 , 153-154, 99 S.Ct. 970 , 59 L.Ed.2d 210 .) Unlike issue preclusion

2022(In re Grayden N., at p. 604; Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 12 Cal.4th 278, 284 [the act of the DMV suspending a driver’s license pursuant to Vehicle Code sections authorizing them to do so is an administrative act in performing a mandatory function and 31. the DMV, having received an abstract of record, is simply required to suspend the defendant’s driving privilege].) The DMV’s suspension or revocation of defendant’s driving privilege under Vehicle Code section 13351.5 is substantively distinct from any punishment a court may impose as a result of a criminal conviction.

2015(Grayden N., at p. 604; Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 12 Cal.4th 278, 284 [the act of the DMV in suspending a driver’s license pursuant 20 to Vehicle Code sections authorizing them to do so an administrative act in performing a mandatory function and the DMV, having received an abstract of judgment is simply required to suspend the defendant’s driving privilege]).

1969(Citation.)” (Westmoreland v. Chapman (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 1, 4-5 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 363 ] (hear.den.); see also Reirdon v. Director of Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 808, 810-811 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 936, 938-943 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]; Fallis v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 373, 383 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 595 ]; Finley v. Orr (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 656, 663-665 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 137 ] (hear. den.).) The rule is equally well settled, based upon the pilot opinion of the appellate court for the Fourth District in Rus

1969(Citation.)” (Westmoreland v. Chapman (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 1, 4-5 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 363 ] (hear.den.); see also Reirdon v. Director of Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 808, 810-811 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 936, 938-943 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]; Fallis v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 373, 383 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 595 ]; Finley v. Orr (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 656, 663-665 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 137 ] (hear. den.).) The rule is equally well settled, based upon the pilot opinion of the appellate court for the Fourth District in Rus

2023Sanchez held that “gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated should not be treated as a lesser included offense of murder.” (Id. at p. 992.) Sanchez reached that conclusion because gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated “requires proof of additional elements that are not included in the offense of murder or in other forms of nonvehicular manslaughter.” (Ibid.) Specifically, “[g]ross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated requires proof of elements that need not be proved when the charge is murder, namely, use of a vehicle and intoxication.” (Id. at p. 989; see also People v. Hic

2023Sanchez held that “gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated should not be treated as a lesser included offense of murder.” (Id. at p. 992.) Sanchez reached that conclusion because gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated “requires proof of additional elements that are not included in the offense of murder or in other forms of nonvehicular manslaughter.” (Ibid.) Specifically, “[g]ross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated requires proof of elements that need not be proved when the charge is murder, namely, use of a vehicle and intoxication.” (Id. at p. 989; see also People v. Hic

2014(Id. at p. 435.) Similarly, in Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795 (Donohue), the court held the factual basis for recovery alleged in the complaint was not reflected in the plaintiff’s tort claim where the claim asserted the Department of Motor Vehicles negligently allowed an uninsured motorist to take a driving test and the complaint alleged that the department negligently supervised and instructed the driver during the exam.

2008In doing so, the court stated that the “cause of action patently attempts to premise liability on an entirely different factual basis than what was set forth in the tort claim.” (Id. at p. 435.) In Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 57 ] (Donohue), the plaintiff alleged in his claim that the State of California was negligent in allowing an uninsured motorist to take the driving test.

2017"The procedure is called 'administrative per se' because it does not impose criminal penalties, but simply suspends a person's driver's license as an administrative matter upon a showing the person was arrested for driving with a certain blood-alcohol concentration, without additional evidence of impairment. [Citation.] The express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation

2017"The procedure is called 'administrative per se' because it does not impose criminal penalties, but simply suspends a person's driver's license as an administrative matter upon a showing the person was arrested for driving with a certain blood-alcohol concentration, without additional evidence of impairment. [Citation.] The express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation

2025“Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.” (§ 191.5, subd. (a); see also CALCRIM No. 590.) “Gross negligence is the exercise of so

2013(People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 562, 577 .) "Where the circumstances support the trier of fact's finding of guilt, an appellate court cannot reverse merely because it believes the evidence is reasonably reconciled with the defendant's innocence." (People v. Meza (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1747 .) Penal Code section 191.5 subdivision (a) provides: "Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and t

2024(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 ; People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108 ,136–137.) “A defendant has no right to instructions on lesser related offenses, even if he or she requests the instruction and it would have been supported by substantial evidence, because California law does not permit a court to instruct concerning an uncharged lesser related crime unless agreed to by both parties.” (People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 668 .) “To determine if an offense is lesser and necessarily included in another offense for this purpose, [courts] apply either the elements test

2019(See, e.g., People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108 , 117-118, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 , 960 P.2d 1073 ( Birks ) ).

2022(People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 939 ; People v. Thompson (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 51-54 .) The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 590, the pattern instruction on gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, which tracks the elements of the offense and has been found to be an accurate and complete statement of the law.

2016(People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159 .) In 2004, defendant pleaded guilty to count one of the charging document, which alleged that defendant “unlawfully kill[ed] Jerry Walker . . . without malice aforethought, 4 in the driving of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code Sections 23140, 23152 and 23153 and the killing was the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence.” By pleading to this charge, defendant admitted that another person was killed as a proximate result of his unlawful driving.

2025(People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036-1038 .) The phrases “intoxicated” and “under the influence” mean the alcohol “must have so far affected the nervous system, the brain, or muscles as to impair to an appreciable degree the ability to operate a vehicle in a manner like that of an ordinarily prudent and cautious person in full possession of his faculties.” (People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1193 .) “[E]vidence of actual impairment may include the driver’s appearance, an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, impaired motor skills, slowed or erratic mental processing, and impaired me

2024Finally, the court imposed a 180-day jail term on the misdemeanor conviction in count 10 and a 364- day jail term on the misdemeanor conviction in count 11. 7 manner, and with gross negligence.” (§ 192, subd. (c)(1); see also CALCRIM No. 592.) The offense is a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, which requires, in addition to the elements above, proof “the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code,” which define unlawful use of alcohol and other drugs while operating a vehicle. (§ 191.5, subd. (a); see also CALCRIM No.

2024(Id. at pp. 294, 298–299.) This is “informally known as a Watson murder.” (Wolfe, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 677 .) Section 191.5, subdivision (a) provides that “Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act tha

2024(Id. at pp. 294, 298–299.) This is “informally known as a Watson murder.” (People v. Wolfe (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 673, 677 (Wolfe).) “Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an u

2022(People v. Linares (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1199 (Linares).) A serious, intentional abuse of the driving privilege by using a vehicle as a weapon constitutes a rational basis for permanently taking away the right to drive from those who intentionally use a vehicle to harm others.

2015(People v. Linares (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1199 .) A serious, intentional abuse of the driving privilege by using a vehicle as a weapon constitutes a rational basis for permanently taking away the right to drive from those who intentionally use a vehicle to harm others.

2021(See, e.g., Coffey v. Shiomoto (2015) 60 Cal.4th 5 1198, 1205 (Coffey) [Plaintiff was charged with DUI but was “allowed to plead to a ‘wet reckless,’ ” a misdemeanor reckless driving offense].) When the DMV proposes to suspend a license based on a DUI arrest and a chemical test result, the licensee can request an administrative hearing. (§ 13353.2, subd. (c).) At the hearing, “the DMV is required to suspend a person’s driving privilege if it determines by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a peace officer had reasonable cause to believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle un

2014At the administrative hearing, the DMV “shall consider its official records and may receive sworn testimony.” (§ 14104.7.) In other respects, Government Code section 11500 et seq., which applies to administrative hearings generally, governs the admission of evidence. (§ 14112, subd. (a); Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 458 ; Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 987 .) An administrative hearing before the DMV “does not require the full panoply of the Evidence Code provisions used in criminal and civil trials.” (Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2001)