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16 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1956–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ramos v. Texas Department of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Ramos, 35 S.W.3d at 727 (officer performed a discretionary act by conducting a driving test because he exercised judgment regarding how and when to conduct the test). 2014See Ramos, 35 S.W.3d at 727-29 (officer performed a discretionary act by conducting a driving test because he exercised judgment regarding how and when to conduct the test). | 2 | 4 |
Mata v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Id. at 909–10. 2004Id. at 909–10. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Mechlergreen1 sentence2008See id. | 1 | 1 |
Swain v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Swain, 2005 Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2000See Chapman, 824 S.W.2d at 686-88 . 2000See Chapman, 824 S.W.2d at 686-88 . | 1 | 1 |
GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Brucegreen2 sentences1999In considering whether the evidence establishes more than an ordinary employment dispute, we will also address GTE's argument that because none of Shields's acts standing alone rises to the level of outrageous conduct, the court of appeals erred in holding that, considered cumulatively, *615 the conduct was extreme and outrageous. 956 S.W.2d at 644, 647 . 1999In considering whether the evidence establishes more than an ordinary employment dispute, we will also address GTE’s argument that because none of Shields’s acts .standing alone rises to the level of outrageous conduct, the court of appeals erred in holding that, considered cumula tively, the conduct was extreme and outrageous. 956 S.W.2d at 644, 647 . | 1 | 1 |
Swinney v. Wintersgreen2 sentences1989Swinney v. Winters, 532 S.W.2d 396, 406 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 1989Swinney v. Winters, 532 S.W.2d 396, 406 (Tex.Civ.App. —San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Cocke
green
2 sentences1960The Austin Court in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Cocke, Tex.Civ.App.1956, 292 S.W.2d 827 , no rehearing (and see Texas Department of Public Safety v. Gil, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 832 , no rehearing) dismissed an appeal from a judgment of dismissal of an appeal under Sec. 22(a) by a county court at law, where there was.no showing that the driving privilege had been suspended. 1956It is the view of the writer that the appeal is, from an affirmative finding, that the County Court at Law did not acquire jurisdiction, that my views expressed in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Cocke, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 827 , this day decided i$ applicable here and that this appeal should be dismissed in accordance with those views. .It appears to me that the allegation supra to the effect that the Department on July 12, 1955, “demanded” the suspension of appellee’s driving privilege relates only to the petition for' an affirmative finding and the hearing had on that petition. | 2 | 1956–1960 |
Balentine v. State
green
1 sentence2006Obviously, the greater the length of time between the driving and the test, the greater the potential variation between the two BACs.” See id. 3 favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling, as long as the findings are supported by the record. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1988Implied consent statutes became anachronistic following the subsequent decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), in which the Supreme Court ruled that forced extraction of blood for chemical testing with probable cause would offend neither Fourth nor Fifth Amendment principles. 1988Implied consent statutes became anachronistic following the subsequent decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), in which the Supreme Court ruled that forced extraction of blood for chemical testing with probable cause would offend neither Fourth nor Fifth Amendment principles. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Gil
green
1 sentence1960The Austin Court in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Cocke, Tex.Civ.App.1956, 292 S.W.2d 827 , no rehearing (and see Texas Department of Public Safety v. Gil, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 832 , no rehearing) dismissed an appeal from a judgment of dismissal of an appeal under Sec. 22(a) by a county court at law, where there was.no showing that the driving privilege had been suspended. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.