discrete claim in Pennsylvania

2026In Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court held that Grant’s general deferral rule remained “pertinent law,” but also recognized two exceptions to that rule: First, … there may be extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice; and we hold that trial courts retain their discretion to entertain such claims.

2025In Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 , 563–64 (Pa. 2013), the Court announced two exceptions to the general rule: (1) “extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice;” and (2) where -6- J-S16020-25 good cause is shown and the defendant gives “knowing and express waiver of his entitlement to seek [Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)] review from his conviction and sentence, including an express recognition that the waiver

2025The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to this rule: (1) a discrete claim “is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice;” (2) there is good cause shown and the defendant expressly and knowingly waived his or her right to seek PCRA review; or (3) the defendant is “statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review.” Id. at 563-64 (outlining the first two exceptions); Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 361 (Pa. 2018) (stating the third exception). - 16 - J-A18026-25 There is nothin

2024Three exceptions have been recognized to the general rule that ineffective assistance claims may not be raised in a direct appeal: (i) in “extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record - 14 - J-S08038-24 and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice”; (ii) where the defendant asserts multiple ineffective assistance claims, shows good cause for direct review of those claims, and expressly waives his entitlement to PCRA review before the trial court; and (iii) “where th

2025Immediate review is only proper (i) in extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice; (ii) where the defendant asserts multiple ineffective assistance claims, shows good cause for direct review of those claims, and expressly waives his entitlement to PCRA review before the trial court; and (iii) where the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review. -5- J-A08025-25 Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 23

2024Three exceptions have been recognized to the general rule that ineffective assistance claims may not be raised in a direct appeal: (i) in “extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record - 14 - J-S08038-24 and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice”; (ii) where the defendant asserts multiple ineffective assistance claims, shows good cause for direct review of those claims, and expressly waives his entitlement to PCRA review before the trial court; and (iii) “where th

2016First, we appreciate that there may be extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice; and we hold that trial courts retain their discretion to entertain such claims. [ ] Second ... where the defendant seeks to litigate multiple or prolix claims of counsel ineffectiveness, including non-record- based claims, on post-verdict motions and direct appeal, we repose discretion in the trial courts to entertain such claims, but onl

2016First, we appreciate that there may be extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice; and we hold that trial courts retain their discretion to entertain such claims. [ ] Second ... where the defendant seeks to litigate multiple or prolix claims of counsel ineffectiveness, including non-record- based claims, on post-verdict motions and direct appeal, we repose discretion in the trial courts to entertain such claims, but onl

2021Second, with respect to other cases and claims, including cases such as [Commonwealth v.] Bomar [, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003)] and the matter sub judice, where the defendant seeks to litigate multiple or prolix claims of counsel ineffectiveness, including non- record-based claims, on post-verdict motions and direct appeal, we repose discretion in the trial courts to entertain such claims, but only if (1) there is good cause shown, and (2) the unitary review so indulged is preceded by the defendant's knowing and express waiver of his entitlement to seek PCRA review from his conviction and sentence

2015First, we appreciate that there may be extraordinary circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice; and we hold that trial courts retain their 13 Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003). -9- J.

2018Second, we held that trial courts also have discretion to entertain prolix claims of ineffectiveness if there is a good cause shown and the unitary review thus permitted is accompanied by a knowing and express waiver by the defendant of the right to pursue a first PCRA petition. -7- J-S73029-17 Commonwealth v. Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 856-57 (Pa. 2014).

2018Second, we held that trial courts also have discretion to entertain prolix claims of ineffectiveness if there is a good cause shown and the unitary review thus permitted is accompanied by a knowing and express waiver by the defendant of the right to pursue a first PCRA petition. *472 Commonwealth v. Arrington , 624 Pa. 506 , 86 A.3d 831 , 856-57 (2014) (emphasis added).

2025Commonwealth v. Stefanowicz, 315 A.3d 162, 172 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up).

2024See In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 724 , 69 A.3d 603 (2013) (reiterating that, “This Court will not consider the merits of an argument which fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority”); Bombar v. West American Ins.

2024See 107 A.3d at 17 (finding a scientific consensus that juveniles convicted of sexual crimes commit new sexual crimes at a rate “indistinguishable” from juvenile non-sexual offenders).

2021See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Commonwealth v. Plante, 914 A.2d 916, 924 (Pa. Super. 2006) (failure to develop argument with citation to and analysis of relevant authority waives issue on review).

2020See Commonwealth v. Parisi, 873 A.2d 3, 9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (explaining that each claim or cause of action asserted in a complaint “must be presented in a self-sufficient separate count, which includes averments of facts pertaining to the particular claim and relief sought.”); see also Estate of Swift v. Northeaster Hosp. of Philadelphia, 690 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“If a plaintiff fails to properly plead a separate cause of action, the cause he did not plead is waived.”). - 11 - J-S13038-20 Accordingly, had Bassaro relied on these same averments in a personal injury matter, Hobart c

2020I write separately to underscore that this case illustrates most consequentially the potential for mischief, albeit well-meaning, when we are called upon to question the “true” meaning of the General Assembly’s contextually ambiguous use of the word “shall.” In my view, headaches-for-some-absentee-voters (discussing legal challenges to signature-match laws). 17 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam). 18 During the pendency of this appeal, Secretary Boockvar issued a guidance document that, in furtherance of “consistency across the 67 counties,” instructs election officials that “[t

2020See Commonwealth v. Parisi, 873 A.2d 3, 9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (explaining that each claim or cause of action asserted in a complaint “must be presented in a self-sufficient separate count, which includes averments of facts pertaining to the particular claim and relief sought.”); see also Estate of Swift v. Northeaster Hosp. of Philadelphia, 690 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“If a plaintiff fails to properly plead a separate cause of action, the cause he did not plead is waived.”). - 11 - J-S13038-20 Accordingly, had Bassaro relied on these same averments in a personal injury matter, Hobart c

2019The second exception . . . gives trial courts discretion to address ineffectiveness claims on post-sentence motions and direct appeal if there is good cause shown and the defendant knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement to seek subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and sentence. ____________________________________________ 4 In Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 602 (Pa. 2005), our Supreme Court declined to recognize a categorical exception to Grant’s general deferral rule, which would have permitted defendants with short sentences who possibly would be ineligible for PCRA review

2015Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002). -5- J.

2009See Ronald Collins, 888 A.2d at 573 .

2007Collins, 897 A.2d at 472 (focus of Gruber remains “best interests” of children); Dranko, 824 A.2d at 1222 . ¶ 14 Given that Father had already moved to Florida, the trial court did not delve into a discrete analysis regarding the integrity of his motives in seeking the move.

2005See Commonwealth v. Healey, 836 A.2d 156, 158 (Pa.Super.2003); see also Gatling, 807 A.2d at 901 (Saylor, J. concurring) (“I have difficulty subscribing to the lead’s “break-in-the-chain” test, however, since this issue of distinctness is best assessed according to the totality of the circumstances, and the discrete factors described by the opinion announcing the judgment of the court are open to subjective interpretation and may be difficult to definitively resolve, particularly where, as here, the offenses upon *671 which multiple punishments are to be predicated occurred in close proximity

2005See Commonwealth v. Healey, 836 A.2d 156, 158 (Pa.Super.2003); see also Gatling, 807 A.2d at 901 (Saylor, J. concurring) (“I have difficulty subscribing to the lead’s “break-in-the-chain” test, however, since this issue of distinctness is best assessed according to the totality of the circumstances, and the discrete factors described by the opinion announcing the judgment of the court are open to subjective interpretation and may be difficult to definitively resolve, particularly where, as here, the offenses upon *671 which multiple punishments are to be predicated occurred in close proximity