discrete instruction in Indiana

2014In Dill v. State, our Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in giving a flight instruction to the jury, and it noted that, although the evidence of flight might “be a proper subject for counsel’s closing argument, it does not follow that a trial court should give a discrete instruction highlighting such evidence.” 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001).

2013The Court further noted that, “although evidence of flight may under appropriate circumstances be relevant, admissible, and a proper subject for counsel’s closing argument, it does not follow that a trial court should give a discrete instruction highlighting such evidence” and that “instructions that unnecessarily emphasize one particular evidentiary fact, witness, or phase of the case are disapproved.” Id.

2013The courts of this State have long disapproved instructions that unduly “emphasize one particular evidentiary fact, witness, or phase of the case[.]” Id. at 641-42 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 2003) (“[t]o expressly direct a jury that it may find guilt based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single person is to invite it to violate its obligation to consider all the evidence[]”); Dill, 741 N.E.2d at 1232-33 (“although evidence of flight may, under appropriate circumstances, be relevant, admissible, and a proper subject for counsel’s

2013See id. 9 The courts of this State have long disapproved instructions that unduly “emphasize one particular evidentiary fact, witness, or phase of the case.” Ham, 826 N.E.2d at 641-42 ; see, e.g., Ludy, 784 N.E.2d at 459 (“[t]o expressly direct a jury that it may find guilt based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single person is to invite it to violate its obligation to consider all the evidence[]”); Dill, 741 N.E.2d at 1232-33 (“although evidence of flight may, under appropriate circumstances, be relevant, admissible, and a proper subject for counsel’s closing argument, it does not follow

2013The courts of this State have long disapproved instructions that unduly “emphasize one particular evidentiary fact, witness, or phase of the case[.]” Id. at 641-42 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 2003) (“[t]o expressly direct a jury that it may find guilt based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single person is to invite it to violate its obligation to consider all the evidence[]”); Dill, 741 N.E.2d at 1232-33 (“although evidence of flight may, under appropriate circumstances, be relevant, admissible, and a proper subject for counsel’s

2013See id. 9 The courts of this State have long disapproved instructions that unduly “emphasize one particular evidentiary fact, witness, or phase of the case.” Ham, 826 N.E.2d at 641-42 ; see, e.g., Ludy, 784 N.E.2d at 459 (“[t]o expressly direct a jury that it may find guilt based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single person is to invite it to violate its obligation to consider all the evidence[]”); Dill, 741 N.E.2d at 1232-33 (“although evidence of flight may, under appropriate circumstances, be relevant, admissible, and a proper subject for counsel’s closing argument, it does not follow

2020See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(8) (“All grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition.); Koons v. State, 771 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“The failure to raise an alleged error in the petition waives the right to raise that issue on appeal.”), trans. denied.