11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2020However, as the Supreme Court contemplated in Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. 63 and Prima Paint, supra, 388 U.S. 395 , when a challenge is asserted against the arbitration provision itself, the court decides the challenge. 2013Thus, a defense of fraud, duress or unconscionability as to some specific provision of the arbitration agreement will require the postponement of arbitration while the validity of the defense is adjudicated. ‘If a party challenges the validity under § 2 of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the federal court must consider the challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement under § 4.’ (Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 [ 177 L.Ed.2d 403 , 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2778 ] (2010).) Thus, the policy of promoting streamlined arbitration proceedings must yield to the ass | 1 | 2 |
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.green1 sentence2025(Cf. Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 892 [“If conduct that supplies a necessary element of a claim is protected, the defendant’s burden at the first step of the anti- SLAPP analysis has been carried, regardless of any alleged motivations that supply other elements of the claim”].) Finally, for reasons already discussed, the Flatley exception does not apply to appellant’s IIED cause of action. 10 Defamation The elements of defamation are “‘“(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.”’” (S | 1 | 1 |
People v. Beltongreen2 sentences2006(See People v. Belton (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1433 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 669 ].) Here, the suspension was not imposed based on a discrete violation but on persistent violations occurring over an extended period. 2006(See People v. Belton (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1433 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 669 ].) Here, the suspension was not imposed based on a discrete violation but on persistent violations occurring over an extended period. | 1 | 1 |
City of Fairfield v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2003(Craddock, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.) Its other claim of bias states (in its entirety) that four unspecified Council members present at the meeting were also “members of the California Apprenticeship Coordinators Association (‘CACA’), a group of union apprenticeship programs [that] had intervened as amicus curiae in support of [Union Plumbers] ... in the proceedings ... at the administrative level[,] and should not have voted due to the obvious conflict of interest.” Not only is this “argument” waived for want of adequate briefing (Craddock, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307), it ignore 2003(Craddock, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.) Its other claim of bias states (in its entirety) that four unspecified Council members present at the meeting were also “members of the California Apprenticeship Coordinators Association (‘CACA’), a group of union apprenticeship programs [that] had intervened as amicus curiae in support of [Union Plumbers] ... in the proceedings ... at the administrative level[,] and should not have voted due to the obvious conflict of interest.” Not only is this “argument” waived for want of adequate briefing (Craddock, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307), it ignore | 1 | 1 |
Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2003(Craddock, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.) Its other claim of bias states (in its entirety) that four unspecified Council members present at the meeting were also “members of the California Apprenticeship Coordinators Association (‘CACA’), a group of union apprenticeship programs [that] had intervened as amicus curiae in support of [Union Plumbers] ... in the proceedings ... at the administrative level[,] and should not have voted due to the obvious conflict of interest.” Not only is this “argument” waived for want of adequate briefing (Craddock, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307), it ignore 2003(Craddock, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.) Its other claim of bias states (in its entirety) that four unspecified Council members present at the meeting were also “members of the California Apprenticeship Coordinators Association (‘CACA’), a group of union apprenticeship programs [that] had intervened as amicus curiae in support of [Union Plumbers] ... in the proceedings ... at the administrative level[,] and should not have voted due to the obvious conflict of interest.” Not only is this “argument” waived for want of adequate briefing (Craddock, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307), it ignore | 1 | 1 |
Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissionersgreen2 sentences1983(Lord v. Henderson, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d 426, 441 ; see also Aero Transit Co. v. Comm’rs (1947) 332 U.S. 495, 506, fn. 19 [ 92 L.Ed. 99 , 108, 68 S.Ct. 167 ].) As the DMV so aptly states “the case at bar poses neither in law nor in fact a ‘duplicate” assessment dilemma in any way, shape or manner: One assessment was levied upon each of two separate operators for the discrete privilege granted to each; neither of those operators has been assessed more than once. 1983(Lord v. Henderson, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d 426, 441 ; see also Aero Transit Co. v. Comm’rs (1947) 332 U.S. 495, 506, fn. 19 [ 92 L.Ed. 99 , 108, 68 S.Ct. 167 ].) As the DMV so aptly states “the case at bar poses neither in law nor in fact a ‘duplicate” assessment dilemma in any way, shape or manner: One assessment was levied upon each of two separate operators for the discrete privilege granted to each; neither of those operators has been assessed more than once. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baral v. Schnitt
green
1 sentence2023Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1010 (Bonni).) Instead, each activity out of which a discrete claim arises is analyzed to determine whether it is protected and whether any claim arising out of that activity has minimal merit. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 393, 395; see Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) While Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have alleged a mixed cause of action for defamation, they contend that the multiple claims within that cause of action should not be analyzed individually because Srinivasan did not do so, thereby waiving the Supreme Court’s ruling in | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.
green
2 sentences2020However, as the Supreme Court contemplated in Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. 63 and Prima Paint, supra, 388 U.S. 395 , when a challenge is asserted against the arbitration provision itself, the court decides the challenge. 2020However, as the Supreme Court contemplated in Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. 63 and Prima Paint, supra, 388 U.S. 395 , when a challenge is asserted against the arbitration provision itself, the court decides the challenge. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Krontz v. City of San Diego
green
1 sentence2016(Krontz, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141 .) Coe had ample notice of the violations because the City sent her multiple warning letters detailing them. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Coley v. M & M MARS, INC.
green
1 sentence2015Based on the facts of Rackin, we question whether this is, indeed, a discrete exception to the doctrine, as opposed to a variation of the exception applicable to conduct outside the scope of employment.8 The court in Coley v. M & M Mars, Inc. (M.D.Ga. 1978) 461 F.Supp. 1073 rejected the multiple discriminatory acts exception to the doctrine based on the “general rule . . . that a single entity cannot conspire with itself” no matter the number of acts involved. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Senior
green
1 sentence2010Importantly, as the Senior court noted about the claim of error there, “all of the factual predicates upon which defendant’s present contention rests were available at the time of defendant’s initial appeal.” (Senior, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 .) As we are about to show, however, the same cannot be said about the case before us now. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Mildred D. Martin, Administratrix of the Estate of B. T. Martin, Deceased v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company
green
2 sentences2010(See id. at pp. 534-538.) The bulk of the opinion essentially imports a common law waiver doctrine from federal case law; perhaps the most noteworthy was the invocation of Martin v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. (5th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 414 (Martin), which rejected the specter of “ ‘piecemeal’ ” consideration of cases just because “ ‘the attorneys generate an idea they should have advanced by specification of error on the first appeal.’ ” ( Senior, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 535-536, italics omitted, quoting Martin, supra, 289 F.2d at p. 416 .) Senior thus articulates a common law waiver 2010(See id. at pp. 534-538.) The bulk of the opinion essentially imports a common law waiver doctrine from federal case law; perhaps the most noteworthy was the invocation of Martin v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. (5th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 414 (Martin), which rejected the specter of “ ‘piecemeal’ ” consideration of cases just because “ ‘the attorneys generate an idea they should have advanced by specification of error on the first appeal.’ ” ( Senior, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 535-536, italics omitted, quoting Martin, supra, 289 F.2d at p. 416 .) Senior thus articulates a common law waiver | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1989“In determining what benefits or duties an insurer owes his insured pursuant to a contract of . . . insurance, the court may not look to the words of the policy alone, but must also consider the reasonable expectations of the public and the insured as to the type of service which the insurance entity holds itself out as ready to offer. [Citation.] Stated in another fashion, the provisions of the policy, ‘ “must be construed so as to give the insured the protection which he reasonably had a right to expect ....’” (Original italics.) (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 270 , fn. 7 . . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Lord v. Henderson
green
1 sentence1983(Lord v. Henderson, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d 426, 441 ; see also Aero Transit Co. v. Comm’rs (1947) 332 U.S. 495, 506, fn. 19 [ 92 L.Ed. 99 , 108, 68 S.Ct. 167 ].) As the DMV so aptly states “the case at bar poses neither in law nor in fact a ‘duplicate” assessment dilemma in any way, shape or manner: One assessment was levied upon each of two separate operators for the discrete privilege granted to each; neither of those operators has been assessed more than once. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.