collateral estoppel is not applicable doctrine (New York) · Go Syfert
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collateral estoppel is not applicable doctrine in New York

12 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1962–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Storman v. Stormangreen
nyappdiv · 2011 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable to preclude the plaintiff from bringing this action, which seeks, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the agreement is a valid and enforceable contract (see Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d 895, 897 [2011]; Wollman v Long Is.

2013Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable to preclude the plaintiff from bringing this action, which seeks, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the agreement is a valid and enforceable contract (see Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d 895, 897 [2011]; Wollman v Long Is.

22
Schwartz v. Public Administratorgreen
ny · 1969 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 1986–2010
2 sentences

2010Furthermore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable here because the issue of whether the tortfeasor’s vehicle was insured at the time of the accident never was litigated and decided in the Pennsylvania action (see generally Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 71 [1969]).

1986The appellants did not have a "full and fair opportunity” to contest the prior decision, so the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable (see, Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 71 ; Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 28).

12
Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopezgreen
ny · 1979 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Corp. v Lopez , 46 NY2d 481, 486-487 [1979]; Magic Recovery Med. & Surgical Supply Inc. v State Farm Mut.

11
Halyalkar v. Board of Regentsgreen
ny · 1988 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016As to the stipulation at trial between the plaintiff and the Silver defendants, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable, since the issues resolved therein were not actually litigated (see Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 261, 267 [1988]; Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d at 456-457; M.V.B.

11
Singleton Management, Inc. v. Comperegreen
nyappdiv · 1998 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
1 sentence

2010Furthermore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable here because the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to, and deprived of, full possession of the basement of the premises never was actually litigated and decided in the Civil Court proceeding, which was settled without prejudice to this action (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449 , 456-457 [1985]; Brandenberg v Primus Assoc., 304 AD2d at 695 ; Singleton Mgt. v Compere, 243 AD2d 213, 217 [1998]; 1829 Caton Realty v Caton BMT Assoc., 225 AD2d at 599 ).

11
Holt v. Holtgreen
nyappdiv · 1999 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
1 sentence

2010The Pennsylvania court order which determined that the tortfeasor’s policy was void ah initio was made on the default of Rodriguez (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449 , 456-457 [1985]; Chambers v City of New York, 309 AD2d 81 [2003]; Holt v Holt, 262 AD2d 530, 530 [1999]; Rourke v Travelers Ins.

11
In re the Estate of Huntergreen
nyappdiv · 2004 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005Although the defendant correctly asserts that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable under the circumstances of this case (see Matter of Hunter, 6 AD3d 117, 121 [2004], affd 4 NY3d 260 [2005]), the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

CaseCitedYears
M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v. Rovt green
nyappdiv · 2012
1 sentence

2016Collision, Inc. v Rout, 101 AD3d 830 , 831 [2012]; Pawling Lake Prop.

12016–2016
Brandenberg v. Primus Associates green
nyappdiv · 2003
1 sentence

2010Furthermore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable here because the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to, and deprived of, full possession of the basement of the premises never was actually litigated and decided in the Civil Court proceeding, which was settled without prejudice to this action (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449 , 456-457 [1985]; Brandenberg v Primus Assoc., 304 AD2d at 695 ; Singleton Mgt. v Compere, 243 AD2d 213, 217 [1998]; 1829 Caton Realty v Caton BMT Assoc., 225 AD2d at 599 ).

12010–2010
Chambers v. City of New York green
nyappdiv · 2003
1 sentence

2010The Pennsylvania court order which determined that the tortfeasor’s policy was void ah initio was made on the default of Rodriguez (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449 , 456-457 [1985]; Chambers v City of New York, 309 AD2d 81 [2003]; Holt v Holt, 262 AD2d 530, 530 [1999]; Rourke v Travelers Ins.

12010–2010
1829 Caton Realty v. Caton BMT Associates green
nyappdiv · 1996
1 sentence

2010Furthermore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable here because the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to, and deprived of, full possession of the basement of the premises never was actually litigated and decided in the Civil Court proceeding, which was settled without prejudice to this action (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449 , 456-457 [1985]; Brandenberg v Primus Assoc., 304 AD2d at 695 ; Singleton Mgt. v Compere, 243 AD2d 213, 217 [1998]; 1829 Caton Realty v Caton BMT Assoc., 225 AD2d at 599 ).

12010–2010
Oneida Indian Nation v. Pifer green
nyappdiv · 2007
1 sentence

2009(See Matter of Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v Pifer, 43 AD3d 579 [3d Dept 2007]; Sterling Natl.

12009–2009
In Re the Estate of Hunter green
ny · 2005
1 sentence

2005Although the defendant correctly asserts that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable under the circumstances of this case (see Matter of Hunter, 6 AD3d 117, 121 [2004], affd 4 NY3d 260 [2005]), the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

12005–2005
Gilberg v. Barbieri green
ny · 1981
1 sentence

1998Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable under the circumstances of this case (see generally, Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449 , 455; Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 291 ).

11998–1998
Crawford v. Sheriff's Department green
nyappdiv · 1989
1 sentence

1998Such determinations, when final, indeed become conclusive and binding with respect to determining General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits (see, Matter of Delahunt v City of Oswego, 222 AD2d 1078 , lv denied 88 NY2d 801 ; Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 AD2d 938 ; Matter of Fedorczak v Dolce, 202 AD2d 668 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriffs’ Dept., Putnam County, 152 AD2d 382 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ).

11998–1998
Fedorczak v. Dolce green
nyappdiv · 1994
1 sentence

1998Such determinations, when final, indeed become conclusive and binding with respect to determining General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits (see, Matter of Delahunt v City of Oswego, 222 AD2d 1078 , lv denied 88 NY2d 801 ; Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 AD2d 938 ; Matter of Fedorczak v Dolce, 202 AD2d 668 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriffs’ Dept., Putnam County, 152 AD2d 382 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ).

11998–1998
De John v. Town of Frankfort green
nyappdiv · 1994
1 sentence

1998Such determinations, when final, indeed become conclusive and binding with respect to determining General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits (see, Matter of Delahunt v City of Oswego, 222 AD2d 1078 , lv denied 88 NY2d 801 ; Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 AD2d 938 ; Matter of Fedorczak v Dolce, 202 AD2d 668 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriffs’ Dept., Putnam County, 152 AD2d 382 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ).

11998–1998
Delahunt v. City of Oswego neutral
nyappdiv · 1995
1 sentence

1998Such determinations, when final, indeed become conclusive and binding with respect to determining General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits (see, Matter of Delahunt v City of Oswego, 222 AD2d 1078 , lv denied 88 NY2d 801 ; Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 AD2d 938 ; Matter of Fedorczak v Dolce, 202 AD2d 668 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriffs’ Dept., Putnam County, 152 AD2d 382 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ).

11998–1998
People v. Rodgers green
nyappdiv · 1918
1 sentence

1962On the other hand, if it could not be definitely determined on what ground the acquittal was had in the Federal court, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable (State v. Barton, 5 Wn. [2d] 234; State v. Orth, 107 Ohio App. 35 , appeal dismissed 167 Ohio St. 388 ; Hoag v. New Jersey, 21 N. J. 496, affd. 356 U. S. 464 , supra; People v. Rodgers, 184 App. Div. 461 , affd. 226 N. Y. 671 ).

11962–1962
Hoag v. New Jersey yellow
scotus · 1958
1 sentence

1962On the other hand, if it could not be definitely determined on what ground the acquittal was had in the Federal court, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable (State v. Barton, 5 Wn. [2d] 234; State v. Orth, 107 Ohio App. 35 , appeal dismissed 167 Ohio St. 388 ; Hoag v. New Jersey, 21 N. J. 496, affd. 356 U. S. 464 , supra; People v. Rodgers, 184 App. Div. 461 , affd. 226 N. Y. 671 ).

11962–1962
State v. Orth green
ohioctapp · 1957
1 sentence

1962On the other hand, if it could not be definitely determined on what ground the acquittal was had in the Federal court, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable (State v. Barton, 5 Wn. [2d] 234; State v. Orth, 107 Ohio App. 35 , appeal dismissed 167 Ohio St. 388 ; Hoag v. New Jersey, 21 N. J. 496, affd. 356 U. S. 464 , supra; People v. Rodgers, 184 App. Div. 461 , affd. 226 N. Y. 671 ).

11962–1962
People v. . Rodgers green
ny · 1919
1 sentence

1962On the other hand, if it could not be definitely determined on what ground the acquittal was had in the Federal court, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable (State v. Barton, 5 Wn. [2d] 234; State v. Orth, 107 Ohio App. 35 , appeal dismissed 167 Ohio St. 388 ; Hoag v. New Jersey, 21 N. J. 496, affd. 356 U. S. 464 , supra; People v. Rodgers, 184 App. Div. 461 , affd. 226 N. Y. 671 ).

11962–1962

Where else courts name it

NY 12 (1962–2018) TX 8 (1971–2010) CA 6 (1970–1993) NJ 3 (1987–2017) FL 3 (1985–2017) PA 2 (1991–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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