accused to prepare defense in Texas

2025See State v. Mejia, No. 04-22-00127-CR, 2023 WL 3082426 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 26, 2023, no pet) (mem. op.) (“A charging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense.”) (citing State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Tex. Crim.

2019“The charging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense.” Id.

2015State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Crim.

2015At minimum, an indictment must “convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare his defense.” State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Crim.

2015The Court of Criminal Appeals stated in its opinion: “When considering a motion to quash the indictment, it is not sufficient to say the defendant knew with what offense he was charged; rather, the question presented is whether the face of the indictment or charging instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense.” Castillo at 447 citing Haecker v. State 571 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Crim App. 1978).

1996Haecker v. State, 571 SW.2d 920, 921 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).

2004Lewis v. State , 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. Crim.

1984In Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), the Court emphasized the above constitutional and code requirements: When considering a motion to quash the indictment, it is not sufficient to say the defendant knew with what offense he was charged; rather, the question presented is whether the face of the indictment or charging instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense.

2025Both federal and state constitutions require “[t]he charging instrument [to] convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense.” Id. (quoting Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. Crim.

2023“The charging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense.” Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. Crim.

1992McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Haecker v. State, 571 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978).

1992Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).

1991This language suggests that the court of appeals overlooks the proper inquiry when review ing the propriety of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash: “When considering a motion to quash, it is not sufficient to say the accused knew with what offense he was charged; rather, the question presented is whether the face of the instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense." Jeffers v. State, 646 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (original opinion, modified on other ground on motion for rehearing). .

1983In upholding the defendant’s contention, we stated: “When considering a motion to quash, it is not sufficient to say that the accused knew with what offense he was charged; rather, the question presented is whether the face of the instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense ...” Id. at 187 . [[Image here]] “The essence of each of the eight offenses, as alleged in the indictments, was appellant’s act in receiving a bet and offer to bet by a named individual.

2022“To provide this fair notice, the charging instrument must convey sufficient information to allow the accused to prepare a defense.” Id.

2022“To provide this fair notice, the charging instrument must convey sufficient information to allow the accused to prepare a defense.” Id.

1987See Beck v. State, 682 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

1986Beck v. State, 682 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

1985Haecker v. State, supra; McManus v. State, supra; Jeffers v. State, supra; Marrs v. State, 647 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).

1985Haecker v. State, supra; McManus v. State, supra; Jeffers v. State, supra; Marrs v. State, 647 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. Cr.App.1983); Lewis v. State, 659 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).

1996See also, Castillo v. State, 689 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (“[T]he question presented is whether the face of the indictment or charging instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense.”); Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and, Earl v. State, 33 Tex.Crim. 570 , 28 S.W. 469 (1894).

1996See also, Castillo v. State, 689 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) ("[T]he question presented is whether the face of the indictment or charging instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense."); Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and, Earl v. State, 33 Tex.Crim. 570 , 28 S.W. 469 (1894).

2005Galliford v. State , 101 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref ’ d).

2003Galliford v. State , 101 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d.); State v Mays , 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Crim.

2003State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex. Crim.App.1986).

1998Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (citing Voelkel v. State, 501 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)).

1996See also, Castillo v. State, 689 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (“[T]he question presented is whether the face of the indictment or charging instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense.”); Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and, Earl v. State, 33 Tex.Crim. 570 , 28 S.W. 469 (1894).

1996See also, Castillo v. State, 689 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) ("[T]he question presented is whether the face of the indictment or charging instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense."); Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and, Earl v. State, 33 Tex.Crim. 570 , 28 S.W. 469 (1894).

1991Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

1991Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Tex.Code CRIM.P.

2025Both federal and state constitutions require “[t]he charging instrument [to] convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense.” Id. (quoting Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 906 (citing Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. Crim.

2025App. 2008) (emphasis added); Townsley v. State, 538 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. Crim.

2025See Kellar, 108 S.W.3d at 313 (detailing what the State provided to the defense to show the defendant had actual notice after stating “[w]hen a motion to quash is overruled, a defendant suffers no harm unless he did not, in fact, receive notice of the State’s theory against which he would have to defend” (citation omitted)); Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 602 (“Because fundamental constitutional protections are involved, if a defendant files a timely motion stating that the indictment does not provide adequate notice, there are some circumstances in which the trial court may require more information.”);

2025See Kellar, 108 S.W.3d at 313 (detailing what the State provided to the defense to show the defendant had actual notice after stating “[w]hen a motion to quash is overruled, a defendant suffers no harm unless he did not, in fact, receive notice of the State’s theory against which he would have to defend” (citation omitted)); Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 602 (“Because fundamental constitutional protections are involved, if a defendant files a timely motion stating that the indictment does not provide adequate notice, there are some circumstances in which the trial court may require more information.”);

2025See Kellar, 108 S.W.3d at 313 (detailing what the State provided to the defense to show the defendant had actual notice after stating “[w]hen a motion to quash is overruled, a defendant suffers no harm unless he did not, in fact, receive notice of the State’s theory against which he would have to defend” (citation omitted)); Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 602 (“Because fundamental constitutional protections are involved, if a defendant files a timely motion stating that the indictment does not provide adequate notice, there are some circumstances in which the trial court may require more information.”);

2024Id. at 780 (noting that determining which party requested the inclusion of manslaughter was “irrelevant for our analysis”). 26 instrument is sufficient if it provides enough notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense.

2017App. 2000)); see also Castorena, 486 S.W.3d at 632 .

2017See Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 250 (noting “chai-ging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense”); cf. Lovett v. State, Nos. 02-16-00094-CR & 02-16-00095-CR, 523 S.W.3d 342, 347-48 , 2017 WL 2590221, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, pet. filed) (noting “the mere presence of a firearm or deadly weapon in public cannot possibly supply the requisite mens rea for a disorderly-conduct conviction, or else anyone participating in Texas’s embrace of lawful open carry would be guilty the moment he stepped outside his home visibly armed”).

2017See Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 250 (noting “chai-ging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense”); cf. Lovett v. State, Nos. 02-16-00094-CR & 02-16-00095-CR, 523 S.W.3d 342, 347-48 , 2017 WL 2590221, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, pet. filed) (noting “the mere presence of a firearm or deadly weapon in public cannot possibly supply the requisite mens rea for a disorderly-conduct conviction, or else anyone participating in Texas’s embrace of lawful open carry would be guilty the moment he stepped outside his home visibly armed”).

2011See Moreno v. State , 721 S.W.2d 295 , 300–01 (Tex. Crim.

2008Law A. Notice The Texas and United States Constitutions grant a criminal defendant the right to fair notice of the specific charged offense.18 “The charging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense.” 19 Toward that end, Chapter 21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs charging instruments and provides legislative guidance concerning the requirements and adequacy of notice.20 With respect to informations, Article 21.21 sets out what facts must be included in an information and states, 18 Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. Crim.

2003Hare v. State, 713 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1986, pet. ref'd).