connection rule in New York

2009Grubart, Inc. v Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. ( 513 US 527 [1995]), the Supreme Court explained the status test, or “connection” test, as having two components: “The connection test raises two issues.

2002As relevant here, the jurisdictional requirements set out in former Domestic Relations Law § 75-d (1) (b) are satisfied by a showing that New York has a substantial connection with the parents or the child and that there is substantial evidence within the state respecting the child’s future care. 2 Since the child was born here, the parties were married and divorced here, the father has continued to reside here, and the child has visited him here, the substantial connection test is met (see, Corkins v Corkins, 253 AD2d 783 ; Matter of Irwin v Schmidt, 236 AD2d 401 , lv denied 89 NY2d 815 ).

2002As relevant here, the jurisdictional requirements set out in former Domestic Relations Law § 75-d (1) (b) are satisfied by a showing that New York has a substantial connection with the parents or the child and that there is substantial evidence within the state respecting the child’s future care. 2 Since the child was born here, the parties were married and divorced here, the father has continued to reside here, and the child has visited him here, the substantial connection test is met (see, Corkins v Corkins, 253 AD2d 783 ; Matter of Irwin v Schmidt, 236 AD2d 401 , lv denied 89 NY2d 815 ).

2000We note in this connection that the doctrine set forth in Noseworthy v City of New York ( 298 NY 76 ) has no application at bar because defendant’s knowledge respecting the circumstances of the decedent’s death is no greater than plaintiffs (Lynn v Lynn, 216 AD2d 194, 195 , citing Wright v New York City Hous.

2000Auth., 208 AD2d 327, 332 ).

2000We note in this connection that the doctrine set forth in Noseworthy v City of New York ( 298 NY 76 ) has no application at bar because defendant’s knowledge respecting the circumstances of the decedent’s death is no greater than plaintiffs (Lynn v Lynn, 216 AD2d 194, 195 , citing Wright v New York City Hous.

1972It deals with “ probabilities ” including “ the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act (People v. Lombardi, 18 A D 2d 177, 180, citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175 .) In the case before us we have not only factual and práótica! considerations acted upon by reasonable and piudent men but we have the additional factor that the reasonable and prudent men were experienced police officers trained in the very line of law enforcement which was involved in their arrest of the-defendant.

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1950Basic in this connection is the rule that “ The maimer and extent of the cross-examination lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.” (People v. Malkin, supra, 250 N. Y. 185, 197 ; see, also, People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 268-269 ; People v. Webster, supra, 139 N. Y. 73, 84 ; People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 657-658 ; People v. Casey, supra, 72 N. Y. 393, 399 ; La Beau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230 .) Accordingly, although there may he room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be vouchsafe

1935It has been held on innumerable occasions that “ a trust duty may thus be imposed upon an executor which thereby becomes and is made a function of his office.” (McAlpine v. Potter, 126 N. Y. 285, 289 .) Wherefore the only safe criterion for determination in this connection is by an analysis of the duties which have actually been imposed upon the fiduciary with a decision based thereon as to the character of the offi.ce which he occupies.

1934On this point the cases furnish a clear insight into the law. “ The action thus provided for is purely statutory, has existed in this state for many years substantially as now found in the Code and has been repeatedly considered by the courts.” (Matter of Snedeker v. Snedeker, 164 N. Y. 58, at p. 62 .) “ Whatever the theory of the complaint may be, it is an action for damages for the causing of the death of a decedent by a wrongful act, be that act one of negligence or a wrongful act of a different character.

1934(Matter of Harned, 140 Misc. 151, 153 ; affd., 234 App. Div. 796 ; Matter of Kruger, 139 Misc. 907, 908 ; Matter of Stulman, 146 id. 861, 868; Matter of Taft, 144 id. 896, 899, 900; Matter of Taft, 143 id. 387, 391; Matter of Burroughs, 137 id. 844, 852; Matter of Berbling, 134 id. 730, 731.) This sum was due, $1,174.82 to Horan and $531.16 to John.

1934(Matter of Harned, 140 Misc. 151, 153 ; affd., 234 App. Div. 796 ; Matter of Kruger, 139 Misc. 907, 908 ; Matter of Stulman, 146 id. 861, 868; Matter of Taft, 144 id. 896, 899, 900; Matter of Taft, 143 id. 387, 391; Matter of Burroughs, 137 id. 844, 852; Matter of Berbling, 134 id. 730, 731.) This sum was due, $1,174.82 to Horan and $531.16 to John.

1934(Matter of Harned, 140 Misc. 151, 153 ; affd., 234 App. Div. 796 ; Matter of Kruger, 139 Misc. 907, 908 ; Matter of Stulman, 146 id. 861, 868; Matter of Taft, 144 id. 896, 899, 900; Matter of Taft, 143 id. 387, 391; Matter of Burroughs, 137 id. 844, 852; Matter of Berbling, 134 id. 730, 731.) This sum was due, $1,174.82 to Horan and $531.16 to John.

1924(McNally v. Georgia-Florida Lumber Co., 146 App. Div. 456 .) In this connection it also was error, and very prejudicial to the plaintiffs, for the learned court to charge as matter of law that the plaintiffs never were ready, willing and able to ship the beans from Michigan, since the evidence is that they had furnished the defendants with the shipper’s name and point of shipment, requesting the defendants to furnish permit for said shipment; from all of which it might reasonably have been inferred by the jury that the beans were ready for shipment at said point by said shipper.

1905(New York & Mount Vernon Transportation Co. v. Tyroler, 25 App. Div. 161 ; Cohn v. Goldman, 76 .N.