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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Board of Education of Community Consolidated High School District No. 230 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2000We believe the primary purpose test is too narrow and that the significant connection test, as articulated by the majority of the IELRB, avoids the distinct problems associated with an overly broad definition of the term "student." See Board of Education of Community Consolidated High School District No. 230 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. 2000We believe the primary purpose test is too narrow and that the significant connection test, as articulated by the majority of the IELRB, avoids the distinct problems associated with an overly broad definition of the term “student.” See Board of Education of Community Consolidated High School District No. 230 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars ($364,960.00) in United States Currencygreen2 sentences1997See United States v. $364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522). 1997See United States v. $364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.1981) (citing Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraftgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances b 1997See 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d at 494 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. One 1984 Cadillacgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances b 1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir.1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir.1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances becau | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Schifferligreen2 sentences1997At minimum, the property must have more than an incidental or fortuitous connection to criminal activity.” United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990). 1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances b | 2 | 2 |
United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, Appeal of Paul F. Born, Iii, Claimant-Appellantgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances b 1997See 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d at 494 . | 2 | 2 |
Ruby Nnadi v. Robert Richter, District Director, United States Customs Servicegreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances b 1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir.1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir.1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances becau | 2 | 2 |
United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, Serial No. 6l47s4q407966green2 sentences1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances b 1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir.1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir.1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances becau | 2 | 2 |
People v. Murdockgreen1 sentence2014See Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶¶ 36-37 ; People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91 , 108- 09 (1999) (evidence adduced at trial should not be considered on appeal for purposes of reversing a ruling on a motion to suppress; proper procedure would have been for trial counsel to request reconsideration on motion to suppress). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Parcel of Land and Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusettsgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances b 1997See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir.1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727 ; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir.1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances becau | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A.
green
1 sentence2022Just as with the third-party beneficiary theory, nothing in the RILC provided Stacey with any “direct benefit.” Any benefit to Stacey was incidental or indirect because it derived solely from Lee’s ownership of the vehicle as evidenced by Ford’s release of lien and the certificate of title which granted sole ownership of the vehicle to Lee. ¶ 46 In short, we find the connection at bar even more nebulous than seen in A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 885 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 2018). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Brooks
green
1 sentence2014See Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶¶ 36-37 ; People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91 , 108- 09 (1999) (evidence adduced at trial should not be considered on appeal for purposes of reversing a ruling on a motion to suppress; proper procedure would have been for trial counsel to request reconsideration on motion to suppress). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander
green
1 sentence1999Wilander, 498 U.S. at 343-45 , 112 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis
green
2 sentences1999The Court explained the significance of this inquiry, stating: “The fundamental purpose of this substantial connection requirement is to give full effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.” Chandris, Inc., 515 U.S. at 368 , 132 L. 1999The Court explained the significance of this inquiry, stating: “The fundamental purpose of this substantial connection requirement is to give full effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.” Chandris, Inc., 515 U.S. at 368 , 132 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Waggoner v. Clark
neutral
1 sentence1930Waggoner v. Clark , 293 Ill. 256 ; Lingle v. Bulfer , 322 id. 606. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.