effects presumption in New York

2023Even ignoring that this is punishment, application of the effects factors still compels the conclusion that the residency prohibition is so punitive that it cannot be deemed civil in effect (see id. at 105-106 ).

2018However, the party that made the payment must give some indication that it "took steps to indicate that [it] was reserving [its] rights" ( 133 AD3d at 405 ).

1985Here, where the danger of falling on the wet playing field was obvious, it makes no sense to relieve plaintiffs from the effects of the doctrine of assumption of risk merely because Maddox was a professional, and not an amateur, player (cf. Davidoff v Metropolitan Baseball Club, 92 AD2d 461 , affd 61 NY2d 996 [standard of care imposed on proprietor of professional playing field not different from that imposed on proprietor of high school field]; Heldman v Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio App 2d 21, 371 NE2d 557 [assumption of risk applicable to professional tennis player]; Santiago v Clark, 444 F Supp

1985Here, where the danger of falling on the wet playing field was obvious, it makes no sense to relieve plaintiffs from the effects of the doctrine of assumption of risk merely because Maddox was a professional, and not an amateur, player (cf. Davidoff v Metropolitan Baseball Club, 92 AD2d 461 , affd 61 NY2d 996 [standard of care imposed on proprietor of professional playing field not different from that imposed on proprietor of high school field]; Heldman v Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio App 2d 21, 371 NE2d 557 [assumption of risk applicable to professional tennis player]; Santiago v Clark, 444 F Supp

1985Here, where the danger of falling on the wet playing field was obvious, it makes no sense to relieve plaintiffs from the effects of the doctrine of assumption of risk merely because Maddox was a professional, and not an amateur, player (cf. Davidoff v Metropolitan Baseball Club, 92 AD2d 461 , affd 61 NY2d 996 [standard of care imposed on proprietor of professional playing field not different from that imposed on proprietor of high school field]; Heldman v Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio App 2d 21, 371 NE2d 557 [assumption of risk applicable to professional tennis player]; Santiago v Clark, 444 F Supp

1985Here, where the danger of falling on the wet playing field was obvious, it makes no sense to relieve plaintiffs from the effects of the doctrine of assumption of risk merely because Maddox was a professional, and not an amateur, player (cf. Davidoff v Metropolitan Baseball Club, 92 AD2d 461 , affd 61 NY2d 996 [standard of care imposed on proprietor of professional playing field not different from that imposed on proprietor of high school field]; Heldman v Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio App 2d 21, 371 NE2d 557 [assumption of risk applicable to professional tennis player]; Santiago v Clark, 444 F Supp

1978True, a defendant would be appreciably less inclined to waive counsel when sufficiently apprised of the effects of that waiver by an attorney (see People v Hobson, supra, at p 485 ).

1967The court placed great stress on his assertion of privilege and relied on holdings in this court and the United States Supreme Court which distinguish between the availability and the effects of a claim of privilege against self incrimination by a public official in a disciplinary proceeding and the effects of such claims in any subsequent criminal proceeding against him (Matter of Gardner v. Broderick, 20 N Y 2d 227, and Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 ; cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511 ).

1967The court placed great stress on his assertion of privilege and relied on holdings in this court and the United States Supreme Court which distinguish between the availability and the effects of a claim of privilege against self incrimination by a public official in a disciplinary proceeding and the effects of such claims in any subsequent criminal proceeding against him (Matter of Gardner v. Broderick, 20 N Y 2d 227, and Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 ; cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511 ).

1953It is interesting to note that in 1952 the Legislature amended section 33-e of the Personal Property Law to avert the effects of the rule in Green v. Doniger (supra), thus indicating a strong policy in favor of the right of contracting parties who have entered into a written agreement to eliminate oral changes in their relations (L. 1952, ch. 831; N. Y.

1930It was said in Clayton v. Warded ( 4 N. Y. 230, at p. 232 ): “ The only difference between a marriage celebrated by formal ceremony, and one not so celebrated, is that, in the former case, the regular celebration is conclusive evidence of the mutual consent requisite to the validity of the marriage, while in the latter it is competent to rebut the proof of the marriage by other evidence.” While, therefore, it is unquestionable that rebutting testimony in a case where no ceremonial marriage has been shown, is admissible, the cogency of such evidence to produce a determination of non-marriage, i

1930Marriage is a status which may be established by the words, actions, and the lives of the parties evidencing their understanding and intent.” (See, also, Ellis v. Kelsey, 118 Misc. 763, 767, 768 ; affd., 208 App. Div. 774 ; 214 id. 784 , and affd. so far as concerns this question, 241 N. Y. 374, 379 ; Matter of Moncrief, 235 id. 390, 392 ; Matter of Leslie, 175 App. Div. 108, 111 .) It being apparent from these citations that the facts shown in the petition and supplementary affidavit raise a presumption of marriage, the effects of such presumption become pertinent.

1930Marriage is a status which may be established by the words, actions, and the lives of the parties evidencing their understanding and intent.” (See, also, Ellis v. Kelsey, 118 Misc. 763, 767, 768 ; affd., 208 App. Div. 774 ; 214 id. 784 , and affd. so far as concerns this question, 241 N. Y. 374, 379 ; Matter of Moncrief, 235 id. 390, 392 ; Matter of Leslie, 175 App. Div. 108, 111 .) It being apparent from these citations that the facts shown in the petition and supplementary affidavit raise a presumption of marriage, the effects of such presumption become pertinent.

1930Marriage is a status which may be established by the words, actions, and the lives of the parties evidencing their understanding and intent.” (See, also, Ellis v. Kelsey, 118 Misc. 763, 767, 768 ; affd., 208 App. Div. 774 ; 214 id. 784 , and affd. so far as concerns this question, 241 N. Y. 374, 379 ; Matter of Moncrief, 235 id. 390, 392 ; Matter of Leslie, 175 App. Div. 108, 111 .) It being apparent from these citations that the facts shown in the petition and supplementary affidavit raise a presumption of marriage, the effects of such presumption become pertinent.