67 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tyrone Gaither v. United States of America, Charles Tatum v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011In Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 284-85 (D.C.2007), we articulated the factors as “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969)). 2000In deciding whether there was “substantial prejudice,” this court will consider factors such as “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969). | 33 | 34 |
Clark v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019Rather, "we must look to the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and any steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. at 193 . 2007See Clark v. United States, 593 A.2d 186, 192-93 (D.C.1991) (setting forth as factors for determining whether the error was harmless under Kotteakos , “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and any steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error”). | 5 | 7 |
Dyson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted); see also Settles v. United States, 615 A.2d 1105, 1109 (D.C.1992); Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969). 1997The critical factors to our determination are “ ‘the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.’ ” Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980) (citing Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App. | 5 | 5 |
In Re Morrisgreen2 sentences2006In other words, a ease is moot “if ‘there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur [to the complaining party] and ... interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the violation.’ ” Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C.1997) (quoting In re Morris, 482 A.2d 369, 371 (D.C.1984)). 1997A case is considered to be moot if "there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and ... interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the violation." In re Morris, 482 A.2d 369, 371 (D.C.1984) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 , 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383 , 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Bliss v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993In deciding whether to reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial, this court considers "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [asserted] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. (quoting Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), opinion amended, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C.1982), ce rt. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 , 103 S.Ct. 756 , 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983)) (brackets by the court). . 1993In deciding whether to reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial, this court considers "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [asserted] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. (quoting Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), opinion amended, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 , 103 S.Ct. 756 , 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983)) (brackets by the court). [24] The judge also instructed the jury that "You may consider only the evidence in this case ... you must permit only the evidence in this case to enter in | 2 | 3 |
McGrier v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 , (1946), and Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App. 1994McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 7 . | 2 | 2 |
Freeman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006See Freeman v. United States, 689 A.2d 575, 584 (D.C.1997) (factors to be considered in determining the existence of substantial prejudice are “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error”). 2006See Freeman v. United States, 689 A.2d 575, 584 (D.C.1997) (factors to be considered in determining the existence of substantial prejudice are "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error"). | 2 | 2 |
Outlaw v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1994The decisive factors for determining whether an error is imper-missibly prejudicial are “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Outlaw, supra, 604 A.2d at 880 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 1994The decisive factors for determining whether an error is imper-missibly prejudicial are “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Outlaw, supra, 604 A.2d at 880 (internal quotations and citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Bennett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983The test to determine whether substantial prejudice occurred as a result of the misconduct is “whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 123 1980See also Cooper v. United States, supra; Bennett v. United States, D.C.App., 375 A.2d 499, 504 (1977). | 2 | 2 |
Kotteakos v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” 58 In applying Kotteakos, this court has observed that “the ‘burden’ is not on the appellant to show that he has suffered prejudice; rather, the issue is whether the record eliminates the appellate court’s doubt about whether the error influenced the jury’s decision.” 59 Indeed, “we must find it highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.” 60 Finally, we have said, to “assess[] an error’s impact, we typically take three factors into consideration: (1) the centrality of the issue affected by the error 2021If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” 58 In applying Kotteakos, this court has observed that “the ‘burden’ is not on the appellant to show that he has suffered prejudice; rather, the issue is whether the record eliminates the appellate court’s doubt about whether the error influenced the jury’s decision.” 59 Indeed, “we must find it highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.” 60 Finally, we have said, to “assess[] an error’s impact, we typically take three factors into consideration: (1) the centrality of the issue affected by the error | 1 | 14 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983The test to determine whether substantial prejudice occurred as a result of the misconduct is “whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 123 1982“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Smith v. United States, supra at 993-94, quoting Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 163, 166 , cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 9 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1985This court has held that “[t]he decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Thomas, supra, 444 A.2d at 954 (quoting Smith v. United States, 392 A.2d 990, 993-94 (D.C.1978)). 1982“The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Id. at 993-94 , quoting Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 163, 166 , cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 2 |
Melvin Andrade v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See Atkins, 290 A.3d at 485 (In a plain error posture, we reserve reversal “to particularly egregious situations,” leaving us to determine if a failure to cure allegedly improper comments “was ‘so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.’” (quoting Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1257 and Andrade 29 v. United States, 88 A.3d 134, 140 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Ball v. United States, 26 A.3d 764, 772 (D.C. 2011)). 1. | 1 | 1 |
Ball v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See Atkins, 290 A.3d at 485 (In a plain error posture, we reserve reversal “to particularly egregious situations,” leaving us to determine if a failure to cure allegedly improper comments “was ‘so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.’” (quoting Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1257 and Andrade 29 v. United States, 88 A.3d 134, 140 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Ball v. United States, 26 A.3d 764, 772 (D.C. 2011)). 1. | 1 | 1 |
Portillo v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See Atkins, 290 A.3d at 485 (In a plain error posture, we reserve reversal “to particularly egregious situations,” leaving us to determine if a failure to cure allegedly improper comments “was ‘so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.’” (quoting Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1257 and Andrade 29 v. United States, 88 A.3d 134, 140 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Ball v. United States, 26 A.3d 764, 772 (D.C. 2011)). 1. | 1 | 1 |
O'NEAL v. McAninchgreen1 sentence2021If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” 58 In applying Kotteakos, this court has observed that “the ‘burden’ is not on the appellant to show that he has suffered prejudice; rather, the issue is whether the record eliminates the appellate court’s doubt about whether the error influenced the jury’s decision.” 59 Indeed, “we must find it highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.” 60 Finally, we have said, to “assess[] an error’s impact, we typically take three factors into consideration: (1) the centrality of the issue affected by the error | 1 | 1 |
Washington v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” 58 In applying Kotteakos, this court has observed that “the ‘burden’ is not on the appellant to show that he has suffered prejudice; rather, the issue is whether the record eliminates the appellate court’s doubt about whether the error influenced the jury’s decision.” 59 Indeed, “we must find it highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.” 60 Finally, we have said, to “assess[] an error’s impact, we typically take three factors into consideration: (1) the centrality of the issue affected by the error 2021If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” 58 In applying Kotteakos, this court has observed that “the ‘burden’ is not on the appellant to show that he has suffered prejudice; rather, the issue is whether the record eliminates the appellate court’s doubt about whether the error influenced the jury’s decision.” 59 Indeed, “we must find it highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.” 60 Finally, we have said, to “assess[] an error’s impact, we typically take three factors into consideration: (1) the centrality of the issue affected by the error | 1 | 1 |
Wilson-Bey v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” 58 In applying Kotteakos, this court has observed that “the ‘burden’ is not on the appellant to show that he has suffered prejudice; rather, the issue is whether the record eliminates the appellate court’s doubt about whether the error influenced the jury’s decision.” 59 Indeed, “we must find it highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.” 60 Finally, we have said, to “assess[] an error’s impact, we typically take three factors into consideration: (1) the centrality of the issue affected by the error | 1 | 1 |
Perez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” 58 In applying Kotteakos, this court has observed that “the ‘burden’ is not on the appellant to show that he has suffered prejudice; rather, the issue is whether the record eliminates the appellate court’s doubt about whether the error influenced the jury’s decision.” 59 Indeed, “we must find it highly probable that [the] error did not contribute to the verdict.” 60 Finally, we have said, to “assess[] an error’s impact, we typically take three factors into consideration: (1) the centrality of the issue affected by the error | 1 | 1 |
Ebron v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2016See Ebron v. United States, 838 A.2d 1140, 1150 (D.C.2003) (assessing whether admission of irrelevant threats evidence was harmless error by considering “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error”) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Anthony v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011In Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 284-85 (D.C.2007), we articulated the factors as “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” (quoting Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
| Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Loving v. Virginiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allen v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hardesty v. Drapergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Freeman v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Settles v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bowman v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pounds v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brooks v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brooks v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. Marvins Credit, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Franklin Delano Gipsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hack v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garris v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Saunders v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zane v. United States
green
2 sentences1983The test to determine whether substantial prejudice occurred as a result of the misconduct is “whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 123 1979Our task in assessing the impact of prosecutorial misconduct is to determine whether we can say “with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. [Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 ( | 8 | 1977–1983 |
First Presbyterian Church of Forest Park v. Lowe
green
2 sentences1983The test to determine whether substantial prejudice occurred as a result of the misconduct is “whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 123 1979Our task in assessing the impact of prosecutorial misconduct is to determine whether we can say “with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. [Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 ( | 8 | 1977–1983 |
Jeffries v. United States
green
2 sentences1983The test to determine whether substantial prejudice occurred as a result of the misconduct is “whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 123 1979Our task in assessing the impact of prosecutorial misconduct is to determine whether we can say “with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. [Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154 , 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 ( | 8 | 1977–1983 |
County of Los Angeles v. Davis
green
2 sentences1997A case is considered to be moot if "there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and ... interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the violation." In re Morris, 482 A.2d 369, 371 (D.C.1984) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 , 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383 , 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 1997A case is considered to be moot if "there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and ... interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the violation." In re Morris, 482 A.2d 369, 371 (D.C.1984) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 , 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383 , 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 4 | 1984–1997 |
Powell v. United States
green
2 sentences2023The determinative factors for assessing whether there has been substantial prejudice include “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Id. 1989The decisive factors determinative of whether there has been substantial prejudice include “the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Powell, supra, 455 A.2d at 411 . | 2 | 1989–2023 |
Wright v. United States
green
2 sentences1993In deciding whether to reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial, this court considers "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [asserted] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. (quoting Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), opinion amended, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C.1982), ce rt. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 , 103 S.Ct. 756 , 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983)) (brackets by the court). . 1993In deciding whether to reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial, this court considers "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [asserted] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. (quoting Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), opinion amended, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 , 103 S.Ct. 756 , 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983)) (brackets by the court). [24] The judge also instructed the jury that "You may consider only the evidence in this case ... you must permit only the evidence in this case to enter in | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Goldberg v. United States
green
2 sentences1993In deciding whether to reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial, this court considers "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [asserted] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. (quoting Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), opinion amended, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C.1982), ce rt. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 , 103 S.Ct. 756 , 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983)) (brackets by the court). . 1993In deciding whether to reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial, this court considers "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [asserted] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. (quoting Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), opinion amended, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 , 103 S.Ct. 756 , 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983)) (brackets by the court). [24] The judge also instructed the jury that "You may consider only the evidence in this case ... you must permit only the evidence in this case to enter in | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Slotcavage v. United States
green
2 sentences1993In deciding whether to reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial, this court considers "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [asserted] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. (quoting Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), opinion amended, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C.1982), ce rt. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 , 103 S.Ct. 756 , 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983)) (brackets by the court). . 1993In deciding whether to reverse the denial of a motion for a mistrial, this court considers "the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the [asserted] error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error." Id. (quoting Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 634 (D.C.1982), opinion amended, 452 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 , 103 S.Ct. 756 , 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983)) (brackets by the court). [24] The judge also instructed the jury that "You may consider only the evidence in this case ... you must permit only the evidence in this case to enter in | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Durant v. United States
green
1 sentence2021This conclusion matches the § 23-110 testimony offered by Dr. Penrod, who stated that lay people “disagree amongst themselves about the effects of these factors on identification accuracy.” We are convinced that a satisfactory understanding of the eyewitness testimony reliability factors “require[s] information beyond that ordinarily attributable to the average juror.” Durant v. United States, 551 A.2d 1318 , 1328 n.12 (D.C. 1988) (quoting J. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Wainwright v. Greenfield green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Scott v. United States green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Mercer v. United States green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| United States v. Young green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Ware v. United States green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Johnson v. United States green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Bliss v. United States green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Bennett v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Griggs v. Duke Power Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Thomas v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Berger v. United States green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Villacres v. United States green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Kenneth Jones v. United States of America, Willis Campbell, Jr. v. United States green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| United States v. Clinton L. Phillips green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| United States v. William E. Hawkins, United States of America v. Henry H. Jones, Jr. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| United States v. Wilbur Jones green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.