effects test in Illinois

2019The effects test “determines the number of accidents or occurrences by looking at the effect an event had, i.e., how many individual claims or injuries resulted from it.” Nicor, 223 Ill. 2d at 418 .

2019The effects test “determines the number of accidents or occurrences by looking at the effect an event had, i.e., how many individual claims or injuries resulted from it.” Nicor, 223 Ill. 2d at 418 .

2001This court in Lanier noted that section 10b(1) of the Consumer Fraud Act provides that the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to "`[a]ctions or transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the United States.'" Lanier, 114 Ill.2d at 17 , 101 Ill.Dec. 852 , 499 N.E.2d 440 , quoting Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 121½, par. 270b(1) (now 815 ILCS 505/10b(1) (West 2000)).

2001This court in Lanier noted that section 10b(l) of the Consumer Fraud Act provides that the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to “ ‘[a]ctions or transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the United States.’ ” Lanier, 114 Ill. 2d at 17 , quoting Ill.

2026Second, an error is structural where “the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure.” Id.

2026Significantly, “a defendant cannot transform a ‘failure to appear’ pursuant to subsection (b) of the speedy trial statute into a ‘delay occasioned by defendant’ outlined in subsection (f) and avoid the effects of waiver, simply by providing an explanation for her absence at a later court date.” Id.

2012Morr-Fitz, 371 Ill.

2011Remarks that inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury constitute reversible error, and it is "within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether arguments are inflammatory because it has the superior opportunity to observe the impact of the remarks on the jury." Fintak v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 51 Ill.App.3d 191, 197 , 9 Ill.Dec. 223 , 366 N.E.2d 480 (1977). ¶ 108 The trial court was in the best position to judge the effects of defense counsel's comments, and it found that, while each of defense counsel's improper statements alone may be insufficient to merit a new

2011Remarks that inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury constitute reversible error, and it is "within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether arguments are inflammatory because it has the superior opportunity to observe the impact of the remarks on the jury." Fintak v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 51 Ill.App.3d 191, 197 , 9 Ill.Dec. 223 , 366 N.E.2d 480 (1977). ¶ 108 The trial court was in the best position to judge the effects of defense counsel's comments, and it found that, while each of defense counsel's improper statements alone may be insufficient to merit a new

1982A suit is against the State if “the State will be directly and adversely affected by the judgment or decree * * (Hudgens v. Dean (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 353, 357 , 388 N.E.2d 1242 .) The court concluded that the suit in question was barred by sovereign immunity because it would require “the spending of state funds * * (Hudgens v. Dean (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 353, 357 ; see also Land v. Dollar (1947), 330 U.S. 731, 738 , 91 L.

1982A suit is against the State if “the State will be directly and adversely affected by the judgment or decree * * (Hudgens v. Dean (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 353, 357 , 388 N.E.2d 1242 .) The court concluded that the suit in question was barred by sovereign immunity because it would require “the spending of state funds * * (Hudgens v. Dean (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 353, 357 ; see also Land v. Dollar (1947), 330 U.S. 731, 738 , 91 L.

1976(Dombrow v. Dombrow, 401 Ill. 324 , 82 N.E.2d 47 ; Jones v. Robley, 402 Ill. 302 , 83 N.E.2d 570 ; Sawyer v. Creighton, 403 Ill. 364 , 86 N.E.2d 242 .) The Dombrow court then proceeded to discuss the effects of such presumption: “This presumption is not conclusive but may be rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the dominant party has exercised good faith and has not betrayed the confidence reposed in him.

1976(Dombrow v. Dombrow, 401 Ill. 324 , 82 N.E.2d 47 ; Jones v. Robley, 402 Ill. 302 , 83 N.E.2d 570 ; Sawyer v. Creighton, 403 Ill. 364 , 86 N.E.2d 242 .) The Dombrow court then proceeded to discuss the effects of such presumption: “This presumption is not conclusive but may be rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the dominant party has exercised good faith and has not betrayed the confidence reposed in him.

1976(Dombrow v. Dombrow, 401 Ill. 324 , 82 N.E.2d 47 ; Jones v. Robley, 402 Ill. 302 , 83 N.E.2d 570 ; Sawyer v. Creighton, 403 Ill. 364 , 86 N.E.2d 242 .) The Dombrow court then proceeded to discuss the effects of such presumption: “This presumption is not conclusive but may be rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the dominant party has exercised good faith and has not betrayed the confidence reposed in him.

1976(Dombrow v. Dombrow, 401 Ill. 324 , 82 N.E.2d 47 ; Jones v. Robley, 402 Ill. 302 , 83 N.E.2d 570 ; Sawyer v. Creighton, 403 Ill. 364 , 86 N.E.2d 242 .) The Dombrow court then proceeded to discuss the effects of such presumption: “This presumption is not conclusive but may be rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the dominant party has exercised good faith and has not betrayed the confidence reposed in him.

1976(Dombrow v. Dombrow, 401 Ill. 324 , 82 N.E.2d 47 ; Jones v. Robley, 402 Ill. 302 , 83 N.E.2d 570 ; Sawyer v. Creighton, 403 Ill. 364 , 86 N.E.2d 242 .) The Dombrow court then proceeded to discuss the effects of such presumption: “This presumption is not conclusive but may be rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the dominant party has exercised good faith and has not betrayed the confidence reposed in him.

1976(Dombrow v. Dombrow, 401 Ill. 324 , 82 N.E.2d 47 ; Jones v. Robley, 402 Ill. 302 , 83 N.E.2d 570 ; Sawyer v. Creighton, 403 Ill. 364 , 86 N.E.2d 242 .) The Dombrow court then proceeded to discuss the effects of such presumption: “This presumption is not conclusive but may be rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the dominant party has exercised good faith and has not betrayed the confidence reposed in him.

1969In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238, 242 , the United States Supreme Court stated, “It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” By analogy the same standard may be applied to determine whether or not a jury waiver was understandingly and intelligently made.