12 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2026Structural errors ‘defy analysis by “harmless-error” standards,’ [Arizona v.] Fulminante, [ 499 U.S. 219 ], 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , for three reasons: (1) “the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,’” Weaver [v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 ],295, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , (2) “the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure,” id., and (3) “the error always results in fundamental unfairness,” id. at 296 . 2026Structural errors ‘defy analysis by “harmless-error” standards,’ [Arizona v.] Fulminante, [ 499 U.S. 219 ], 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , for three reasons: (1) “the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,’” Weaver [v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 ],295, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , (2) “the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure,” id., and (3) “the error always results in fundamental unfairness,” id. at 296 . | 1 | 4 |
McCoy v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2025No. 23AP-582 43 {¶ 110} In McCoy the Supreme Court recognized that, while decisions regarding trial management remain the lawyer’s province, the accused has the ultimate authority to decide “whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal.” McCoy, 584 U.S. at 422. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2026Structural errors ‘defy analysis by “harmless-error” standards,’ [Arizona v.] Fulminante, [ 499 U.S. 219 ], 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , for three reasons: (1) “the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,’” Weaver [v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 ],295, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , (2) “the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure,” id., and (3) “the error always results in fundamental unfairness,” id. at 296 . 2022Structural errors “defy analysis by ‘harmless- error’ standards,” Fulminante at 309 , for three reasons: (1) “the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest,” Weaver at 1908 , (2) “the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure,” id., and (3) “the error always results in fundamental unfairness,” id. | 3 | 2017–2026 |
Calder v. Jones
green
2 sentences2019The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the effects test from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 , 104 S.Ct. 1482 , 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984). 2019The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the effects test from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 , 104 S.Ct. 1482 , 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984). | 2 | 2010–2019 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences2002Defendant cites State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 , which reaffirmed “ ‘the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 , 44 O.O.2d 132 , 239 N.E.2d 65 . 2002Defendant cites State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 , which reaffirmed “ ‘the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 , 44 O.O.2d 132 , 239 N.E.2d 65 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Post
green
2 sentences2002Defendant cites State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 , which reaffirmed “ ‘the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 , 44 O.O.2d 132 , 239 N.E.2d 65 . 2002Defendant cites State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 , which reaffirmed “ ‘the usual presumption that in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151 , 44 O.O.2d 132 , 239 N.E.2d 65 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
McKaskle v. Wiggins
green
1 sentence2025The court also explained an error may be structural “if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure,” such as when a defendant is denied the right to select his or her own attorney, and if “the error always results in fundamental unfairness,” such as when a trial “judge fails to give a reasonable-doubt instruction.” Id. at 295-96 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2022Id., citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). {¶ 28} The Supreme Court has deemed a constitutional error structural when the effects of the error are too difficult to measure. 2022Id., citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). {¶ 28} The Supreme Court has deemed a constitutional error structural when the effects of the error are too difficult to measure. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. v. Dingle-Clark Co.
green
1 sentence1963Such wrongdoers actually are not joint tortfeasors, and the right of recovery is the right to indemnity, and not contribution.” In Insurance Co. v. Dingle-Clark Co., 142 Ohio St., 346 , 52 N. E. (2d), 340, the Supreme Court in the first paragraph of the syllabus states the general rule of law as follows: “1. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.