10 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adrian Durden v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2024See Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (“A party’s failure to object to an alleged error at trial results in waiver.”); Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. 2011). (“[A] defendant may not argue one ground for an objection to the admission of evidence at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal.”). [20] Sincere attempts to avoid the effects of his waiver by claiming fundamental error. 2 Because we conclude that admission of Detective Hart’s testimony was harmless, we need not consider Sincere’s alternative argument that the testimony amounted to impermissible vouching test | 1 | 1 |
Konopasek v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (“A party’s failure to object to an alleged error at trial results in waiver.”); Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. 2011). (“[A] defendant may not argue one ground for an objection to the admission of evidence at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal.”). [20] Sincere attempts to avoid the effects of his waiver by claiming fundamental error. 2 Because we conclude that admission of Detective Hart’s testimony was harmless, we need not consider Sincere’s alternative argument that the testimony amounted to impermissible vouching test | 1 | 1 |
Delarosa v. Stategreen1 sentence2024“The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Delarosa v. State, 938 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-783 | January 24, 2024 Page 23 of 33 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)). | 1 | 1 |
William T. Phillips, Jr. v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2024Phillips v. State, 719 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 1999). [40] The only way for Konkle to avoid the effects his waiver would be to establish that fundamental error occurred. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Perezgreen1 sentence2023Rather, a trial court’s evaluation of potential juror bias is entitled to “the highest degree of respect[.]” Id. at 511 ; see Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195, 208 (Ind. 2011) (determining the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in granting a mistrial due to defense misconduct during closing argument although “another trial judge might have employed another method to reduce the effects of defense counsel’s comments”), cert. denied. [31] Nearly 200 years ago, the United States Supreme Court articulated the standard we still apply to a mistrial granted over the defendant’s objection: courts m | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Huntergreen1 sentence2023Although the defendant’s “right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal” is valued, in some instances it must “be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.” Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). | 1 | 1 |
Nathan Brock v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2023Rather, a trial court’s evaluation of potential juror bias is entitled to “the highest degree of respect[.]” Id. at 511 ; see Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195, 208 (Ind. 2011) (determining the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in granting a mistrial due to defense misconduct during closing argument although “another trial judge might have employed another method to reduce the effects of defense counsel’s comments”), cert. denied. [31] Nearly 200 years ago, the United States Supreme Court articulated the standard we still apply to a mistrial granted over the defendant’s objection: courts m | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2018“The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 479 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
Jewell v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Scarbrough does not attempt to avoid the effects of his waiver by claiming that the admission amounted to fundamental error, which is “a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Booher v. Stategreen1 sentence2018A failure to object may avoid default if the misconduct at issue constitutes fundamental error, meaning it must “‘make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process [and] present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A05-1711-CR-2702 | August 27, 2018 Page 4 of 10 2002) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). | 1 | 1 |
Benson v. Stategreen1 sentence2018A failure to object may avoid default if the misconduct at issue constitutes fundamental error, meaning it must “‘make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process [and] present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ind. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A05-1711-CR-2702 | August 27, 2018 Page 4 of 10 2002) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Stategreen1 sentence2017The error claimed must either “make a fair trial impossible” or constitute “clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Robertson attempts to avoid the effects of his waiver by arguing that the admission of the testimony amounts to fundamental error. [19] The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A04-1705-CR-1153 | December 27, 2017 Page 11 of 14 fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 200 | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Robertson attempts to avoid the effects of his waiver by arguing that the admission of the testimony amounts to fundamental error. [19] The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 53A04-1705-CR-1153 | December 27, 2017 Page 11 of 14 fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 200 2017The error claimed must either “make a fair trial impossible” or constitute “clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Hopkins v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Fundamental error is “error so egregious that reversal of a criminal conviction is required even if no objection to the error is registered at trial.” Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Washington
green
1 sentence2023Rather, a trial court’s evaluation of potential juror bias is entitled to “the highest degree of respect[.]” Id. at 511 ; see Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195, 208 (Ind. 2011) (determining the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in granting a mistrial due to defense misconduct during closing argument although “another trial judge might have employed another method to reduce the effects of defense counsel’s comments”), cert. denied. [31] Nearly 200 years ago, the United States Supreme Court articulated the standard we still apply to a mistrial granted over the defendant’s objection: courts m | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Alexander K. Jerden v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2018Jerden v. State, 37 N.E.3d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). [7] Bays acknowledges that he did not object to any of the alleged misconduct of which he now complains but attempts to avoid the effects of his waiver by claiming that fundamental error occurred. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Parke County v. Ropak, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013Just as we observed in Ropak that “a defendant cannot shield himself from liability under the ITCA by characterizing his action as something it is not,” id. at 738 , so too a 15 plaintiff cannot shield himself from the effects of immunity by characterizing his claim as something it is not. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel
green
2 sentences1980It has long been the rule in this state that “Where a standard of duty is fixed, and its measure defined by law, the omission of that duty is negligence per se,” Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 600 , 106 N.E. 365, 368 , when the duty was owed to the person injured through the violation thereof. 1980It has long been the rule in this state that “Where a standard of duty is fixed, and its measure defined by law, the omission of that duty is negligence per se,” Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 600 , 106 N.E. 365, 368 , when the duty was owed to the person injured through the violation thereof. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.